

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHYI.—THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWING AND
ITS OBJECT. (I.)

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Is knowing "construction" or "fin'ing"? In what sense, if any, is the object of knowledge dependent on our knowing it? Is reality a truly coherent system or a mere aggregate of externally related elements? The solution of these vitally important philosophical questions presupposes among other things a careful consideration of the question of relations in general and especially of the relation between knowing and object known, the cognitive relation; hence the importance of the question whether this relation is "external" or "internal". My primary purpose in this article is to deal with the current argument that the cognitive relation must be "external" since otherwise the act of knowing would change its object and would therefore not be *knowing* at all but inventing or erroneously supposing. The difficulty is not merely a handy weapon against "Absolutism" but is of importance for any account of knowledge that philosophy can give. It has been contended on the one side that the object of knowledge must be absolutely independent of our knowing it, since otherwise knowing would vitiate itself by changing its object; it has been contended on the other side that, since the object of knowledge cannot be absolutely independent of our knowing it, knowing must "construct" or at any rate remould its object. The one contention has been made a principal foundation of far-reaching theories of external relations, intended to form a logical and epistemological basis for Realism, the other has been used as an irrefutable argument for a still more far-reaching Idealism.

Now there is a presupposition which seems to be often—

I do not, of course, say always—made by both sides in the controversy. This presupposition is that, if the relation between knowing and its object is not “external,” it follows that in knowing we construct or at least change the object known. The one side says that the relation must be external since knowing cannot construct or transform its object, the other side says that, since the relation cannot be external, knowing must construct or transform its object. Both generally hold that, if the relation in question is “internal” or makes a difference to its terms, the object known must be changed by being known. It is this view that I intend to question, but I must first clear the path by further definition of the terms “internal” and “external” as applied to relations.

It is an unfortunate fact that these terms, like most others which have been the subject of philosophical controversy, have come to be used in several different senses. In the first place, an “internal” relation is often treated as being a relation that makes a difference to its terms, one such that if either related term were different in a way affecting the relation the other would likewise be different. Now it seems quite impossible to hold that no relations are internal in this sense. Such a view would involve the bare-faced denial of all causality, it would involve the conclusion that, *e.g.*, my experience is not in the least affected by my relation to my friends, or that the spatial relation of an object to a fire has no share in determining the temperature of that object. But it does not necessarily follow that *no* relations are external in the sense described, and the cognitive relation might be one of those, if any, that are external. Now at first sight it seems that the cognitive relation must make a difference to one of its terms, namely the experience of knowing, for it would seem that, if I know something, my psychological state at the moment of knowing it must be different from what it would be if I did not know it; but at first sight it seems also that the relation does not, at any rate usually, make a difference to the object known, that the object I know would usually have been quite the same if it had not been known by me. That is, apparently, what is meant by most of those who maintain that the cognitive relation is external. According to them it is implied in the nature of knowing that the object is not in the least affected by being known. I suppose they must admit that, when an object comes to be known, it acquires the new relational property of being known, but they would say that this new relational property is no part of the nature of the

object known and has no influence whatever on the other properties of the object. Conversely those who maintain that the cognitive relation is internal mean primarily that the object would have been different if it had not come to be known: at least that is the minimum they must maintain if they are to say that the relation is internal. They may and often do assert more, but this at least they must assert, if they are not to identify themselves with the cause of their opponents. This is the main question at issue when it is asked whether the cognitive relation is internal or external:—Would the object have been different if I had not come to know it? One side asserts that it is implied in the nature of knowledge that the object would not have been different, the other that it is implied in the nature of relations, or of knowledge, or of both, that it would have been different. This is the issue with which I am mainly concerned in the present article, and I shall therefore practically ignore the other senses of the terms "internal" and "external" after just mentioning them.

There is a second very important sense of the phrase "internal relations" in which it is specially associated with the "Absolutist" school and the coherence view of truth. In this sense it means not only that the relation makes a difference, but that the difference is logically necessary, that the terms related are so interconnected that either taken by itself implies the other, or is incoherent and self-contradictory without the other. We might define "internal relation" in this sense as meaning "a relation such that from one related term the other term follows logically or *a priori*." The question whether all relations are internal in the sense defined is one of considerable importance and interest. The view that all relations are internal in this sense certainly seems to be involved in the coherence theory of truth and is one of the chief points in that theory to which exception has been taken. The view involves the assertion that all relations are internal in the first sense, *i.e.*, that they make a difference to their terms, or that the terms related would always have been different if it had not been for the relation, but it goes further and demands that the difference made, and ultimately everything else in the universe, should be, theoretically speaking, deducible *a priori* from one related term. For on that view everything must be deducible from anything. This differs from the view that all relations are internal in the first sense because it may be and is often held that the difference made by a relation, though a real fact, is not logically necessary and could not be deduced *a priori* by

any possible intelligence, even omniscience itself. (That it generally cannot *by us* be deduced *a priori* is universally admitted, but it may be asserted also that it is on principle not deducible by any mind.) If it is asserted that the difference is not only a fact but is always deducible *a priori* from one related term, or at any rate from the relation¹ and one related term, then it is being maintained that relations are internal in a second sense distinct from but including the first. That the cognitive relation is internal in this second sense also I am not trying to prove, but the advocates of the second view have nevertheless good reason to be interested in the issue which is being discussed, since, unless the cognitive relation is internal in the first sense, it cannot *a fortiori* be internal in the second.

There are two more senses of "internal relation" which I must mention in order to guard against confusion. "Internal relation" might be interpreted as meaning "a relation essential to its terms". It is possible that one of the causes which has hindered the wider acceptance of the coherence view has been the erroneous supposition that an advocate of this view was bound to maintain that all relations were essential to their terms, a proposition which, when applied to the relation between any particular human being and a small meteor fifty million miles away or a mammoth in the Ice Age, seemed absurd. But the assertion that of two related terms one is always ultimately deducible from the other is not equivalent to the assertion that all relations are essential or even important for their terms. And still less does the assertion that the terms always are different from what they would be if it had not been for the relation imply that all relations are essential to the related terms. Again "internal relation" may be interpreted as meaning a relation that falls within, and "external relation" as meaning a relation that falls outside of, the nature of the related terms. But this sense of "internal" and "external," though perhaps etymologically the most appropriate, is not the sense at issue here. The question at issue is whether the object known must be different from what it would have been if it had not been known, *i.e.*, whether the cognitive relation is internal or external in the first sense of these words.

But if "internal" and "external" cannot pass without a scrutiny, "cognitive relation" will certainly be challenged at once. I must say, however, that I have no qualms about

¹ This phraseology must not be taken to imply that the relation is a separate entity beside the related terms.

calling it a relation. It seems to me that either the act (or experience) of knowing and the object known are completely and literally identical, or they are different facts, and if different they must be related. There is no third alternative, for surely no one would maintain that knowing and the object known were both different and totally unrelated? Can knowing and its object then be treated as identical, as the same fact, and not as different but related facts? Can we hold my knowing that the battle of Hastings was fought in 1066 and the fact that the battle was fought in 1066 to be one and the same fact? Can we hold that there is not the very least difference between them? Can we hold that they are indistinguishable and identical both qualitatively and numerically? Can we hold that they are completely the same in existence, quality and temporal position? I think, even philosophers must confess themselves quite incapable of that feat of faith, but if what is known and the knowing of it are not one and the same fact, they must be different and related. They are two inseparable aspects of the same thing, you may reply; but if so surely you grant my point? For what is this but to say that, although themselves not identical numerically and qualitatively, they are related in a peculiarly close and intimate way? More than this we cannot say, since something in the present, *i.e.*, my knowing, cannot be numerically and absolutely identical with something in the past or future, or a universal law, or a mathematical equation. These are known by me and yet not identical with my knowing them, and therefore they must be related to, though different from, my act or experience of knowing. Distinction between relations and terms may be a very inadequate way of dealing with the concrete continuum, but we seem to have at least as much justification for applying the distinction here as we have in the case of other relations. All relations may be "phenomenal," but at any rate anyone would admit that propositions involving relations may be at least phenomenally and partially true. So why should we not use the term, "cognitive relation" to express the way in which an act or experience of knowing and the object thereby known are related, as long as we do not make any unfounded assumptions about the nature of this relation and do not rule out the possibility that we may find it to be analysable into two or more relations?

"Act of knowing" is a rather more questionable term, and it would perhaps be wise to substitute for it simply "knowing" or "cognition," in order to satisfy, if possible, both those

who recognise a specific cognitive act and those who do not. I mean by "knowing" or "cognition" just the psychological fact that a particular mind comes to know such and such a truth. A feeling of belief, or any sort of sensation or combination of sensations which might be used to take the place of the cognitive act, would still be covered by the term "cognition". All I am insisting on is that knowledge as a psychological fact is not identical with the fact or object known but must be related to it, and any view which admits this separation in any case of knowledge will be concerned in the question of their relation. Unless my cognition and its object are either literally and completely the same fact or different and totally unrelated, there is this antinomy to face:—Thesis. The relation between cognition and the object cognised must be internal, for otherwise it would not relate. Antithesis. It cannot be internal, for, if it were, cognition would change the object and so never give us truth about the object.¹ With the thesis we are not here concerned. The antithesis depends on two points: (1) that, if the cognitive relation is internal, it changes its object, (2) that, if cognition, or knowing, changes its object, we can know no truth about the object.

To take the second point first, I am doubtful myself whether the assumption that cognition always changed the object cognised would invalidate all knowledge. I am not even sure that, if cognition changed its object, it would follow that we could not know the object as it was before being changed by our cognition of it or our knowing it. For no change caused by our knowing it could take place till its cause had first occurred, *i.e.* till we had at least begun to know it. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we could only know the object as changed by our knowing it. Would not this knowledge still be real knowledge, for, if knowing did change the object, the object really would be changed? In that case we might be unable to know the object as it was before being known, but it might still be possible to know it as it was after being changed by our knowing it, and therefore we should still know some truth about the object.² We might

¹ The antinomy is, needless to say, not removed by merely denying the existence of an independent physical world, for it would still arise with knowledge of other people, of one's own past, of mathematical truths, of universal laws.

² To say that, if knowing changes its object, we can only know it as changed by knowing, seems, however, dangerously like saying that an effect can change its own cause. But perhaps this objection might be avoided by making knowing a process, and saying that the first part of the knowing process affects the object and that the object as changed affects the latter part of the knowing process in turn.

indeed be wrong, (a) in supposing that it was the same before we knew it, (b) in not including among the causes by which we accounted for its present state the fact that we had come to know it. But this error would not prevent us knowing that the object really had the qualities in question, either after our knowing it or when we knew it, even if we were totally unable to find out how it would differ if we had never known it.¹

If we mean by the object of cognition or knowledge the truth known, we cannot indeed say that knowing changes its object, for in that case its object is timeless and so not liable to change. The truth that there was a general election in Great Britain in October, 1924, or even for that matter the most trivial truth, say, that I had tea at a certain time on a certain day, if true at all, cannot be changed. If it is ever true that anything was at a certain time in a certain state, it will always remain true that it was in that state *at that time*, however much it may change afterwards. Even the more indefinite truth that it was "sometime" in a certain state cannot be changed if true, because in that case it was in that state once and, however much it changes afterwards, it will still have been in that state once. If this were not so, the proposition, *e.g.*, that the earth was once a molten mass, could be refuted by showing that the earth was not now molten. But knowing might still change the object² of which we know a state or about which we know a fact, so that either (a) the fact that we know might be partially produced (made a fact) by our knowing it, or (b) some other quality or state might, just because of our knowing, take the place of the quality or state known by us, with the result that the judgment we rightly make about the latter would be false if it had reference to a time after our knowing it.

¹ It may be objected that, if I cannot know anything, A, because in knowing (or trying to know ?) it I should change it to A1, I cannot know A1 either, because in knowing it I should change it to A2, and so on *ad infinitum*. But this objection seems to presuppose that knowing A1 would be a separate act from knowing A, which it *ex hypothesi* would not be. The change due to cognition has already been expressed by saying that A is changed to A1, and we have no reason to introduce a second change for the same act of knowing. If knowing is a process it must stop when the object has reached a definite state, A1, and cannot go on *ad infinitum*; if knowing is not a process but instantaneous, no change in the object due to knowing it could take place till we had known the object, and therefore the change would not prevent us knowing the object.

² The object of knowledge is, strictly speaking, only what is actually known, but the term "object" may also be used to mean a whole, or substance, of which I know some qualities but not all, and which changes in time (*v.* usual sense of physical object).

There are cases in which a cognition or a practically certain belief does admittedly change its object in one or both of these senses. My cognition that the room is cold may undoubtedly be an important cause in changing the temperature of the room, yet nobody supposes that the fact that I can and will make the room warm renders it untrue to say that the room is cold. In this case the object cognised is cognised as it is before being changed by my cognising it. But I may also know, or believe with practical certainty, that the room will be warmed (by lighting the fire). Yet an essential cause of the occurrence of the object of belief is my belief that it will occur, for I should not light the fire if I did not believe that the room would be warmed thereby. So there are cases where our cognition, or practically certain belief, may be said to change the object of knowledge or belief in both of the senses above given. And yet in these cases we know the latter either as it was before the change, or as it will be after the change, or both. In fact this seems to be the case with all rational and successful practical action. To act rationally and successfully we must both (*a*) know the state of affairs we wish to change, at least sufficiently to see that the change is desirable, (*b*) believe that our action will or (at any rate) may effect this change, and our knowledge of or belief in both (*a*) and (*b*) are essential causes of the change we effect. The most that can be said is that the change in these cases is indirectly, not directly, due to our cognition, but even this would be difficult to maintain in the case of introspection. The chief difficulty of introspection is that there cognition is liable to change the object cognised. But it is a difficulty not because it would prevent us knowing *anything* about the object but because it would result in our knowing something different from what we want to know, *e.g.*, a self-conscious instead of a natural emotional state. So it seems to me, on the one hand, that, if we mean by the object of knowledge the truth known, it is impossible to maintain that this, if really true, can ever be changed by our knowing it, but, on the other hand, that, if we mean the object about which we know a truth, this may be and sometimes is changed by our knowing it. It does not seem right to maintain that it is implied in the very nature of knowledge that the fact cognised cannot be either partially produced or changed by our cognition of it.

But the view that knowing always changes its object, whether inconsistent with the possibility of knowledge or not, leads to some paradoxes of a very remarkable order. Can it be the case that every schoolboy who learns about the battle

of Hastings thereby helps to make or change the battle? Can it be the case that every philosophy student helps to make or change the law of non-contradiction by coming to know it? In general, can we be said to produce (make) or change universal laws valid for all time, or events which happened long before we were born? Further, if knowing always changes, or in some way even makes, the fact which is known, can anybody ever know what anything was like before he as individual knew it, can he, *e.g.*, know that any other particular human being existed before he knew him? These questions are sufficient instances of the difficulties that would follow from the view that knowing always produces or changes the fact known, and in face of these difficulties it is well worth while considering whether this view is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that the object known is different from what it would be apart from the cognitive relation involved in any particular cognition of it.

It is said that, if the cognitive relation is internal in this sense, it must make a difference to and therefore change its object. One line of reply to this objection is obvious. It may be said that the question—Does knowing change its object?—presupposes that the object existed before being known, and that this presupposition is indefensible. It may be urged that knowing, though it makes a difference to objects, does not change them, because they never existed in a universe in which they were not known. We can only know facts, it may be said, as they are in a world in which knowledge of them is actual; to ask what they would be like in a world in which knowledge of them was not actual would be a futile, if not a meaningless, question. That they would be different if not known, it may be said, does not matter in the least because they in fact are known.

This answer might possibly be sufficient if this were a timeless world in which anything that was ever known was always known, but in the world in which we live we come to know what was not known before by us. Even if it be the case that nothing can exist without being known by some mind, at least the individual comes to know what he as an individual did not know before. Thus it may still be argued that, if the cognitive relation makes a difference to the object known or is such a relation that the object known must be different from what it would be apart from the relation, it follows that every fresh person who knows, *e.g.*, the battle of Hastings or the law of non-contradiction, thereby changes, or even helps to make, either. The idealist may maintain that nothing can exist or be true before it is known, but he can

hardly maintain that nothing which he comes to know could have existed or been true before he as an individual knew it. If physical objects do not exist apart from being known or experienced by particular minds (as the idealist may hold), yet at least a man comes to know facts about the experience of other human beings, or general laws, or causal relations, which he did not know before. So this attempt at a solution seems to break down. Even the idealist must maintain that other human beings existed before he knew anything about them, and that he sometimes comes to know what occurred or what was true long before he knew it. But, if that is so, how could he change or make these past facts by knowing them in the present? He may, indeed, say that what we know is made not by our mind but by Mind with a capital M, but, even if he does so, he must still admit that our knowing as a phenomenon does not make the object known. For, whether our finite knowing is more than a phenomenon or not, it is at least a phenomenon. It is an empirical fact that I sometimes know what existed or occurred before I knew it. If any empirical fact is certain, that seems to be certain, and therefore we have an instance of knowing in which it is at least extremely difficult to say that knowing changed or made its object. The knowing of an Absolute Mind may change or make its object, but you cannot say that our knowing does, unless you are prepared to admit that the present may change or make the past, or change or make universal laws, an admission which is at least difficult. I am not objecting in any way to the introduction of an Absolute Mind, what I am contending is only that it does not solve this particular problem by itself. If the idealist conceives Absolute Knowing as only immanent, only realised in our finite knowing, he is accepting the paradox that in knowing anything I always mould the object of my cognition; if he conceives Absolute Knowing as something transcendent, not exhausted by finite knowing, he does not deal with the difficulty as regards finite knowing. If he means that all knowing as such changes or constructs its object, he is involved in the difficulties that we have seen; if he means that only Absolute Knowing does, the question as to our finite knowing is still open for discussion. In either case it is worth while inquiring into the question whether we are bound to conclude from the nature of the cognitive relation that knowing changes its object.

But I think it is still possible to make quite a simple reply to the objector who urges that the theory of internal relations implies that knowing changes the object known, and to do this without either definitely accepting or abandoning ordinary

realism. For the sake of the argument I shall provisionally assume that my knowing is so related to its object that the latter must be different from what it would have been if I had not known it, *i.e.*, that the object and experience of knowing are internally related in the first sense of "internal". The question is whether, if this is assumed, it necessarily follows that knowing changes its object. A complication arises, because, as we have seen, the phrase "changes its object" is ambiguous, but I think that the following considerations will apply to any of the interpretations of the phrase that I have mentioned above, that they will apply whether by the object of knowledge is meant the object about which we know something or the truth known. The chief sting of the objection may be discovered by asking—what is the proper meaning of "change"? Now the verb, to change, ordinarily means "cause a change in," and it seems to me, on the one hand, that the special difficulty only occurs if "change" is interpreted in this sense, and, on the other hand, that the conclusion that knowing changes its object in this sense does not follow from the doctrine of internal relations at all. It only follows that knowing changes its object in a very loose sense of "change".

The main difficulties which we feel in the view that knowing changes its object and which are urged by realists are reducible to three heads. In the first place, it seems impossible for a present act of knowing to change the past, or to change a universal law or mathematical truth, etc. Secondly, if my act of knowing changes its object it is difficult to see how I could know what anything was before I knew it.¹ Thirdly, to say that knowing changes its object seems to imply that knowing is a process of construction exercised on the object known (not only on our ideas of it), and this seems to many philosophers incompatible with the nature of knowledge. It seems to them that knowledge can only reveal what is there already before being known, and that, in so far as we construct what we are said to know, by our cognition of it, we are simply not "knowing" it. Now all these difficulties seem to me not to arise unless by "change" is tacitly understood "cause a change in". It does seem absurd to suppose that my knowing should change the past or a universal law, because what happens now cannot be the cause of any change in the past or in an unchangeable law. But,

¹ It is difficult to express this unambiguously. For, if "before I knew it" is taken with "could know," it leads to an obvious contradiction. But, because I cannot know that S is P without knowing it, it does not follow that I cannot know the truth that "S, before I knew it, was P".

if it could be the case that the object known was different from what it would be if I had not known it but yet that my knowing it did not cause a change in it, this particular absurdity would disappear. Again, the second difficulty arises because it is supposed that, if it is the case that the object would be different apart from being known, it follows that we by knowing it cause it to be different from what it was before and so cannot know what it was before. And, thirdly, our knowing can only be said to construct its object if it causes its object's existence or at least causes changes in its object. These points should be made clearer by what follows.

Now is it the case that, whenever there is a relation between A and B such that, if A were different in respect of the relation, B would be different, A may always be said to change B? Surely not? If A is the effect of B, there is a relation of the kind described between A and B. Since a cause could not have occurred without its effect following, it must be true that the cause would have been different if the effect had not occurred. Yet the effect, A, certainly cannot be said to cause a change in the cause, B. The effect does not change its cause. Again, if either or both the terms are universals, the relation may be of the kind described, and yet the one cannot be said to change (cause a change in) the other. A particular instance does not cause a change in the universal truth of which it is an instance. Yet it is certainly the case that, *e.g.*, the universal truth that $2 + 2 = 4$ could not be true in its present form if $2 + 2 = 5$ were true of any particular instance, and consequently that, if the particular were different, the universal truth would also be different. Two different universal truths may also be so related that neither could be different without the other being different. This must occur whenever two universal propositions imply each other. So it *may* be the case that the cognitive relation is likewise of such a character that both terms are different from what they would be in its absence and yet that knowing does not change its object (cause a change in its object). But let us look more closely.

1. Suppose the object of cognition is in the past. In that case my knowing cannot be the cause of a change in the object known, since a present event cannot cause changes in the past. But it might still be the case that the object of cognition would have been different if I had not known it. Perhaps the point may be made clearer by an illustration. Suppose a man had died through his head being cut off. In

that case it would certainly be true that, if the man had not died, it could not be a fact that his head had been cut off, *i.e.*, that, if the effect had been different in a certain way, the cause would have been different also. But would it be right to conclude from this that the man had cut off his own head, or that by dying he had caused a change in the preceding stroke of the axe which led to his death? Certainly not, no jury would on that ground bring in a verdict of suicide. But, if so, have we any more right to say that, if the fact I know and my knowing it are internally related so that the fact would have been different if I had not known it, it therefore follows that my knowing changes—causes a change in—the fact known, or even, as is sometimes argued, that it in some way constructs or gives rise to the fact known? Just as we can say that, if so-and-so had not happened, another earlier event could likewise not have happened, without implying that the later event caused a change in the earlier one, so we *might* be able to say in the case of cognition that, if I had not known it, the past event would have been in some respect different. I am not trying to prove here that we always are justified in saying this, only to remove an objection against the view in question.

We are, however, on any view faced with the difficulty that a past fact can be changed in the sense of acquiring a new relational property, *e.g.*, being known by me, but this paradox is not peculiar to cognition. It holds also in regard to other relations, *e.g.*, similarity, succession in time, causality. If the battle of Hastings can be said to acquire a new relational property through being known by me, it can also be said to acquire the new relational property of being succeeded by me in time or being similar to a later battle or being the ultimate cause of the writing of a treatise on itself by a twentieth-century historian. Or the value of a past event may be greatly changed by what follows, so that it acquires the new property of being "wasteful" or "advantageous". But that the past may change in this sense must be admitted by any philosopher. It does not follow that the newly acquired relational property can change (cause a change in) the original properties of the past fact, even though these might have been different if it had not been possible for the past fact to acquire the new relational property later.

2. Suppose the object of cognition to lie in the future. My experience of cognition (or practically certain belief¹)

¹ I am bound to introduce belief here, because knowledge, in the sense of absolutely certain knowledge, of the future events we help to cause is

may then, as we have seen, be a part-cause in determining the intrinsic nature of the fact known, but it *need* not be so unless we use "cause" in that strict sense in which the only true cause is the whole previous state of the universe. For the fact known may be causally related to the experience of knowing without the experience of knowing causing a change in it. If my barometer were acting differently, rising instead of falling, to-morrow's weather would be different, but it does not follow that my barometer causally determines or changes to-morrow's weather, only that it is causally related to it. A may be causally related to B without being a part-cause of B, (1) if A is the effect of B, (2) if A is an effect of a cause of B (which is the case with the barometer), (3) if A is related to B or a cause of B only by a series of intermediate causes and effects so long and indirect that it would be extremely far-fetched to speak of it as a cause or part-cause of B, although theoretically defensible. Now in cognition of the future my cognition or belief may very well be causally related to its object in the second or third of the above-mentioned senses, although it may also, as we have seen, be a more or less important part-cause of the fact believed in. But, all the same, it is no more justifiable to say that, if cognition of the future is internally related to the event cognised, it must always change or help to cause the event than to say that, because the weather can be inferred from my barometer, it is changed or partly caused by my barometer.

3. Knowledge of the present can be treated on similar lines, if it is indeed permissible to speak of knowledge of the present as something distinct in kind from knowledge of the past and future. Unless simultaneous causation is admitted, knowing clearly cannot be the cause of a *present* fact known, but in any case it may be causally related to it in other ways.

4. Knowledge of universal truths is a rather more complicated case, but for our purpose we have simply to ask what, if any, causal relations are involved in knowledge of these. I certainly do not wish to reduce knowledge to a causal relation, but, since "change" means properly "cause a change in," it is only in so far as it involves causal relations that it can possibly change the truth known. But, since a universal truth cannot be an existent, there cannot be a causal relation between it and the experience of knowing

unattainable for us. In this, as in other discussions, one is much hampered by the lack of a suitable word to cover our mental attitude in knowledge, belief, error and opinion alike.

it. It follows that I cannot rightly be said to change a universal truth by knowing it.¹ There often, possibly always, are causal relations between my experience of knowing and an instance of the universal truth known, but this is not to the point and any knowledge of the instances as existents comes under knowledge of the past. The above argument applies to all judgments which do not imply existence or qualify existents; in all such judgments what is asserted cannot stand in a causal relation to anybody's knowledge and can still less be changed by the knowledge of it. But, although nothing can cause a change in a universal truth, we have seen that there are cases in which a particular is related to the universal truth in such a way that, if the particular were different, the universal could not be what it is now, *e.g.*, the universal truth that $2 + 2 = 4$ could not hold if in any particular case $2 + 2$ were equal to 5. Conversely, if the universal truth that $2 + 2 = 4$ were not true, all instances of $2 + 2$ would be different, *i.e.*, they would not be equal to 4 but some other number. So we have cases in which a particular and a universal truth are related in the first sense of internal. That knowing a universal truth might be a case of this is left an open possibility. What seems clear is that, even if it were a case of this, it would not follow that it changed the object known.

We have seen that A may be internally related to B in the first sense of the term without A changing B. Anyone who denies this will have to maintain that the effect changes its cause or that particulars can change universal truths that are valid for all time, which seems absurd if we mean by change "cause a change in". But, if we do not mean by "change" "cause a change in," the main point of the objection to internal relations is turned. For why did the assertion that knowing changed its object seem obviously false? Because it seemed to imply that the present could cause changes in the past or in a universal truth, and because it seemed contrary to the nature of knowledge to maintain that the knowing mind caused changes in or actually constructed the object of knowledge and did not find it determined independently of being known. But, even if knowing is related to its object in such a way that the latter is different from what it would be if it were never known,

¹ As in the case of past events, we are bound to admit on any view that a universal truth may acquire certain new relational properties by being exemplified in a new instance, etc., but this does not imply that the original properties of the universal truth were changed, and the difficulty is not peculiar to cognition.

it seems now that it still does not follow that knowing changes or constructs the object any more than the effect changes or constructs its own cause or the particular instance changes or constructs the universal law which determines it. It may still be said that knowing makes a difference to its object; but "makes" must not be interpreted as "causes," and owing to this ambiguity it is perhaps better to avoid the phrase. Knowing can only make a difference to its object in the sense that the object is different from what it would be if I had not known it, and this assertion, whether true or not, does not involve the absurdities credited to the view that knowing "changes" its object. Nor would it make it impossible for us to know what anything was like before we knew it or even before it was known by anyone,¹ for it would only lead to the conclusion that, the world being what it is we could not have failed to know X unless X had been different, not to the conclusion that by knowing X we make X different from what it was before we knew it. For, although X existed before we knew it, it never existed in a world in which we were not going to know it. This reply cannot be legitimately made if we hold that knowing always changes (causes a change in) its object, for in that case X would have to be different through our knowing it from what it was before we knew it. But it can be legitimately made if we hold only that knowing "makes a difference to" its object in the sense above indicated, for in this case all we need say is that X would have been different if we had never come to know it, not that through our knowing it it becomes different from what it was before we knew it. So I think that, unless we assume that knowing could not be internally related to its object without causing changes in the object, the main argument against knowing being an internal relation loses most of its plausibility, or at least that the argument in question derives most of its plausibility from the fact that one is apt to think of "making a difference to" as meaning the same as "cause a change in". Likewise the argument, sometimes used for idealism, that knowing must be internally related to its object and must therefore be an activity by which the object known is transformed or constructed, seems to involve the same assumption. To show that cognition must change its object in the proper sense of the term "change" it seems necessary to prove not only that it is internally related² to its object but also that

¹ At least, independently of other idealistic arguments.

² Unless by "internally related" is meant falling within the original nature or *essential* to the existence of the object. I am not discussing

it must exercise a causal influence on its object, and this not only cannot be proved but seems quite impossible in most cases. At least it seems so in all cases of knowledge of the past or of universal truths, and this constitutes at any rate much the larger part of our knowledge. The present cannot "change" the past, yet the past is known by a present act of cognition which may still be internally related to it, but if so is related to it rather as its effect than its cause, as its consequent than its ground, and similarly with knowledge of universal truths. I have used the terms "knowing" or "cognition," but what I have said would no doubt apply to opinion, belief or thinking about a thing in general, as well as to knowledge in the strict sense.

I do not think the conclusion will be any different if we hold that the cognitive relation is also an internal relation in the second sense, that is, not only a relation which makes a difference to its terms but a relation such that from one term the other follows logically or *a priori*. For, if A and B may be so related that A would be different if B never were related to it and B yet not change A, there is no reason why the additional circumstance that this follows logically or *a priori* and is not merely a brute fact should force us to conclude that B must change A. If B does not cause a change in A in one case, it will not in the other. Logical ground and consequent are so related that the consequent follows logically from the ground, yet the consequent does not therefore change its ground. Two universal truths may be related in such a way that one follows logically from the other, yet one universal truth does not therefore cause a change in the other.

In all this I have not been trying to prove that knowing and its object are internally related in any sense of the term. I have only tried to reply to the main argument against the view that they are so related. If this main objection to the theory can be refuted, it will at least leave the field open for any positive arguments in favour of the doctrine that knowing involves an internal relation. In the continuation of this article in the July number I shall suggest one or two such arguments.

these senses of the doctrine, which seem to me much less defensible metaphysically (v. above, p. 140).

(To be continued.)

II.—PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

By R. G. COLLINGWOOD.

IT has been usual in recent years to regard Plato's account of art, in the tenth book of the *Republic*, not as a theory of art but as an attack on art; an attack based on a misunderstanding of its nature so complete and so unwarranted as to defy explanation, except on the hypothesis that Plato was either speaking ironically or influenced by motives which ought not to weigh with a philosopher. Something like a general agreement seems to exist among editors of Plato and writers of treatises on æsthetic, to the effect that Plato has, in this passage at least, wholly failed to grasp the nature of art, and that we should look in vain to this passage for any serious contribution to the science of æsthetic: for the whole passage, we are told, rests on the blunder of regarding the work of art as a reduplication of perceptible objects, whose value, so far as it has a value, is therefore the same in kind as the value of the objects which it reduplicates. This accusation has been so repeated and developed by one writer after another that to rebut it might seem hopeless; yet the aim of this paper is to maintain that Plato never for a moment exposes himself to it, and that the blunder lies wholly on the side of his interpreters.

For this purpose I shall begin by giving a short abstract of the passage in question (595-608), and then try to state what exactly is the view that Plato is here expounding; after which I shall briefly consider certain important passages in other works where the same subject is again treated. I do not wish to suggest that everything maintained, whether by Socrates or by any other character, in a Platonic dialogue is necessarily the view held by Plato himself; and at the outset I shall treat the thesis maintained in the *Republic* merely at its face value, as a position held by a character in a dramatic work. But the comparison of this position with relevant passages in other works will, as I hope to show, strongly suggest that the view here expressed by Socrates is Plato's own.

The passage opens with the formal statement of a thesis to be defended: namely that poetry (*ποίησις*) is an intellectual danger to everyone who is unprovided with an antidote in the shape of a knowledge of its real nature. On this it may be observed (1) that though poetry is the immediate theme of the discussion, the phrase *περὶ ποιήσεως* being the title of the *λόγος*, the sequel shows that Plato is fully aware of the substantial identity of nature which unites poetry with painting: (2) that though Plato no doubt regarded his own myths as works of art, *μῦθοι* as opposed to *λόγοι*, there is here no condemnation of the use of such myths, in so far as the mythologising philosopher understands the nature of the weapon he is using.

The thesis is now developed and defended as follows:—

1. *The Doctrine of the Three Degrees of Reality*.—Three orders or grades of objects are distinguished: first, the absolute and eternal form, wholly real and wholly intelligible: secondly, the perceptible object, copied from the form: and thirdly, the work of art, copied from the object. The form of a bed is an object of the first order, the perceptible bed made by a carpenter is an object of the second order, the picture of a bed made by a painter is an object of the third order. It is important not to confuse objects of one order with those of another; for, if we mistake those of the third order for those of the second, we fall into the mistake of supposing the artist to be skilled in all those crafts which make the objects which he depicts—the error of imagining that the epic poet understands strategy and politics, and so forth. This error, the error of supposing that the artist makes nature when in fact he only holds the mirror up to nature, arises through failing to understand that the work of art stands on a wholly different plane, belongs to a different order of being, from the objects made by the craftsman.

2. *The Doctrine of the Three Degrees of Knowledge*.—This is a consequence of (1). The value of an object of the first degree is absolute and unconditioned. The value (*ἀρετή, κάλλος, ὀρθότης*) of one of the second degree is not absolute, but relative to the need (*χρεία*) which it satisfies: hence its maker, as such, does not know why it should be made in one way rather than in another, but has to assume that the user knows what he wants, and obey orders. *A fortiori*, the value of an object of the third degree is not absolute, but is relative to the corresponding object of the second degree: therefore the artist's grasp of this value, which, like any other apprehension of an object, must be conditioned in character by the object apprehended, is a third order of knowledge related to

the second as the second to the first. Now the second, the craftsman's knowledge, is strictly not knowledge but opinion, an opinion guided by someone's knowledge, an opinion about knowledge; and therefore the artist's knowledge is opinion guided by someone's opinion, an opinion about opinion; opinion of the second degree.

3. *The Doctrine of the Emotionality of Art.*—This is a development of (2), just as (2) is a development of (1). Knowledge can justify itself by appeal to demonstration; opinion cannot demonstrate itself, but it can appeal to authority; art, as opinion about opinion, can do neither, and therefore its standard can only be the standard of immediate feeling. Our perceptions, says Socrates,—perception being quoted as an instance of opinion—are liable to error, but we can correct this error by measuring, counting and weighing, thus appealing to something other than perception to test the correctness of perception, as the bridle-maker appeals to the rider to settle the question whether his bridles are well made. The object of the second degree refers directly to an object of the first degree, and this enables us to disentangle the right opinion from the wrong. But in the case of objects of the third degree there is no such reference, and therefore no possibility of distinguishing truth from error. This distinction has, at the level of art, simply disappeared; and art therefore lies at the vanishing-point of reason. But since human nature is compounded of reason and emotion, the vanishing-point of reason coincides with the absolute rule of emotion. Art encourages and appeals to emotion as such; its ruling principle is the passions, which in a happy and well-ordered life must be controlled by reason; and hence the æsthetic experience is a psychological anarchy, an orgy of misrule.

The passage ends with an epilogue, commenting upon the argument from a personal point of view. The peculiar danger of art, says Socrates, lies in the fact that it appeals most strongly to the best men; and this is why we cannot neglect the problem, but must in our ideal state admit only that poetry in which this dangerous weapon of emotional appeal is wisely used. And if this seems severe, we are only too anxious to hear anything that can be said in mitigation of its severity; for obviously such ardent lovers of poetry as ourselves can only stand to gain by any relaxation in its favour, so long as we do not forget that our first duty and interest is to keep before ourselves the ideal of the best life. If it is asked why Socrates permits certain forms of art to be retained in the ideal state instead of consistently banishing

all alike, the answer is surely obvious: these are, in the opinion of Socrates, the forms which art will take in the hands of men who understand its true nature.

The key to the whole passage is the conception of imitation or copying (*μίμησις*). The current misinterpretations of the passage are based on assuming that when Socrates speaks of copying he means that kind of activity by which a carpenter makes a chair resembling another chair, or an artist paints a picture resembling another picture. Now this is precisely what is not here meant by copying. A copy, as the word is used in this passage, means not a facsimile or replica, that is, an object of the same order and possessing as far as possible the same characteristics as the original, but an object of a wholly different order, having the characteristics proper to that order, but related by way of resemblance to an object of another order, and having in that resemblance the ground of its peculiar value. Thus, the carpenter copies the form of a bed. He does not, in doing so, produce a second form of a bed; Socrates is careful to point out that he cannot; it is the essence of a form, that it cannot be reduplicated. What the carpenter produces is not a concept or intelligible object, an object of the first order, but a percept or visible object, an object of the second order; and a percept whose value consists in its relation to the form of a bed, its attempt to embody that form in perceptible shape. This perceptible bed is not related to the form as its instance, for it is not an instance of 'bedhood'; it is not an embodiment of the universal bedhood, but only an attempt at such an embodiment, a more or less unsuccessful attempt. This is because the perceptible as such is tainted with imperfection, unreality, unintelligibility: hence the attempt to embody the perfection of the concept in perceptible shape is a self-contradictory attempt, and foredoomed to failure. The perceptible bed is not an instance of bedhood, but only an approximation to bedhood: and it is this idea of approximation that Socrates expresses by the term copying. To copy is to construct in a given material an object resembling one which is not made in that material; and the material itself imposes an impassable restriction on the fidelity of the resemblance. This conception has an obvious reference to the artist's attempt to represent in a given material, as well as that material will allow, an object in a different material.

ἡ δὲ μελαινέτ' ὀπισθεν, ἀρηρομένη δὲ ἐφίκει
χρυσείη περ εὐῶσα· τὸ δὲ περὶ θαῦμα τέτυκτο.

(*Iliad*, Σ. 548-549).

But in the *Republic* the merely empirical gulf which separates the gold of Achilles' shield from the earth of the ploughed

furrows has widened into a metaphysical gulf between appearance and reality, appearance being conceived as an imitation of reality, a copy of the conceptual world in terms of perceptible objects. It may, no doubt, be argued that the notion of copying or imitation is inadequate to bear all the weight that this doctrine puts upon it; but, for the moment, we are concerned only to see what the doctrine is.

The definition of art given in the *Republic* is that in art this same process is repeated at a further stage. As the percept copies the concept, so the work of art copies the percept. This does not mean that the work of art is a facsimile of a perceptible object, possessing the same characteristics and claiming the same kind of value; it means the precise opposite. It means that, just as the percept is on a wholly different metaphysical plane from the concept which it copies, so the work of art is on a different plane from the percept; it possesses none of the characteristic attributes of percepts, but has attributes altogether peculiar to itself. Yet in so far as it has a value, this value depends on its relation to the world of percepts, just as the value of a percept depends on its relation to the world of concepts. As the perceptible bed is judged by its relation to the ideal of bedhood, so the picture of a bed is judged by its relation to the perceptible bed.

It is sometimes objected that in point of fact the artist is not limited by his model; that in the best art, at least, the artist depicts the model not as it is but as it ought to be; and that this is actually recognised in the *Republic* itself, where it is pointed out (472 D) that a painter may paint a man more beautiful than any man actually existing; and the moral is drawn that the artist really copies not the percept but the concept, not the actual but the ideal. But this objection is simply a confusion of thought. To copy the concept of man would be to make a man, in other words to live an actual human life. The painter, whatever he paints, paints pictures and nothing but pictures; and any picture is judged as a picture by reference not to the ideal of humanity, the concept of man in general, but to some particular man, whether this particular man actually exists or not. To suggest that the artist copies the form or concept is to suggest that the landscape painter, in painting a cottage, alters it so as to bring it into the closest attainable conformity with the concept of an ideal residence, and that the dramatist, so far as he is a good dramatist, depicts his characters as purged of all moral imperfections and regulated by the standard of what a man ought to be. These suggestions are of course absurd;

the concept, the ideal which the craftsman would realise if he could, is a thing of which the artist knows nothing. What the artist produces is not a bed or a battle or a hero or a villain, but an object *sui generis*, to be judged not by the standards by which these things are judged, but by a standard peculiar to itself. That is the negative side of the conception of art as double imitation; and it is hardly necessary to add that it is the very foundation-stone of all sound æsthetic theory. To distinguish art from science and morality and handicraft and to assert that it has a sphere of its own; to distinguish the value of its works from scientific truth and from practical utility, and to place them in a distinct metaphysical category; this is the first step towards any real philosophy of art.

But there is more than this merely negative implication in the doctrine of the three degrees of reality. There is also implied a positive account of the relation between each degree and the next. The world of perception is wholly distinct from the world of thought, but not merely distinct. It has a positive relation to it, which is expressed by saying that it copies it. Similarly, the work of art, though wholly distinct from the world of perception, has a positive relation of the same kind to it. This cannot mean that Socrates is expounding a crudely naturalistic view of art as a quasi-photographic reproduction of nature; anyone who makes that suggestion need only be invited to explain how nature can be a quasi-photographic reproduction of a world of concepts; and this, if anything can, will convince him that it is dangerous to jump at what may seem the most obvious interpretation of the term *μίμησις*. Certainly Socrates maintains that art copies nature; but we have not yet explained what he means by copying; we have only explained what he does not mean.

The answer is to be sought in the *Republic* itself. In the sixth and seventh books Socrates elaborately expounds a conception according to which the universe is stratified, as it were, into various grades of reality.¹ Only the highest grade is absolutely real, and ultimately therefore the other grades do not exist at all; they are appearance, not reality, but they actually do appear, and therefore from the point of view of human life it is necessary to give an account of them. Now to say that only the highest grade is real, is to say that it alone is absolutely possessed of its own attributes; is unreservedly what it is; is such that a true

¹ In the interpretation of this passage and the making use of it to explain the account of art in the tenth book, I have been greatly helped by Mr. H. J. Paton's paper on *Plato's Theory of εἰκασία*, in *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, xii. (1922).

account of it is possible. Elsewhere we find things, or ostensible things, which are not what they are; things possessed of contradictory attributes, that is not really possessed of any at all; things of which—not through the fault of mind or language, but by reason of their own inherent unintelligibility—no account whatever can be given. Or rather, an account of sorts can be given of them, but it will be a self-contradictory account; it will ascribe to them contradictory predicates, and these predicates will be terms having a genuine applicability to the real and to nothing else. This grade of things or quasi-things which are approximately describable in terms of reality is the grade next below the highest. So far as it is anything, it is a confused or perverted version of the highest grade; and so far as we can understand or apprehend it at all, we can do so only by thinking of it as such a confused version of the real. But this relation which subsists between a reality and a confused version of it is capable of reappearing at a further stage, in the form of a relation between the confused version of reality and a confused version of this confusion. This third grade, the perversion of perversion, will again be approximately describable in a sense, but only approximately describable, in terms of the second grade, that is to say in terms of what is itself a confusion; and hence the third grade is unintelligible in the second degree. Further; in such a series of grades it is shown at the end of the sixth book that each grade will develop within itself distinctions of a similar kind to those which separate it from the others; thus each will show the same general type of structure with each other and with the whole. The study of this structure, which enables the philosopher to pass out of the lower grades into the region of reality, is called dialectic.

This theory of grades of reality is indisputably the key to the *Republic* as a whole and, in particular, to the conception of imitation. Each grade imitates the one above it; that is, tries to be what the one above it is. Now this, translated out of the terminology of the object into that of the subject, means that there are as many forms or grades of experience as there are grades of objects, and that each grade of experience involves the error of believing that one is enjoying the next above it; or rather, simply is that error. For the inferior grades are, by definition, not real; that is to say, the *real* universe is not stratified into these grades but is wholly contained in the highest grade. The other grades are only appearance; they are in fact reality itself as misconceived by persons labouring under various

types of error. Hence it is not really correct to speak of degrees of reality, as if there really were a distinction between objects more real and less real, which is of course absurd: the distinction is in point of fact only a distinction between degrees, or rather powers, of error. Hence the term *μίμησις* expresses not the resemblance between two real things, nor even the relation of a less real thing to a more real thing; it expresses the relation between an appearance and the reality which it appears to be. This is seen in the case of the bed; the perceptible bed is called a copy of the form precisely because it is not a bed at all, but something which we call by the name bed because we fall into the error of thinking that the ideal of bedhood has been embodied in it, when in fact it has not. The source and ground of the distinction between the grades is sheer error. Remove error, and the system of grades disappears.

Art copies nature, then, in the sense that æsthetic experience is concerned with an appearance of an appearance. The world of perception is not real; it is only appearance; and the world of art is not this appearance itself in its actuality but an appearance of it only. Art is not knowledge, for it cannot be praised for its truth, and its object is not the concept. It is not opinion, for it cannot be praised for its utility, and its object is not the percept. It is not, like knowledge, the apprehension of necessary truth; it is not, like opinion, the forming of judgments which may, with luck, be true. It has no concern with truth at all, either essentially or accidentally. The object of art neither is real nor appears to be real: in other words, the æsthetic experience neither is nor believes itself to be knowledge. What, then, is the right name for it and for its objects? Its own right name is imagination, and that of its objects is phantasms or images (*φαντάσματα, εἶδωλα*), sheer appearances apprehended and indeed created—if that can be said to be apprehended and created which does not exist at all, but only appears—by an activity resembling, if not identical with, dreaming. This imaginative activity does not assert anything; hence the artist lacks, not only knowledge, but even (602) opinion; and his works contain no truths, nor even assertions which by some chance might be true, but only a glamour which when stripped off leaves nothing behind (601). This glamour is what we call beauty; and here again one can only say that the view propounded by Socrates is unquestionably sound æsthetics. True, the 'glamour' is not called *κάλλος*; but *κάλλος* does not mean beauty. It means goodness or rightness or utility; the quality of serviceableness in a thing like

a bridle; it is explicitly equivalent to ὀρθότης and opposed to πονηρία. As the Greeks have no word for art, so they have no word for beauty: but it would hardly be true to say that on this account their philosophers did not to some extent grasp the conceptions to which we apply those names. We have seen that Plato realises at least the substantial identity of painting and poetry; and when he wishes to speak of beauty he uses such words as ἡδονή, κηλεῖσθαι, ἔρως; and no one accustomed to Plato's use of terms will be surprised at this or argue that these words commit him to what we should call a hedonistic theory of beauty.

The 'glamour' of art, beauty, is for Socrates an essentially emotional thing, and art is in consequence an exercise of the emotions, not an exercise of reason. This doctrine of the emotionality of art is liable to misinterpretation. Croce, who is far too sound a critic to fall into the main error which it is the object of this paper to criticise, has tripped here: for he remarks (*Estetica*, ed. 4, p. 185) that Plato, while rightly denying that art is concerned with the concept, failed to discover any theoretical activity except intellect, and therefore reached the false conclusion that art was nothing except sense and emotion. But no one has more emphatically than Plato, or at any rate the Platonic Socrates, maintained the existence of opinion and imagination side by side with intellect. This is the whole burden of the long and elaborate discussions of the grades of reality and of knowledge to which we have already referred. The emotionality of art, as Socrates conceives it, is a deduction from its imaginative nature. If each grade of objects is what it is by trying to embody an ideal drawn from the next higher grade, if each is a μίμησις of the next above, imagination is what it is by being a μίμησις, at two removes, of truth. The first remove substitutes for the demonstrability of truth the certitude of perception; the second remove substitutes for this the glamour or emotional atmosphere which clings to the phantasm. If we ask why the phantasm possesses this glamour, the answer is: because the phantasm indirectly symbolises truth. Symbolism, by its very nature, is the apprehension of truth veiled or disguised in an imaginative form; and truth so disguised is felt rather than thought, that is, it is present to the mind in the form of an emotional atmosphere clinging to the symbol. The symbol is heavy with an import which can only convey itself in the shape of a feeling of urgency, a feeling that there is something here which is of supreme value, a feeling that we are in the presence of a mystery revealed and yet not revealed. This is

why art makes the peculiarly strong emotional appeal which, as Socrates points out, it does make to thoughtful and intelligent people; and this is why the struggle against its appeal, which Socrates so vividly describes, has its peculiar bitterness. If the emotionality of art were a merely sensuous reaction, the struggle against it, the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy, would be merely another case of the irksome but not heartrending warfare which all must wage against their animal lusts. The struggle against art is the struggle to resist the emotional appeal of a symbol in order to penetrate to that which it symbolises. And unless we are content to acquiesce in a merely negative theory of the relation between imagination and thought, a theory which exhausts itself in the assertion that they are different things and that there is an end of it, we must attempt to find between them at least some such positive relation as that which Socrates is here defining. The view of art as symbolic of philosophical truth has in the past been pushed by hasty interpretation to the point of obvious absurdity; and it appeared to be altogether a gain when such interpretations were simply swept aside by the assertion that art is imagination and nothing more, that its value is a value which it possesses altogether in its own right and in no sense borrows from anything else. But the real value of such an assertion lies in its provisional isolation of a problem which in the nature of the case cannot be finally understood in isolation. Sooner or later we must raise the question whether mind is not a genuine unity, in spite of its differences.

The view stated by Socrates, at any rate, is that mind is such a unity, and that its various grades of experience are linked together by a progressive dialectic. Art is one grade, but not the highest; it is essentially a primitive form of experience, existing at a level anterior to the distinction between truth and falsehood. From this doctrine emerge two final conclusions. First, because art is symbolic of activities other than itself, it is a preparation for these activities. In the life of art the immature mind enjoys a simulacrum of the life of explicit reason, a life which it is not yet able to enjoy except through such a mirror. It is not truth or morality or utility, but it prepares the mind for a direct acquaintance with these things; and therefore beauty is the mother of truth and goodness, and art is the corner-stone of all sound education. This is the doctrine of the early books of the *Republic*. Secondly, because art is not truth and morality but only symbolic of them, it is not an activity which ought to distract the attention of mature and educated

men from direct contact with the realities which it symbolises. This is the burden of the polemic against the life of art in the tenth book. These two doctrines, so far from being contradictory, are complementary.

But we must not overstate Socrates' polemic. The specialised and isolated form of æsthetic experience which we call *par excellence* the life of art is certainly by him excluded from the ideal state, as being no true element in the life of reason; but æsthetic experience as such remains for him a permanent and necessary part of the life of reason, in so far as that experience is modified or controlled by reason itself. As we have seen, art is not banished from the ideal state. It remains the great educative power by which the young guardians are to be trained; and even the mature guardians are to continue in the practice of it, in shapes suitable to their intellectual and moral stature.

Such is the general view of art stated by the Platonic Socrates in the *Republic*. We have now to consider certain passages in other Platonic dialogues bearing on the same subject.

1. In the *Apology* (22 A-C) Socrates is made to expound certain observations about poets; and these observations have remarkable points of resemblance with, and difference from, the view stated in the *Republic*. Socrates here treats the poets and the craftsmen separately, attributing to them quite different mental characteristics; this already shows in germ the distinction between the arts and the crafts. Further, he claims to have discovered that poets do not work by *σοφία*, but *φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες*: that they do not understand their own sayings, and that their poetical gift does not mark them out as 'wiser' in general than other men. Here we have unmistakably the negative side of the *Republic* doctrine; art is not knowledge, and therefore on the principles of Socrates himself not morality either. But this discovery is presented as a matter of mere experience; it is not brought into contact with any philosophical theory of mind in general, far less deduced from such a theory. Nor is there any attempt to state anything at all corresponding to the positive side of the *Republic* doctrine, the characterisation of art as an imitation and of its objects as phantasms. Of course this does not prove that Socrates, or Plato when he wrote the *Apology*, had not arrived at such a doctrine; the *Apology* would in no case have given a suitable opportunity for expounding it. What it does prove is that the negative side of the *Republic* doctrine had actually been formulated either by Socrates, or at least by Plato in this his earliest period of

writing. And since there is much to be said for the view that Plato's *Apology* represents with substantial accuracy the speech that Socrates made, we may accept it as a reasonable working hypothesis that Plato owed at least the negative side of the *Republic* theory to Socrates himself.

2. The *Ion* is generally regarded as a somewhat early work, though it is too short to be subjected with confidence to the tests of stylometric chronology. I here assume that it is earlier than the *Republic*: a closer dating of it is not required for the present purpose. It is *prima facie* a criticism not of the poet but of his interpreter the rhapsode; but in the course of the dialogue Socrates lays down very clearly certain views on poetry itself. Poetry is a divine power, like that of the magnet (533 D), and the artist's effects are due not to skilful craftsmanship but to inspiration (533 E); a musician composes in a Bacchic revel, feeding on honey-dew and drinking the milk of paradise, and not in an act of thought (534 A); hence the poet is an airy being, a sacred bird whose song depends on his banishing from himself all thought and reason (534 B). The thesis here maintained is identical with that of the *Apology* and the negative side of that in the *Republic*: namely that art is not knowledge, but actually requires the absence of knowledge, and also that it is not craft or skill. If we ask what it is, there is here no answer; to call it a divine force or an inspiration is simply to call it a *je ne sais quoi*. The doctrine of the *Ion* is purely negative, and is developed in detail by showing that Homer, the poet whom Ion's profession compels us to discuss, cannot be justly praised as a source of useful knowledge, although Ion takes the view that he can (536 E, *seqq.*). This topic is dealt with again and more fully in the *Republic* (599-600); and Ion's attitude shows quite clearly that the position there maintained was regarded by professional literary men as heretical. The passage in the *Republic* becomes more intelligible when we bear in mind that Socrates is here attacking a utilitarian view of art which was generally accepted by contemporary opinion.

3. The *Symposium*, with its eloquent discussion of beauty, has often been regarded as the *locus classicus* for a view of art at once more appreciative and more true than the polemics of the *Republic*. But this opinion seems to rest on a misunderstanding. We have seen that *κάλλος* is not necessarily what we call beauty; and in the *Symposium* it is surely clear that *τὸ καλόν* is not the beautiful in the sense of the object of æsthetic contemplation, but the object of desire; the desirable or good. The traditional sub-title *ἡ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ* is perfectly correct: the word *καλόν* is here the name of that *οὐ πάντ'*

ἐφίεται. So powerful is the current illusion of æsthetic theory in the *Symposium*, that a distinguished writer on Plato has twisted the remark about ποίησις in 205 B into a statement of the creative power of art, whereas the context shows it to be a mere observation as to the literal meaning of ποιεῖν, efficient causation.

4. Chronology now brings us to the *Republic*; and here for the first time we find a doctrine of what art is. Moreover, we find this doctrine not in the third book but only in the chronologically later tenth. Why is this? It will be argued by those who hold the Platonic Socrates to be identical with the historical Socrates, that throughout his literary career Plato had known the theory which he ascribes to Socrates in the tenth book, but that he had never before had occasion to state it. But this position, though *ex hypothesi* incapable of direct refutation, involves difficulties. First, there is no single hint, in any earlier work, of the positive theory now first enunciated, whereas we shall see that in later works it is uniformly assumed as both true and familiar. Secondly, the earlier works hitherto quoted actually betray the lack of such a theory, by positively describing the poet's work in terms which amount to a mere *asylum ignorantiae*. It is not true that the Socrates of the *Ion* has no occasion for a positive statement of the nature of art; he clearly tries to give such a statement, and fails. This is very curious if, when he wrote the *Ion*, Plato already possessed the theory stated in the *Republic*. It becomes more than curious if we compare the *Ion* with the *Phaedrus*, to which we shall come before long. Thirdly, there is a remarkable change of terminology within the *Republic* itself. In the third book some art is mimetic and some is not; and the principle to be followed in education is that of using non-mimetic art freely and mimetic art only under certain restrictions (392 D—396). In the tenth book the subject is introduced by saying 'we were right to disallow art ὅση μμητική' (595 A) and going on, in defiance of this still implied distinction between mimetic and non-mimetic art, to argue that all art is mimetic and that this is in fact the key to its whole nature. Nor does Plato ever again in later works assert or imply the existence of non-mimetic art. This is, I submit, unintelligible except on the hypothesis that Plato arrived at the theory of art as double imitation after writing the third book of the *Republic*. On these grounds I shall hereinafter proceed on the hypothesis that the positive side of Plato's theory is his own, though he probably owed the negative side to Socrates.

5. In the *Phaedrus* the negative doctrine of the *Apology*

and *Ion* reappears, explicitly supplemented by the positive additions made to it in the *Republic*. We learn not only that poetry is enthusiasm or inspiration, divine madness as opposed to the sanity of reason (245 A, with much even verbal resemblance to the speech in the *Ion*), but that on this account the poet comes low in the scale of souls (248 D, where the sharp distinction between the φιλόκαλος and the poet is noteworthy), and that literary art, which is a game (cf. *Rep.* 602 B, παιδία τις καὶ οὐ σπουδή), may be a noble game (παγκάλῃν παιδίαν, with the usual non-æsthetic sense of καλός) if it devotes itself to telling stories (μυθολογεῖν) about things just, noble (καλῶν) and good (276 C-E); but that this noble game is surpassed by the still nobler work (σπουδή) of dialectic (276 E). The illustration in this passage, drawn from the comparison of gardening with playing at gardens, shows past doubting that Plato has in mind the notion of art as μίμησις and of its products as εἰκόνες of another order of things, and the correlative notion of art as a propædæutic to philosophy, a game which is the undeveloped soul's introduction to work. In the *Phaedrus*, therefore, a positive view of art is presupposed, very different from the vague language about enthusiasm which it still, though with a deepened meaning, employs; and this positive view is precisely that of the tenth book of the *Republic*. Plato is here not reopening the question of the nature of art; he is rather assuming that the results of the discussion in the *Republic* are to stand, and building upon them in order to discuss the relation between philosophy and rhetoric.

6. The treatment of art in the *Laws* is of special historical importance. Whatever may be the case in other dialogues, there is no reason to think that here Plato is expressing any views other than those he actually held at the time of writing; and therefore, when we find, maintained or presupposed in the *Laws*, a view which has been dramatically expounded in an earlier dialogue, we have some reason for saying that even in the earlier dialogue it represented Plato's own position, whether or not it also represents a position held by the person in whose name it is there set forth.

The discussion of art in the *Laws* expresses or presupposes a theory of its nature in complete agreement with that whose growth we have traced in the earlier works. The second book discusses the place of song and dance in the education of the young, and explicitly recognises their necessity throughout human life; though it is assumed that their true value in adult life is that of a recreation or relaxation from work, and that this recreation must be so organised as to bring it

into harmony with the fundamental aims of adult life. Throughout this book it is maintained that songs and dances are mimetic : *εἰκαστική τε καὶ μιμητική* (668 A), *εἰκόνες* (669 B) and, more explicitly, *μιμήματα τρόπων* (655 D). Hence, Plato argues, their value can be properly judged only by one conversant with the reality which they copy, the substance of which they are the shadow (*τὴν οὐσίαν*, 668 A ; the doctrine of two removes is not explicitly stated, but appears to be presupposed rather than abandoned). This is the reason why we must not allow poetry to be controlled by the judgment of a popular vote (658-659). All this is the doctrine of the *Republic* both on its positive and on its negative side. Later, in the seventh book, the question of dramatic performances is raised. Both tragedy and comedy are to be admitted, the latter because learning to ridicule the contemptible is a necessary part of learning to admire the admirable ; but comedy is to be played only by slaves and foreigners (816 D). When our city is visited by tragic actors, we shall say to them, ' we too are actors, for our whole city is designed as an imitation of the noblest and best life ' (this is an obvious reference to the doctrine of double imitation). ' But for this very reason we shall not allow you a free hand ; we shall submit your plays to a strict censorship, and subsidise those we approve and ban those which we do not ' (817 B-E). There is nothing here inconsistent with the principles laid down in the *Republic* ; on the contrary, the views maintained in the earlier work are used as premises from which the details of the later are developed. True, the *Laws* permit drama, whereas the *Republic* permits no kind of literary art except hymns to the gods and praises of good men (*Rep.*, 607 A) ; but this is a difference not of principles but of their interpretation. Granted that the best and most rational life will admit into itself only an art controlled by reason, it still remains an open question what this art will include ; and the dramatic censorship of the *Laws* is perhaps a better means of achieving the end aimed at than the restrictions as to subject and form which are prescribed in the *Republic*.

Thus, throughout his literary career, we find Plato consistently maintaining that art is something quite distinct from knowledge, morality and utility, something *sui generis* : and that its object is therefore not the real or the good or the useful, the object of knowledge or opinion, but an object as unique as the act of apprehending it. This view he may have owed to Socrates. In the tenth book of the *Republic* he supplements this by a positive theory of what art is :

it is imagination, whose object is an image or phantasm, and whose emotional character derives from the fact that this phantasm is not the real but a symbol of the real. This positive theory, we have seen reason to believe, was a discovery of Plato's, made between the writing of the third book of the *Republic* and the writing of the tenth. When first he stated it, he felt it to be beset by difficulties and advanced it with some hesitation (607-608); but later thought only confirmed it, and all his subsequent references to the subject assume it as sound.

Plato's philosophy of art would perhaps have proved less perplexing to modern readers had it been expressed with less heat. It can hardly be doubted that the subject is one on which Plato felt strongly, and the strength of his feelings has powerfully affected his language; notably in the tenth book of the *Republic*. It is impossible to refrain from asking what it is that Plato felt so strongly when he wrote this passage. Readers sometimes fancy that what he felt was the puritanical moralist's objection to art as such; that he is writing as a fervent and bigoted partisan of the respectable as against the beautiful. But this is to forget that Plato is, after all, an artist of the first rank, one of the world's greatest masters of prose style and dramatic form. Now a man does not attain this rank as an artist without taking trouble, and one must be a very bad critic of literature if one cannot see that Plato cared intensely about the purely artistic side of his work. Whatever accusations can be brought against him, no one can accuse him of being a Philistine. Others, again, have imagined that Plato attacks art in general because the art of his time was decadent. But was it? That it was, is freely alleged by people complacently ignorant of the history of ancient art; yet Plato's own prose bears the stamp of decadence no more than do the carvings of Scopas. And if it was, did Plato think it was? No one has produced any evidence that he did. On the contrary, he habitually illustrates the faults of art by quoting Homer. And if it had been decadent, are Plato's criticisms thereby accounted for? Not at all. On the contrary, it would show the grossest ineptitude in him that he should pick a quarrel with art as a whole on metaphysical grounds when he really only wanted to quarrel with contemporary art on æsthetic grounds.

It may be worth while to suggest another explanation of Plato's heat. He was at once an artist and a philosopher; and in his early works the artist seems to predominate. His first writings have the appearance of being dramatic sketches

written by a man with a strong interest in philosophy, but an even stronger interest in the drama of philosophical discussion. They are literary essays rather than philosophical essays. Now it is notorious that the later works of Plato show a progressive absorption in philosophy, a progressive alienation from the literary form of the mime. It is possible that this change did not take place without an effort. It is possible that Plato felt within himself a real conflict between the claims of his literary genius and those of his philosophical; and that it became gradually clear to him that he could only enter upon the kingdom of philosophy by deserting the field of pure literature. The consciousness of this conflict first becomes apparent in the *Symposium*, and it is this that gives to that dialogue its peculiar emotional tension; the same tension, gradually relaxed as the battle decides itself in favour of philosophy, is present with diminishing force in the *Phædo*, *Republic* and *Phædrus*. The world to which the philosopher must die is the world of art, the world of intuitive semblance or imagination. This is by no means the explicit doctrine of the *Phædo*, but it is, unless I am mistaken, the ultimate meaning: and in the allegory of the Cave it becomes all but explicit. It emerges into full daylight in the tenth book of the *Republic*, where art and philosophy reveal themselves as parties to an 'ancient quarrel,' rivals for the supreme allegiance of mankind; and the violence with which Plato here rejects the claims of art is surely proportionate to the hold which he feels art to possess over his own mind. The 'ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry' is to be sought not in the earlier history of Greek thought, where its traces are, to say the most, meagre, but in Plato's own life; and possibly also in the life of Socrates, sculptor by training and philosopher by choice. This conflict between two powerful tendencies in Plato's mind becomes a matter of more than biographical interest if it is true, as Plato himself believed, that a similar conflict must of necessity arise in the mind of everyone who participates, as every human being must participate, in these two universal activities. From this point of view it becomes clear that Plato can at once, without inconsistency, emphasise the value and importance of art and denounce it as if it were a deadly sin. If to say that art is a permanent and necessary element in human life is to praise it, then no one has praised art more emphatically than Plato; if to say that it is not the only and not the highest element is to revile it, then no one has more emphatically reviled it. But those self-

constituted champions of art who rush in to protect it against Plato's calumnies are easily answered in words of his own: *ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν εἴαν ποτε γηῶ οἶόν ἐστι τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων· νῦν δὲ ἀγροεῖ.*

Yet there is a sense in which Plato does underestimate the value of art: not that he misunderstands the true place of art in the life of mind, but that he misunderstands the place of mind in the universe. Reality is, for Plato, not subject but substance; not mind but something which may or may not become the object of mind's contemplation. We human beings, if we are to know reality, can only come to know it through a course of educative experience which necessarily includes art as one of its phases, though an early phase; but if we do come to know reality, our knowledge of it makes no difference to reality itself. The real world does not demand, as a condition of its own being, our knowledge of it; there is included in the nature of things no reason why this same nature of things should ever become an object of knowledge. But if there is no reason why there should be such a thing as knowledge, there is no reason why there should be such a thing as art; for the only reason why art is valuable is that it forms an indispensable element in that human life whose highest function is to know reality. If our knowledge of reality in no way enriches reality itself, *a fortiori* our art in no way enriches reality. If the worth of human life is to be judged by its relation to a reality wholly other than itself, then knowledge has by this standard a certain worth, because in knowledge we apprehend such a reality; but in art we do not, and therefore art has no such worth at all.

This is a consequence following necessarily from Plato's 'realistic' view of the relation between mind and its object. If the object is wholly independent of mind's knowing it, it follows that knowledge itself, and therefore everything presupposed by knowledge, is a mere contingent fact without a reason in the nature of things. Intelligibility, according to this doctrine, is to be sought not in intelligence itself but in the independent object of intelligence. Intelligence itself is unintelligible, and the stages in its development are doubly unintelligible. If there is no theory of knowledge, but only a theory of the thing known, *a fortiori* there can be no theory of art; and because art is not knowledge and has not a real object but only an imaginary object, there cannot even be a theory of its object. A realist can only avoid this conclusion by committing himself to a radical falsehood about the entire nature of art, and maintaining that art is not imagination but a kind of knowledge, whose specific object, the beautiful,

is a specific element in the real world. If Plato avoided that error, it was because he knew too much about art.

But if intelligence itself is intelligible, if in philosophical thought the mind itself is its own object, then whatever is involved in the act of knowing is to that extent intelligible. And if the act of imagining is an essential phase of the activity of coming to know, as Plato rightly thought, then the æsthetic consciousness is no mere contingent, irrational or unintelligible fact, but a possible object of philosophical thought, a constituent element of reality.

III.—BRADLEY'S PLACE IN PHILOSOPHY.

By J. H. MUIRHEAD.

I HAVE read with the greatest interest the articles on Bradley by four of his most distinguished contemporaries in the last number of *MIND*. The picture of his friend drawn by Prof. A. E. Taylor must have deeply moved others besides myself, and both in what it has given us and in what it has refrained from giving does honour to the writer. The criticisms which follow are valuable as bringing out different sides of his philosophy and we are grateful for them. What I regret (and here, I know, I speak for others also) is that none of the writers has attempted such a broad treatment of his subject as would give readers some idea of Bradley's work as a whole during the fifty years in which it has been in a sense the focus of an unparalleled philosophical activity in this country: of what it has stood for and of what it may be said to have achieved. They may have thought this too familiar to readers of *MIND*, or again they may have hesitated before so difficult a task. But I cannot help thinking that even in respect to their own criticisms they would have gained something if they had tried to set them in the broader light of Bradley's philosophy as a whole. The present article has been undertaken in no spirit of controversy but merely with the view of supplying in some small degree this omission. The only claim of the writer to speak on such a subject is that his own interest in philosophy (unfortunately with that of few now alive) may be said to have coincided almost precisely with the whole period of Bradley's philosophical activity from 1874, the date of his first published work, to 1924 the year of his death.

In a similar article on Bosanquet a year and a half ago¹ I ventured to apply to him a phrase he himself quotes in his last book, "the man is the sphere which his activity doth fill," with his own characteristic addition that "it is in his works that we must look for the fulness of the man, not in the man for a greater fulness than that of his works."² This holds

¹ *MIND*, Oct. 1923.

² *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind*, pp. 40 and 11.

even more truly of Bradley, in that the sphere which his activity did fill coincided even more narrowly with that of his philosophical works. To understand what this sphere was it is necessary to recall the condition of British philosophy in the sixties and seventies of last century.

Bradley himself in his earlier Prefaces has not been sparing in his characterisation of the mixture of blind prejudice and one-sided dogmatism of which it in the main consisted. A new note had indeed already been struck by writers imbued with the spirit of Kant and Hegel. Bradley was always generous in acknowledging the merit of their work. "The present generation is learning," he writes, "that to gain education a man must study in more than one school. We owe this improvement to men of a time shortly before my own and who insisted well, if perhaps incautiously, on the great claims of Kant and Hegel."¹ He traced many of his own ideas to Hegel but he disowns Hegelianism as a system "We want no system-making or systems, home-grown or imported. What we want at present is to clear the ground so that English philosophy, if it rises, may not be choked by prejudice." The main requirement, he held, was "a critical, or, if you prefer it, a sceptical study of first principles."² This is the note struck in his first book, *Presuppositions of Critical History* (1874). It is carried on in the *Ethical Studies*³ of 1876 and in *The Principles of Logic* (1883), and is still the dominating one in the middle period of his work. While there was thus no "precritical period" in Bradley's philosophical life, there may be said to have been a pre-Bradleyan period before he appears himself to have realised the full scope and bearing of the principle which he had adopted and before he had turned it, as he may be said afterwards to have done, against itself. It may perhaps, therefore, best serve the purpose of this article if in the first place I remind the reader of what this critical principle was and wherein the particular extension of it, which is associated with his name, consisted, before going on to consider some of the criticisms which his application of it has met with both at the hands of Idealists and others. If I end by suggesting a distinction between the principle itself and Bradley's detailed method of applying it, as an indication of what seems to me the true line of advance upon what he has done, I hope that I shall not be going beyond the limits of an article of which the main object is appreciation.

¹ *A. and R.*, p. xiii.

² *Principles of Logic* (1st Ed.), p. vi.

³ "The writer's object in this work has been mainly critical." Preface.

1. Though perhaps the most original thinker of his time in philosophy, Bradley was always particularly anxious to disclaim originality.¹ He owned, as we have seen, a special debt to Hegel and to his own immediate predecessors, of whom Green and Caird were the leaders. Neglecting differences of emphasis what was central in the teaching of these men was the implication in self-conscious knowledge and action of the idea of a whole or organised system, as the criterion of what we must hold to be true and good. Implicit in all man's thought and conduct is the reference to a world of completely harmonised experience, to be one with which is the end imposed upon him by his nature as a rational being. Bradley's *Ethical Studies* was the first constructive application of this idea to ethical and religious experience to appear in England. The gist of the book is contained in the celebrated chapter "My Station and its Duties" and in the "Concluding Remarks". On the one hand as against all forms of Utilitarianism it taught that the moral end is "the realisation of the good will, which is superior to ourselves"; as against a crude idealism, that the good will "is a concrete universal because it not only is above but is within and throughout its details and is so far only as they are."² On the other hand the dissatisfaction and unrest with which, owing to the limits that present imperfections impose upon the good will, our life is infected, drive us beyond morality: "Reflection on morality leads us beyond it. It leads us in short to see the necessity of a religious point of view," something that "does give us what morality does not give" in the sense of an object which is not-ourselves and "further which is real".³ To many besides Bosanquet at the time the book appeared to be "an epoch-making event, not merely as restating and concluding the discussion of Hedonism but because of a philosophical significance, which far transcended that particular subject-matter".⁴ Notwithstanding the "excess of thought and experience," of which Bosanquet complains, it has recently been described by a writer in the *Times* as "the most readable work on serious philosophy in English."

In the second of his chief books Bradley may be said to have done for Logic what the *Studies* had done for Ethics. In a like sense it was epoch-making. At once critical and constructive, it marked the end of an old and the beginning

¹ See esp. *Ethical Studies*, p. vi. What he there says he would have repeated of all his works.

² *Op. cit.* p. 147.

³ Pp. 280, 282.

⁴ *Contemporary British Philosophy*. First Series, p. 58.

of a new period in logical study. On the one hand the associationist theory of inference was subjected to annihilating criticism summed up in the dictum that "association marries only universals". What operates in the mind is not an external relation between particulars but an ideal identity or universal within the particulars, and what is effected is not a miraculous reinstatement of a particular but a re-integration or reparticularisation of the universal. On the other hand an end is made of the equational or substitutional logic of the syllogism by the proof that the ground of inference is not an abstract identity but the relation of elements within a continuous systematic whole. The fertility of these ideas has since been abundantly manifest in the brilliant development they have received in Logic by Bosanquet, in Psychology by Dr. Stout and others.

So far as the main teaching of these books was concerned though a striking advance there was no overt break with the older idealistic position. But there are already signs of a rift. Whether there was any conscious crisis in Bradley's mind, and, if so, when and under what influences it developed, I do not know. I think that Bradley would have denied that there had been any. What is certain and of vital interest for the understanding of his place in the philosophy of his time is that while in the *Ethical Studies* there is little or no hint of any fundamental quarrel with Hegel, in the Preface to the *Principles of Logic* he writes, "For Hegel himself assuredly I think him a great philosopher but I never could call myself a Hegelian, partly because I cannot say that I have mastered his system, partly because I could not accept what seems his main principle or at least part of that principle." Bradley does not tell us what he regards as the main principle, but the last page of the book seems to leave us in little doubt. "Unless thought," he there writes, "stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if 'thinking' is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational."¹ Bradley may have been wrong in his interpretation of Hegel and much might be said upon this. What is clear is that a new note is here struck, which was to become the dominating one in all his subsequent work. It goes beyond anything we find explicitly attempted by the earlier British writers in "the further determination of the absolute" as not merely

¹ Words oddly similar to these occur in a review by T. H. Green of John Caird's, *Philosophy of Religion* (1880). See Works, III., p. 146.

the unity or organised whole presupposed in knowledge and will but as that within which all the elements, found more or less in conflict in ordinary experience, so fall as to form one harmonious whole. From this it at once followed that neither thought with its ideal of a whole of logically consistent judgments, nor any form of experience resting on an unresolved relation, as thought does on that between idea and existence, can be the measure of the full reality. Like the partial truths which, within each field, theoretic, practical or æsthetic, have to submit to the criticism of a larger truth, so each of these fields themselves has to be supplemented and transformed to some indefinite degree before it can find its place in the completed whole.

It is the idealistic principle as so interpreted that is the key-note of *Appearance and Reality* (1893), by far his most important book. In it he wages the same relentless war against abstraction as he does in the *Studies* and the *Principles*, but from a new plane and with a wider object. The plane is that just described, the object is the examination of the claims of the various commonly recognised forms of reality to ultimate, self-sustaining being. From primary qualities up to the soul or self and from the soul to its ideals of truth and goodness, all of these, when taken as things in themselves, are shown to fall short of the inner harmony which must be the touch-stone of their claim. One and all they are the products of abstraction, *res rationis* as Spinoza would have said. The ultimate reality is something at once simpler and more complex, at once nearer to us and further away from us. It is nearer because it is present with us in simple undifferentiated feeling; ¹ it is further away because it is conceived of as containing all the relations, which science and philosophy discover in our ordinary world, in a super-relational form. If the book cannot be said as yet to have been made the starting-point for new constructive work in metaphysics as the others have been in ethics and logic (unless Bosanquet's *Gifford Lectures* can be taken as such) its influence in other respects has been not less striking. It

¹ It is the idea of a subrelational level of experience that Dr. Ward criticises so severely in the first part of his article in the last number of *MIND*. His readers will have been reminded of Dr. Ward's own "undifferentiated continuum," and may have wondered what the difference between them is. Without presuming to criticise Dr. Ward's conception I would suggest that Bradley's can only be rightly understood in connexion with his view that the self-transcendence, which is a feature of experience at all its levels, can only be taken out of the region of miracle by conceiving of experience from the first as that of an object, and therefore as the bearer of a principle, which necessarily carries it beyond itself.

is not, I think, too much to say that it was the uncompromising consistency with which the idealistic principle as he, conceived of it, was here worked out, that, more than any other single influence, was the source of the violent reaction against it both from the side of idealism and realism which marked the end of last century and the beginning of this.

Passing over the series of articles in *MIND* that covered the next ten years, Bradley's last book, the *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914), particularly in the last Essays, has been represented by some¹ as marking a third stage in his philosophical development and even as a palinode of what went before. I think that, as in Bradley's thought throughout, there is here development. In particular there is a fuller recognition of what is implied in the appeal from merely logical standards to human needs. Bradley himself speaks of a difference of emphasis (p. 432). But there is no going back upon the main principle of his philosophy; still less any approximation to pragmatism. In the first place what a man needs is to Bradley something entirely different from what he desires and wills. And in the second place there are other needs than can in any proper sense be called practical. It is I think unfortunate that Bradley laid such exclusive emphasis on the practical side of religion.² (Kepler's exclamation, "I think Thy thoughts after Thee," was the expression of a purely intellectual emotion, and we have heard of Hymns to Beauty and even to Colour, "The soul's bridegroom"—

Because his touch is infinite and lends
A yonder to all ends.)

But by practical Bradley does not mean instrumental to any end beyond itself. The end of religion is oneness of will with the will of God, and this unity must in the end be submitted to the same test as all lower forms of experience—a test which Bradley could never have consented to call practical.

2. Returning to *Appearance and Reality*, from the main thesis of which there was never a shadow of departure, it is interesting at this distance to recall the suspicion with which it was received even in Oxford. The Delegates of the Clarendon Press of that time refused to be sponsors for it, ostensibly on account of what seemed to be its negative

¹ As by Dr. Schiller in his well-known article in *MIND*, N.S. xxiv., where it is characterised as the last halting place before pragmatism.

² *A. and R.*, page 439 foll. *Essays* xiv and xv.

attitude to religion; and Edward Caird writing in the first weeks after its publication¹ states with admirable brevity, though with equally admirable hesitation (owing to Bradley's habit of bringing in "in a secondary way the points one would allege against him"), the chief criticisms which have often been repeated since. It is "Hegel's dialectic turned backwards": "a reversion to Spinoza, ending in the lion's den, to which the feet all point inward"; "it involves a manifest contradiction, for the idea, which is set up as the test of truth, seems to be finally dissolved in the absolute, which is presented as the complete reality and set as the negation of all the reals which we know." On the other hand the definition of the Whole as experience "really involves that Berkeley is right—Bradley has great difficulty with solipsism." Finally in his doctrine of truth Caird sees the union of two incompatibles "the idealist and the sceptic who can never be satisfied": his intellect is "all blade and no handle".² Leaving meantime the first and main one it may help towards the understanding which is the object of the present article if I say a word or two upon the others.

There are probably few readers who have not stumbled over the passage on page 144 of *Appearance and Reality* in which Bradley announces that "we perceive on reflection that sentient experience is reality and what is not this is not real"; perhaps fewer still who have found themselves wholly reassured by his repudiation, on the next page, of the intention to divide the percipient subject from the universe or to maintain that the mind is powerless to transcend its own states, as the exact contrary of what he meant. Yet if we accept the common distinction between the mental process of experiencing and the thing experienced, which Bradley assumes throughout, it is not too much to say that there is not a line in all his writings that gives the smallest support to the view, either that the only reality is our experiencing, or that all reality is contained in the fragment of the universe that we experience. What he does maintain is *first* that "though my experience is not the whole world yet that world appears in my experience"; and *secondly* that "everything beyond, though not less real, is an expansion of the common essence which we feel burning in this one focus".³

¹ *Life and Philosophy*, page 192 foll.

² Caird nowhere, so far as I know, developed these criticisms. I doubt whether he would have stated them to-day in that form.

³ *A. and R.*, page 260. I fear that in regard to this point I have failed to understand Prof. Dawes Hicks's contention. He seems (*MIND*, N.S., 133,

Widely as Bradley conceived himself to have departed from Hegel, he remained Hegelian in this that he believed that "everything we know both of outward and inward nature, in one word the objective world, is in its own self the same as it is in thought and that to think is to bring out the truth of our object, be it what it may".¹

In regard to the second of the above lines of criticism Bradley in his note-book epigram "every truth is so true that any truth must be false" has stated the paradox, which his theory of truth seems to involve, at least as effectively as any of his critics. Against this we have to set the statement in the *Essays*² that "the whole conclusion far from being paradoxical comes near, I should say, to platitude. If I were not convinced of its truth on the ground of metaphysics, I should still believe it upon instinct"—with the characteristic addition "though I am willing to assert that my metaphysics may be wrong, there is, I think, nothing that would convince me that my instinct is not right". It is with the metaphysical situation that we are here concerned. Bradley's view of it is well known. Dr. Stout has reminded us of part of it in his article. The ideal or claim of truth is that our thought should not only correspond with reality as from the outside but should take possession of and be taken possession of by reality. In "truth" we are to have the very thing, all the thing and nothing but the thing. But this we never can have. For in the first place the very form of thought divides the thing from its attributes, the "that" from the "what" and so far destroys it as the concrete union of the two, which in reality it is. In the second place all truth is asserted conditionally, in that it is asserted subject to conditions, the nature and extent of which we can never fully know. True, if you limit the judgment to a particular system, as for instance to number, you can say that in such propositions as $2 + 2 = 4$, $2 + 2 = 5$ you have "pure truth and sheer error". (Bradley insists upon this.) But if you ask whether in this system and the truths which express its nature the above ideal is realised there can be only one answer. It is on this ground that Bradley holds himself entitled to say that "the doctrine he advocates

p. 62) to be quoting the words "other bodies, souls and God are all states of my mind" (*A. and R.*, p. 300) as proof of Bradley's subjectivism, failing to notice that they occur in the statement of the dialectic by which the mind is driven from this rudimentary error to the admission of the truth that "the Universe and its objects must not be called states of my soul" (p. 301).

¹ Hegel's *Logic*, § 22 (Wallace's tr., p. 44).

² Page 268.

contains and subordinates the absolute view, and in short justifies it relatively".¹

It is these more formal elements in Bradley's view that, as in Dr. Stout's article, have been the main subject of criticism. How far this criticism is valid, it is not my object here to enquire.² But, even though they were less defensible than Bradley held them to be, the ultimate ground of his view of the relativity of all truth was not these but the fact that the characters and relations of things that can appear as the predicates of logical judgment are only a part of their reality. Things are to feeling and will more than they can ever be to thought. In other words there is a larger truth which no thought can embrace just because thought is itself a part and can only bear partial witness to a reality that goes beyond it. Whether in view of this larger truth it is paradox or platitude to assert that every truth is so true (in the narrower sense) that any truth must be false (in the larger) the reader, as Bradley would say, must please himself. It may be legitimate to question Bradley's use of "truth" in this metaphysical sense, though the literature both of religion and philosophy would, I think, amply justify it. But, granting its legitimacy, no other conclusion seems possible as to the ultimateness of intellectual truth.

3. Leaving these details of criticism and returning to the main question raised by Caird in the above quotations and intended, I think, to be pressed by Dr. Ward as the gist of his article, what shall we say of Bradley's metaphysic as a whole? Wherein can we say that it marks a step of progress in the great argument we call modern philosophy? How far is the suspicion of failure and regression justified on a fair estimate of it? It may very well be that we of this generation are hardly in a position to reply to these questions. Some of us may be too near to him, some too far away from him to be competent judges. But I shall venture a surmise on both of them.

¹ *Essays*, p. 267.

² With reference to the second of them there is, however, one fundamental point in which Dr. Stout's argument that we start from such truths as $2 + 2 = 4$ and that it is they that justify us in asserting the truth of the system seems to prove too much. I should have thought it a commonplace of modern logic that we start neither from the particular truths, as on the empirical, nor with the whole or universal, as on the *a priori* view, but that the particular truths and the idea of system, found together from the beginning, stand or fall together in the end. The ultimate ground of the particular truth is "that or nothing". Dr. Stout himself has known (none better) how to insist elsewhere that all particulars are asserted on the background of a synthesis, whether noetic or anoetic.

If by its works a philosophical principle like other things is to be known, it is impossible to believe that the principle of the Idealism of the sixties and seventies was a wholly false one. This philosophy was an attempt to place British thought again in the great line of the continental tradition from Plato to Hegel. It gave to it an impulse comparable in some degree to that which Greek philosophy received "when Parmenides came to Athens at the great Panathenæa," and it was followed by the same burst of constructive activity. In this movement Bradley's place is secure both by reason of the clearness with which he conceived of this principle and the consistency and fertility with which he applied it. But, besides developing on fresh lines the thought of the earlier men, he sought, as we have seen, to advance upon it and free it from the last taint of intellectualism by conceiving of the Absolute in a more concrete way as the reality which the mind at one level feels without knowing it, at another finds pressing on it with the force of the ideals which its own nature pledges it to reach after and so far as may be to realise in the actual world, at another still as that which it may apprehend (if only momentarily) as an encompassing presence with which it feels itself at one. In taking this step I cannot help believing that he made an advance and that his teaching possesses a certain finality comparable to that of some of the greatest.

But there is another side to all this. In mechanics it is found that in proportion to the magnitude of the forces with which men are operating is the risk of error in the application of them to practice. It seems to be somewhat the same in philosophy. In proportion to the scope and power of the principle you accept is the danger that by some fault of emphasis or some incautious phrase a false turn be given to the argument or a false impression be created as to its issue. I do not think that Bradley has altogether escaped this danger. Granted the extension of the idealist principle, for which Bradley's philosophy stands, how, it may be asked, are we to conceive of its relation to the things or experiences, which we ordinarily account the most real: to the world of sense perception, to nature as science describes it, to art, morality and religion, finally to the self into whose life all these enter as elements and in which they find their focus? Are we to conceive of the central reality as something overshadowing and spreading darkness among them by its excess of light? Along this line everything seems to lose its specific colour and value. Not only is nothing as it seems but nothing is more than seeming.

Or are we to conceive of it as a light that reveals itself in and through them, more fully indeed in some than in others, to some minds than to others *in modum recipientis*, but present in some degree in all? Along this line while everything, so far as it is merely finite, is condemned, everything at the same time is raised above its finitude and partakes in its own degree in the completeness of the whole.

I believe that Bradley has made it abundantly clear how he *intended* from the first to answer this question. In 1883 he wrote "that the glory of the world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour,"¹ and in *Appearance and Reality*² "there is no reality at all anywhere except in appearances and in our appearance we can discover the main nature of reality". Not to mention other passages that Dr. Ward has quoted in his article, in a private letter near the end of his life, referring to the criticism of himself and Bosanquet by a contemporary, he put his whole position in a nutshell: "When we say 'Not only *that* but so much *more*: that you must not merely say *that*,' he seems to take this as a denial of 'that,' whenever it suits him". It is this recognition of the "that and so much more" that distinguishes Bradley from Spinoza. Yet that he somehow failed to convey this impression seems proved by the constant recurrence of the same misunderstanding as he here pillories; and the explanation, I think, is not far to seek.

At the beginning of this article I dwelt upon the essentially critical bent of Bradley's mind, his hatred of every form of abstraction and the idolatry that is apt to attend it, and upon his conviction that these were the leading vices both of the philosophic and the popular thought of his time and country. Particular abstractions had occurred for criticism in the fields of Ethics and Logic, but in Metaphysics the whole ground seemed to him covered with them. Hence in the first part of *Appearance and Reality* the overwhelming emphasis on the negative dialectic—the "commination clauses" we might call it of his liturgy. No reader probably but has felt the fascination of the devastating logic that sweeps everything commonly accounted real, himself among them, into the limbo of appearance. After the wind, the earthquake and the fire there comes indeed the still small voice to assure us that, though all these things are not the realities they sometimes appear, yet they are the appearances of reality and if we do not find it in them we shall not find it anywhere

¹ *Principles* etc., page 533.

² Page 551.

at all. It is this voice that speaks in the latter part of the book and in his later work as a whole. But that it has not spoken loudly enough to bring conviction seems clear from the persistent reiteration of the above criticism. One reason for this, I believe, is that to the last he continued to use language as to the indefiniteness of the extent to which the commonly accounted reals have to be supplemented and transmuted before they can take their place in the Valhalla of the absolute, which seems to refute it. It is for this reason that I so far agree with Bradley's critics as to hold that there is need for a revision of his work. But if what I have already said of it is true, this cannot mean that, as Green said of Hegel, "it must *all* be done over again". The central part of it will, I believe, stand secure and will have to be the starting point of any such revision. What may very well have to be done over again is the interpretation in detail of our world on the second of the two lines above suggested. But even here it will have to be with "the voice" which is his "ringing in our ear" and under the sign of his own correction of the misunderstanding which the letter, or perhaps rather the order of the letter, of his chief book may have occasioned. For it is in the "not only *that* but so much more" that the clue to the real meaning of his work must be recovered.

And, to return to what I said at the beginning, of this anyone who seeks to carry on that work may be assured that the more critical he is of it the more in harmony he will be with its ruling spirit. Of the "works," of which I there spoke, we can conceive him saying what Socrates says of his sons in his parting address to his judges: "I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they pretend to be something, when they are really nothing. And if you do this I and my sons will have received justice at your hands."

IV.—EPICUREAN INDUCTION.

By J. L. STOCKS.

Bibliographical Note.

1. The transcripts of the Herculaneum Papyrus numbered 1065 were first published in *Volumina Herculaneusia Coll. Alt.*, iv, 1-47. A restored text was issued by Theodor Gomperz in his *Herkulanische Studien* I. (Teubner, 1865). Supplementary material by R. Philippson in *Rheinisches Museum*, 64 (1909), 1-38, and 65 (1910), 313-316.

2. The papyrus has also been the subject of two monographs—

Des Epicureers Philodemus Schrift περὶ σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων. By F. Bahnsch (Lyck, 1879). [A not very substantial account of the argument.]

De Philodemi Libro qui est περὶ σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων et Epicureorum doctrina logica. By R. Philippson (Berlin, 1881). [A Latin dissertation, containing a most thorough and valuable discussion of the matter of the treatise from every side.]

3. The most important attempts to view the tract in historical perspective are contained in the two following works—

P. Natorp: *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum* (Berlin, 1884).

A. Schmekel: *Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892).

4. The only considerable source of information as to the unpublished portions of the Herculaneum library is the publications of Prof. W. Crönert, especially his—

Kolotes und Menedemos (No. VI. in Wessely's *Studien zur Paläographie und Papyruskunde*) (Leipzig, 1906).

I. *Epicurus and Herculaneum.*

Many years ago, in the introduction to his *Doxographi Graeci*, Diels called attention to the anti-Epicurean prejudice which colours the compendia of Greek philosophy composed in the days of eclecticism. The Epicureans are very rarely mentioned, and where they are mentioned, often it is only that they may receive a round of general abuse. He refers to the couplet of Timon's cited by Diogenes Laertius (x. 3), describing Epicurus as the last and worst of the physicists, and γραμμαδιδασκαλίδης ἀναγωγότατος ζώντων, 'an elementary school teacher who was himself the worst educated of living men'. He also cites a sentence from the Ps.-Galen's *History of Philosophy* (*Dox. Gr.*, 601, 15) to the following effect:

"Epicurus, despising, as some have supposed, the solemnity

characteristic of philosophy (τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν σεμνότητος), took refuge in a method (ἐπὶ τινα τρόπον) which has not approved itself to exact philosophers."

This dislike of Epicureanism seems unconsciously to have affected most modern students of ancient philosophy. And in them it manifests itself similarly, as a kind of conspiracy of silence. The power and eloquence of Lucretius' great work have brought many students into the neighbourhood, so to speak, of Epicurus' garden; but their interests have as a rule not been mainly philosophical and consequently they have made no very determined effort to get in. The popular idea of Lucretius is that of a great mind struggling with an inadequate philosophy, whereas in the case of practically all other Roman attempts at philosophy the complete incapacity of the Roman mind to pass beyond the elegant embroidery of moral platitudes and think for itself is recognised as immediately evident. In short, while all other Roman writers are generally and rightly supposed to be presenting the philosophy which they expound at its worst, Lucretius, thanks to this traditional prejudice against the Epicureans, is thought to be presenting Epicureanism at its best. And that best 'has not approved itself'.

The discovery of the Epicurean library at Herculaneum with its 2000 burnt and lacerated rolls, mostly written by the indefatigable Philodemus, has done little to lift this cloud of prejudice. It may even be said in a certain sense to have consolidated it, by providing evidence in justification. The contents of these rolls, with very few exceptions, were found, as the immense labour of transcription and restoration proceeded, to be almost wholly destitute of philosophical significance. And even the few exceptions have been severely handicapped by the immense initial difficulties with which the interpreter is faced, owing to the fragmentary character of the text. It is more than 100 years since the library was discovered. The rate of progress may be gauged by a single instance. By general consent the most important work in the library was the *περὶ φύσεως* of Epicurus, his manual of philosophy in 37 books, of which considerable fragments were among the first transcripts published. In 1818 a very hasty restoration of a few of these, with a Latin translation and commentary, was published by Orelli. From the first the Naples authorities promised a complete edition. To this day no edition has appeared: many of the rolls are not published at all: many only in the inadequate transcripts of the *Volumina Herculaneisia*: and those which have been more fully treated are buried in the files of learned periodicals,

usually with a promise of more adequate criticism to come. When Usener published his *Epicurea* in 1887, he felt obliged to leave this valuable source of information entirely out of account, relying partly on one of Theodor Gomperz's many unfulfilled promises (an immediate edition), but also owing to the inherent difficulties of the lack of interpretation. "Risum meruissim," he says, "si solis apographis Neapolitanis nisus frustra temptare ausus essem." Usener's material has passed from hand to hand, but no scholar has yet ventured to risk his reputation on an edition. The Herculaneum library has, therefore, not so far helped greatly. It has rather confirmed, not only the prejudice, but the conspiracy of silence. For the student of philosophy who is not primarily a philologist may easily burn his fingers when he meddles with texts which only the most expert philologists and papyrologists, with special training in this particular field, can hope to reconstruct with any certainty.

A less fierce light beats on Philodemus than on Epicurus; and many of his works are also much better preserved. Further, the philosophical insignificance of most of these works is balanced by another consideration. Philodemus' pages are full of names and quotations, and therefore offer invaluable aid in that amusing and exciting game, so popular in the German universities, which a German professor, himself an expert practitioner, has well called the scholar's sport of source-hunting. This however is a game for experts, with peculiar and intricate rules of its own. Its philosophical results are very slight, and its measures of value are in no direct relation to the philosophical.

To this combination of circumstances seems to be due the comparative neglect of Pap. No. 1065, the logical tract which is the subject of this paper. My treatment can claim no special novelty; it is in the main only an attempt to show that the tract deserves much more attention than it has hitherto received from students of ancient philosophy.

II. *Logical Works in the Herculaneum Library.*

The Library of Herculaneum contained a number of biographical and historical works (e.g., *Index Stoicorum* and *Academicorum*), all of which seem to be by Philodemus. These are not now in question. The more properly philosophical works may be classified in the usual triad, logic, physics, and ethics; though it must of course be remembered that the Epicurean school refused to recognise logic as a separate department of philosophy. They accepted only two

divisions, physics and ethics, and included logic in the former. For it was the business of physics, they said, to investigate the force of words, the nature of speech, and the grounds of consecution and contradiction. Such topics as definition, division, modes of reasoning, protection against sophisms, detection of ambiguities they rejected altogether.¹ Thus the Epicurean logic would be expected in any case to be far less imposing in bulk and far less central in character than, *e.g.*, that of their "dialectical" rivals, the Stoics, to say nothing of experts in quibbling like the Sceptics and Empirics.

A general survey of the library shows a heavy preponderance of ethical and semi-ethical works. Among these might even be put the *Rhetoric* of Philodemus and the treatise *On the Gods*. Physics proper seems to have been very slightly represented. It may perhaps be presumed that Philodemus' circle was content in this department with the great work of the master, which suggests the inference that the leading members of the school when Philodemus attended it, Zeno of Sidon and Demetrius the Laconian, were not particularly interested in physical questions. As to logic, the library included a number of other works besides the roll under discussion. The following may be mentioned:—

(1) Pap. 307. The *λογικὰ ζητήματα* of Chrysippus. Three other Stoic works are known to have been included in the Herculanæum library, but none of them deals with logical problems; and Von Arnim also claims Pap. 1020 (semi-logical) for Chrysippus (*Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, II, p. 40).

(2) Pap. 1389. 'By Philodemus after Zeno's lectures . . . ' (remainder of title lost). Appears to discuss definition and other topics similar to those discussed in our roll.

(3) Pap. 1003. 'By Philodemus after Zeno's lectures . . . ' (remainder of title lost). Discusses the firmness of conviction which characterises the philosopher.

(4) Pap. 671. (Title lost.) Discusses sense-perception.

(5) Pap. 861. (Title lost.) Seems to be controversial; but the evidence is slight.

(6) Pap. 998. (Title lost.) Judging from the fragments published by Crönert this roll is of great interest; for it appears to deal with the vexed question of the *κριτήρια*. In col. 10 he reads: *κατὰ [τὴν αἴσ]θησιν ἢ τὴν τῆς διαν[ο]ύ[α]ς ἐπ[ι]βολ[ὴν] φανταστικὴν* (*cf.*, Epicur. *Sent.*, xxiv).

Crönert thinks that (2) (4) and (6) probably belong to the *De Signis*. Our roll ends, as he points out, by promising in the concluding portion of the treatise an examination of the

¹ *Epicurea*, fr. 243 (Cicero).

views of certain physicians. It is evidently the last roll but one of a work in at least three rolls.¹

III. *Philodemus.*

Practically nothing is known of Philodemus except what can be gathered from the pages of Cicero and from his own writings. Obviously he had been trained in the Garden at Athens while Zeno of Sidon presided over it, *i.e.*, somewhere about 100 B.C., and presumably he took a good degree in what was at that time a vigorous and flourishing school of philosophy. Demetrius Lacon was probably associated with Zeno in the management of the School, which had recently renewed its youth under the strenuous guidance of Apollodorus, called the Garden-Tyrant (Kepotyrannus), a martinet, one must suppose, and the author of over 400 books not one of which has survived. Zeno and Demetrius had been pupils of Apollodorus and may be supposed to have carried on his traditions. What Philodemus may have done before he comes into view in Italy one can only guess; but sometime before the middle of the first century he seems to have settled on the shore of the gulf of Naples as a member of the household of Piso and the centre of a circle of well-to-do Italians, students of the Epicurean philosophy. Philodemus' epigrams in verse, as well as the careful and elaborate style of his writings, show him to be something of a *littérateur*. In his prose writings he pretends to no originality. He is evidently more a writer on philosophy than a philosopher. At least three of the titles of his works, apart from that under discussion, avow derivation from the lectures of Zeno (ἐκ τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν), and other sources are from time to time mentioned. On the other hand, Diels² praises his careful and accurate treatment of his sources in the *περὶ εὐσεβείας*, emphasising his superiority over his fluent and superficial contemporary Cicero; and of his other works, so far as external checks are available, no complaint has been made. We have no reason therefore to distrust his report of Epicurean teaching, so far as industry, honesty, and goodwill are concerned.

¹ Of the six papyri above mentioned (1) has been edited by Crönert in *Hermes* 36 (1901) and by Von Arnim in *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.*, II., pp. 96-110. The remainder are unpublished. What scanty information is available about them will be found in this same article in *Hermes* and in Crönert's *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 103, n. 498. Scott in his *Fragmenta Herculaneusia*, p. 29, suspected that Pap. 1012 belonged to the *De Signis*: but Crönert's fuller report of this roll in *K. u. M.*, pp. 115 ff., refutes this. His ascription to Demetrius Lacon is probably correct.

² *Dox. Gr.*, p. 125.

The question may be asked, did Philodemus write these works for general circulation or only for his Epicurean group which centred in Piso? Philippson¹ points to certain traces of hasty composition in the *De Signis* as evidence that this work was written for the circle rather than for the general public; but the evidence is not very conclusive, and he seems to regard the *De Signis* as exceptional. It is quite possible that some of the works were occasioned by the special needs of the circle; but composition on such a scale must have meant prolonged and continuous activity over a number of years. Philodemus must probably be regarded as a habitual writer who wrote for publication and as only secondarily a teacher; and if our tract is really, as seems probable, only a part of a larger work, it seems likely that the roughnesses point rather to a lack of final revision than to a restricted circle of readers. Would a writer so carefully avoid hiatus if his writings were merely intended for the eyes of a few friends?

IV. *Contents of the "De Signis."*

When rolls are destroyed obviously the outer portions will be destroyed first; and consequently it is nearly always the case with the Herculaneum papyri that the best preserved portions are the innermost, *i.e.*, the ends of books.

The *περὶ σημείων* is an exceptionally well-preserved roll. Gomperz's edition gives 38 columns of 38 or 39 lines each and two fragments. There is no doubt as to the sequence of the columns, which offer a continuous text capable of pretty certain restoration to its original form. There are gaps, but these are not very serious. They are made to look more serious than they are in Gomperz's edition by his decision to keep out of the text all restorations which were highly conjectural. There are six other fragments, two of which have been restored by Philippson, and a small quantity of further additional material has been published by Philippson and Crönert.

The 38 columns are the last 38 of the book. The beginning is lost. I have been unable to find any estimate of the probable extent of the loss. Judging by the length of the book as it stands in comparison with other Philodemus rolls, I should judge that the amount lost is small.

Argument.

The argument of the book, as it stands, falls into four main divisions according to the four sources followed.

¹ *De Philodemi Libro*, etc., p. 6.

Part I. Col. 1-19. Dionysius' objections and Zeno's replies.

(a) The book opens in the middle of the statement of certain objections brought against Epicurean theories by a Stoic named Dionysius. It soon appears that what is missing here is the first three objections: the remaining six are preserved.

(b) There follow Zeno's replies to these objections.

Part II. Col. 19-27. Supplement based on Bromios.

Philodemus introduces this as follows (19, 4): 'In discoursing to us Zeno expounded the foregoing arguments of the opposition and replied to them as I have said. But Bromios told me that the following confirmations of the objections (πιστώματ' αὐτῶν) and further replies (συναντήματα) were also expounded.' There follow objections and replies very similar to those already discussed.

Philodemus seems himself to have had some doubt as to the value of this Bromios Supplement. For he ends this part with the following words (27, 33): "It may be thought that these arguments of the opposition are different from the foregoing and have met different replies; or, on the other hand, that some only are new and these not very well composed, since Zeno dealt with the matter more thoroughly in another place before or after this refutation." (This translation follows Philippson's restoration, of which the latter part is perhaps not quite satisfactory).

Part III. Col. 28-29. The Demetriacum.

Philodemus says he will not any longer follow the arguments of the opposition and take them *seriatim*. He will now consider them as a whole and exhibit their general weaknesses (δηκούσας κακίας). A concise summary of these lies, he says, ready to hand in the *Demetriacum* (ἐν τῷ Δημητριάκῳ σφόδρ' ἐπιτόμως ἔκκεται). This he next retails. It is a short passage, and the treatment is most summary. Each underlying weakness is introduced by τὸ followed by an infinitive—"their not having seen that . . ." This suggests that the source is simply copied out.

Part IV. Col. 29—end.

The transition to this section from the last is unfortunately lost, and there has been some difference of opinion as to its source. After the gap containing the transition the first clear sentence begins—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἔφη. It is therefore a report of a lecture or conversation; and certain differences of emphasis from Parts I. and II. justify the view that the speaker is not Zeno. Most probably he is Demetrius. Natorp takes him for Apollodorus the Garden Tryant, whom he supposes to have originated this development of Epicurean-

ism. The subject of this concluding section is the same as that of the third, *i.e.* the general faults of the Stoic arguments. The section (and the book) concludes with the following words — 'The sayings and writing of certain physicians concerning inference by resemblance we will consider, if our digestion will stand it and nothing else prevents, in the concluding portion of our discourse.'

Certain points arising out of this survey of the book may be dealt with at once.

1. The Dionysius referred to is no doubt Dionysius of Cyrene, a Stoic of the generation previous to Posidonius, who had some reputation as a mathematician. Perhaps a younger contemporary of Panaetius and an older contemporary of Zeno. He also represents the Stoics in *περι θεῶν* *α*, col. 9,¹ and there seem to be traces of him in other rolls.² Apart from Herculaneum he is practically unknown, but there is a passing mention by Tertullian, who says of him that he recognised three kinds of God, visible, invisible, and deified men.³ Crönert remarks that his work seems to have been obscured by the fame of his great successor Posidonius.

2. Bromios also turns up in the *Rhetoric*.⁴ He is there referred to as a close friend (*τὸν φίλτατον*) of Philodemus who has written a work *περὶ τεχνῶν*. He was no doubt a contemporary of Philodemus in the school. The supplement contributed by Bromios must be supposed to have been an account of a lecture by Zeno or of conversation with him when Philodemus was not present.

3. The *Demetriadum*, as I have called it (supplying *βιβλίον*), seems to be taken by all writers on this work to be the name of a work by Demetrius Lacon. None of them give any explanation of the curious title or nickname of this work, though Natorp suggests that the work was more explicitly described in an earlier lost reference. Surely it can hardly have been a title, if the work was written by Demetrius. But I suppose it might have been a nickname current in the school for a compendium of logic written by Demetrius. I should like to know if there are any parallels to a name of this kind.

Our knowledge of Demetrius Lacon is almost entirely derived from Herculaneum. Seven Herculanean rolls bear

¹ *Philodemos über die Gotter: erstes Buch* (H. Diels), p. 55 (*Abhandlungen of the Berlin Academy*, 1916).

² See Crönert, *Kol. u. Men.*, p. 123, and Schmekel, *Ph. d. mitt. Stoa*, Index, *s.v.*

³ Cited by Diels, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Ed. Sudhaus, vol. i., p. 64.

his name, and Crönert has made out a good case for attributing several other rolls to him.¹

As to the argument itself: it will be observed that from beginning to end we have elaborate and involved controversy—criticisms by Stoics, answered first *seriatim* and then in general. No part of the book states directly the doctrine criticised or an alternative to it. This creates a curious problem in interpretation. In controversy men are apt to use a mixed terminology, part their own and part their opponents. It is a matter requiring nice judgment to dissect a controversy like the present at the joints, so that each party has its own and no more. What different results different temperaments may arrive at in such a case is excellently seen by comparing Natorp with Schmekel.² Each constructs a pretty theory of *σημείωσις* for the school of his choice, but Schmekel complains that Natorp was only able to do so well by the Epicureans because of his ignorance of Stoicism, and Natorp could probably have reversed the statement on Schmekel. In fact each is trying to claim all the sensible logical doctrine he can find in the book for one of the parties.

Lastly, it will be noticed that in the book as we have it Philodemus seems merely to have put his four sources together without attempting to effect anything more than a purely external relation between them. As Schmekel says (p. 16), "Philodem hat nichts weiter getan als seine Quellen in der einfachsten Weise aneinander zu reihen."

V. The Theory of Signs.

The subject of our tract is Signs and Signification, if 'signification' may be used to stand for inference from signs. But before dealing with the treatise itself it will be well to consider some external evidence as to what this Theory of Signs was.

After Aristotle's familiar account of Signs in the *Prior Analytics* (ii., 27) there seems to be a blank of some centuries. Aristotle's definition was as follows—*οὗ ὅντος ἔστιν ἢ οὗ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι*. The argument was an unsatisfactory attempt at demonstration by means of a sign or symptom, this being a phenomenon adduced as evidence of the existence, prior, simultaneous, or posterior, of another

¹ *Kol. u. Men.*, pp. 100-125. Crönert's reconstruction of Demetrius Lacon is one of the most brilliant performances of a remarkable book. V. de Falco's recent *L'Epicureo Demetrio Lacone* (Naples, 1923) is the direct product of this section of Crönert's book, and presents a complete edition of the remains of Demetrius as reconstructed.

² See Bibliographical Note for works referred to.

related phenomenon. There were three varieties corresponding to the three figures of the syllogism. The examples given were (1) pregnancy inferred from the presence of milk; (2) pregnancy inferred from paleness; (3) the goodness of the wise inferred from the goodness of Pittacus. The theory of the Sign is an unimportant feature of Aristotle's logic: but the phrase *σημείον δέ*, introducing confirmation of a suggested explanation, is of course exceedingly common in Aristotle's non-logical writings.

Apart from this passage and certain scattered medical testimonies, which deserve a more careful examination than I have been able to give them, we hear nothing further of Signs until we come to Sextus Empiricus, the sceptical physician of the second century A.D.¹ In him, to our surprise, we find the Sign elevated to the rank of a main logical topic. Both the *Hypotyposes* and the books *Against the Dogmatics* investigate at length the nature of Signs, and attempt to prove that no good case has been made out for their existence in the form in which philosophers assert it. Unfortunately Sextus makes even less attempt than usual to keep clear the contributions of the different schools of philosophy, and it is often difficult to say with certainty whom he is attacking.

In both treatises the discussion of the Sign is followed by a discussion of Demonstration. Sometimes (e.g. *Dogm.*, ii., 260), sign and demonstration is presented as an exhaustive disjunction comparable to Aristotle's disjunction, *ἐπαγωγή* and *συλλογισμός*. But we are also more than once informed² that *ἀπόδειξις* is *τῷ γένει σημείον*, 'demonstration is generically a sign'. The word *σημείον* had in fact come to be used of all proof or inference, of which the main subdivisions were *σημείον* proper and *ἀπόδειξις*.³ The narrower

¹ Zeno of Citium is said to have written a tract *περὶ σημείων*, but nothing is known as to its contents. I assume with Pearson (*Frag. of Zeno and Cleanthes*, p. 29) that this was not a logical work, but probably a treatise on divination. We have a fairly detailed knowledge of Chrysippus' logical treatises, and in them so far as is known *σημείον* in its logical sense does not occur. It is unlikely that a topic so unimportant to Chrysippus should have received a tract to itself from Zeno. The arguments of Schmekel (*op. cit.*, p. 341) to the opposite effect are to me unconvincing. They do not appear to have convinced von Arnim, to judge from his first volume. In his second volume (Chrysippus) he prints long extracts from Sextus by themselves in a section headed *περὶ σημείων*. But this is in small print, and we are warned in the preface to the whole that matter in small print is not to be taken as attributed to Chrysippus, but only as exhibiting 'aliquam necessitudinem' with his doctrine (*Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, I, v.)

² E.g., *Dogm.*, ii., 277 and 289.

³ The ambiguity of *σημείον* is recognised by Sextus (*Dogm.*, ii., 143). (In citing Sextus I refer only to *Dogm.* The parallel passages in *Hyp.* are

use of *σημείον* is clearly the more natural use, since Sextus at least twice answers the question *τί ἐστι σημείον* without referring to *ἀπόδειξις*.

The main points in Sextus' evidence seem to be the following:—

1. Things are either observed or unobserved (*πρόδηλα—ἀδηλα*), and the unobserved are of three kinds (*α*) *καθάπαξ*—finally and utterly beyond man's grasp, *e.g.*, the number of grains of sand in the African desert: (*β*) *φύσει*—eternally concealed from observation, *e.g.*, minute structural features of bodies or the infinite void beyond the world: (*γ*) *πρὸς καιρὸν*—temporarily obscured, *e.g.*, the city of Athens from us now. (*Dogm.*, ii., 145 ff.)

2. With regard to the first no sign will help: but of the second and third it is supposed that information can be obtained by signs. This in two ways: (*α*) there is the sign of reminder (*ὑπομνηστικόν*) recalling to mind something frequently found accompanying it in experience. Thus smoke is taken as a sign of a present fire, a scar of a past wound, a wound in the heart of coming death. All these are of *πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδηλα*. (*β*) There is the sign of discovery (*ἐνδεικτικόν*), which is postulated for the sake of the *φύσει ἀδηλα*. Here association will evidently not explain the inference, and the sign must be supposed to reveal the unseen by its own power and constitution. In this sense the observed movements of the human body are taken as a sign justifying the assertion of the existence and character of the unobserved human soul. Sextus is ready to concede the validity of the sign of reminder: it is the sign of discovery alone that he contests (ii., 151 ff.)

3. The Stoic definition of a sign was *ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιῇ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον ἐκκαλυπτικόν τοῦ λήγοντος*, 'the antecedent member of a sound conjunction revelatory of the consequent'. An important point in this rather technical definition is the reduction of signification to a hypothetical, of which the antecedent gives the sign and the consequent the signified. It is to be presumed that this definition was intended to cover all signs, and not merely the sign of discovery. As one instance, Sextus gives a variant of an Aristotelian example—"If this woman has milk, she has had a child". (The signified is no longer a present state, but a past event.) (ii., 245, 252.)

to be found in Mutschmann's Teubner text noted at the foot of the page. The general references for the discussion as a whole are *Hyp.*, ii., 97-133; *Dogm.*, ii., 141-299.)

4. The authors of the definition quoted say a sign must be *παρὸν παρόντος*: i.e., they reject such inference as from scar to past wound and from wound to coming death. Clearly they must also reject the example from childbirth given above. But Sextus goes on to argue that in a sense these are all *παρὸν παρόντος*, as though not quite certain on this point (ii., 254 f.).

5. Signification, says Sextus, is seen in sailors, farmers, and dogs—not merely in logicians. It is not plain how far his opponents would admit this. But it appears to be common ground that it is freely used in the arts (ii., 270).

6. Sextus says (ii., 156) that the sign of discovery is the fiction of the dogmatic philosophers and the rationalist (*λογικοί*) physicians. He seldom mentions a particular sect. He notes (ii., 177) that according to Epicurus and the leaders of his school the sign was an *αἰσθητόν*, while the Stoics held it to be a *νοητόν*; and other differences between sects less relevant to our purpose are occasionally noted. On one occasion (ii., 275), the *δογματικοί* are said to maintain a view which is plainly Stoic, and on the whole it seems probable that throughout the section the Stoics are mainly in view. But it does not of course follow that the theory of the Sign was an integral part of Stoic logic. It may have been an Epicurean development, to which the Stoics developed in controversy an alternative. It appears from one passage (ii., 215) that the *Pyrrhonian Discourses* of Aenesidemus treated fully of the Sign, which takes the controversy back to the time of Philodemus; but there is no direct evidence in Sextus taking it further back.

There is another fragment of external evidence outside the pages of Sextus. The Ps.-Galen's *History of Philosophy* (*Dox. Gr.*, p. 605) operates with a disjunction, Sign and Syllogism, identical with that of Sextus. The same two kinds of sign are given. The same definition is cited as that of the 'Dialecticians'; and the same example of signification (from present milk to past child-bearing) is adduced.

VI. The Doctrine of the "De Signis".

The general problem of inference is to find a basis in experience for assertion which goes beyond experience. Such a basis is called a *sign*, the fact based upon it the *signified* (*σημειωτόν*). The sign must of course be direct unquestioned experience (*ἐναργές*, etc.). The inference is called generally transition (*μετάβασις*), or more particularly signification

(σημείωσις). The corresponding verbs (μεταβαίνειν, σημειοῦσθαι) are used. In one passage συλλογίζεσθαι is used for σημειοῦσθαι (16, 30).

Some instances will make these formulæ clearer. There are two stock instances which frequently recur. (1) Inference from the mortality of men within our experience to assertion of mortality of man without qualification: "Since men with us (παρ' ἡμῶν) are mortal, all men whatever are mortal". In this case we have the assertion of a familiar character in regions beyond experience. (2) The second stock instance is the well-known proposition, "If there is movement, there is void," (8, 12, 38). This is always expressed in the hypothetical form. Here we have the assertion of a conjectured entity, necessarily unobservable (*i.e.*, φύσει ἀόηλον), postulated as a condition necessary to the existence of that which is observed.

Other typical instances are the following:—

(a) Concerning *atoms*. "Since all bodies with us are coloured, or destructible, or heavy, atoms are coloured, or destructible, or heavy." The first two of these inferences would be false on the Epicurean view, but the last would be true. The distinction rests on determining in the bodies we know the precise nature of the several attributes. Weight, like resistance, is found to be inseparable from body.

(b) Concerning the *sun*. With us things which appear slowly from behind covering bodies do so either because they move slowly or because of their great size. The sun appears slowly from behind the moon. But the sun does not move slowly. If it did, it could not complete its long journey in twenty-four hours, as it does. Therefore the sun is of great size.

(c) Another interesting case is the well-known assertion of a minimal deviation of atoms from their proper line of movement. This is apparently based on the ascertained facts of chance and free will, together with the absence of evidence to the contrary in experience.

Instances given of false inferences are—that the men of Akrothoön are short-lived, because men with us are—that figs will grow anywhere because they grow with us—that eyes will grow again when plucked out because hair does—that the area and perimeter of all squares can be designated by the same number because this is the case with 4×4 .

These examples are sufficient to show the variety of type included in the term signification. It suggests, I think, that the Epicureans brought all real inference (in Mill's sense) under the term. If there is deduction, it would be regarded,

I take it, as mere hermeneutics, reference to a register of previous observations and their legitimate extensions.

Most of these examples are stated in the form 'since A with us is B, A everywhere is B'. Another common form is this:—'from the fact that . . . (ἐκ-ἀπὸ-τοῦ . . .), we signify concerning the fact that . . . (σημειούμεθα περὶ τοῦ . . .)'. These are the commonest forms of statement. The conditional form occurs in the case of movement and the void, and occasionally elsewhere. I suspect that the Epicureans were not accustomed to express their significations generally in the conditional form, and that the insistence on reduction to this form was a purely Stoic dogma. The Stoic definition of Sign already cited requires of course such reduction. When the conditional form is used, the sign is stated in the antecedent and the thing signified in the consequent.

The question at issue between the Epicureans and the Stoics may be stated as follows. The Epicurean contention is that the method of resemblance (ὁ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τρόπος) is the basis of all signification whatever. All assertion which goes beyond experience, they maintain, finds its justification in the investigation of like cases found within experience. Comparison of these similar cases with identical results in each, together with the entire absence after careful search of any indication to the contrary, is able to establish universal or essential assertions. They admit that in some fields they may have to be satisfied with probability. But whether the assertion is probable or certain, its evidence is always the same in form, *viz.*, a uniformity or constant conjunction within experience established by examination of a variety of similar cases.

The constant use of the word 'like' leads one to suppose at first that this formula is intended only to cover such inferences as that from the mortality of all known men to that of all men whatever; *i.e.*, that in the phrase ὁ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τρόπος the likeness asserted is that of the observed to the unobserved rather than that of observed case to observed case. But this interpretation will not hold. It is not maintained that the asserted unseen is necessarily like the seen which is its evidence. Sometimes the extension beyond experience is effected by analogy (as in the case of mortality); and in that case the relation of unseen to seen is one of likeness. At other times we argue from an experienced effect to its unseen cause, as when we infer void from movements or atomic bodies from bodies composed of them. In these cases the unseen is cause or condition of the seen. But in these cases too the method is that of resemblance. The evidence

is the results of the investigation of observed movements—like cases—leading to the hypothesis of an unseen; and this hypothesis is not confined in its application within the limits of the investigation, but is extended to cover all movement whatever. Thus all inference is by resemblance, or, as the author of Part IV. says, the only form of signification is the method of resemblance.

The opposition contends that the essential feature of all extensions of knowledge beyond experience is what they call the method of removal (ὁ κατ' ἀνασκευὴν τρόπος). They take as typical the Epicurean proposition, "if there is movement, there is void". Here, they say, there is no real question of resemblance. Movement is not like void, nor void like movement; nor is the problem to find warrant for extending what is observed to hold good within experience to similar fields beyond it. The argument is really this: if there is movement, there must be void; for if void were removed from the world movement would cease. The contention might, I suppose, be put in the form that universal affirmative propositions are established indirectly by means of the contrapositive, not directly by means of the examination of what Mill calls positive instances. "All men are mortal," for instance, is guaranteed (if at all) by the evident truth of the proposition, "No not-mortal is man".¹

This argument from removal, then, say the Stoics, is the essential feature of all sound signification, even as the Epicureans themselves employ it. Analogy and resemblance may perhaps be of some use in the preliminary stages of investigation; but there is no real sign which does not stand in this relation to the signified, that the refusal to accept the inference means its destruction.

The procedure which I attribute to the Stoics is closely parallel to that of the Epicureans. The Epicureans took a term which *prima facie* meant argument by analogy and extended it to cover cases in which the central feature of the inference did not appear to be analogy. The Stoics start with a term which is *prima facie* appropriate only to the non-analogical cases, and insist on extending it to cover the analogical. In short, the Stoics claim everything for their

¹ Schmekel (*op. cit.*, p. 302, n. 2) regards this contention apparently as a proof of Stoic acuteness, and as an essential point in their championship of rational insight into the mutual implication of facts against the coarse empiricism of the Epicureans, basing itself on mere agreement or on simple enumeration. But I do not find the rights and wrongs of the matter so plain as that, as the sequel will show.

'removal' as the Epicureans claim everything for their 'resemblance'.

The Epicureans, in reply, insist on confining removal to arguments on all fours with that about void and movement, *i.e.*, to cases in which the inferred unseen is a condition invented to account for an undisputed fact. In such cases, they admit, the hypothesis is properly tested by removal, by considering whether the denial of the consequent (the supposed necessary condition) necessarily involves the non-existence of the indisputable fact which is its alleged ground or antecedent. But even in these cases, they say, removal is only a test, or, in Mill's charming phrase, an indispensable collateral security. It is not here, or anywhere, a *form* of signification. It does not and cannot of itself lead to any extension of experience beyond its inevitable limitations. What it tests is an extension for which the real evidence is provided by resemblance. And further, to most extensions of this kind it is wholly inapplicable. When, *e.g.*, we extend the fact of human mortality, guaranteed within our experience, indefinitely beyond its limits, the removal of the contemplated unseen, *viz.* other men, gives no result. The Epicureans therefore contend that exclusive emphasis on removal makes all inference from the seen to the unseen impossible, and that, apart from that, the importance of removal is much exaggerated by the Stoics. To many fruitful extensions removal is inapplicable, and while it is true that the inconceivability of the opposite is a legitimate aim, this can be and is established by resemblance alone without any aid from removal whatsoever.

Thus the Epicureans claim that propositions which are necessary and universal can be established by the study of resemblances. Both sides, it seems, agreed to state such propositions by means of words like η and $\kappa\alpha\theta\delta$, *e.g.*, 'men, *quod* men, are mortal'. The Stoics granted that if propositions of this kind could be secured, extension beyond experience would be achieved; but they argued that such propositions are essentially an assertion of the inconceivability of the opposite and rest on removal. Zeno (or Demetrius?) seems inclined to accept the view that without these essential propositions (as we may call them) cogent signification was impossible. He complains, however, that his careful analysis of this type of proposition has been ignored by the Stoics; and they have also, he says, ignored the strict and elaborate rules which he has made for the conduct of the investigation of resemblances which is to establish them. They talk as if any superficial resemblance were thought by him sufficient

evidence for universal and necessary propositions. We may conclude this general statement of the Epicurean position by an attempt at an account of their views on these two crucial points. The first, it will be noticed, has to fill the place in the Epicurean theory filled in Mill's by the conception of Cause, as offering a road of escape from the contingency of phenomena; and the second corresponds to the rules of procedure enshrined in Mill's Four Experimental Methods.

We learn from the concluding section of the book that essential predication (attribution) is of four kinds, each of which gives necessity. These therefore give four distinct grounds of signification. The predicate may be—(1) a necessary concomitant (*ὁ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνέπεται*): e.g., man *quâ* man is fleshy and liable to disease and old age:

(2) the proper formula (*λόγος ἴδιος*) or preconception (*πρόληψις*): e.g., body *quâ* body has bulk and resistance; man *quâ* man is rational animal:

(3) a property (*συμβεβηκέναι*): e.g., man *quâ* man is [?mortal].

(4) The description of this fourth variety is lost, but three examples survive—

The knife cuts *καθὸ ἡκόνηται*,

Atoms are indestructible *καθὸ πλῆρεις*,

Body moves downward *καθὸ βάρος ἔχει*.

The relation in these cases is clearly one of consequence which '*quâ*' in our use will not render. In all other cases the '*quâ*' introduces a repetition of the subject; here it introduces a third term. In fact these last instances are telescoped syllogisms in the first figure. The middle term in each case seems to be drawn from one of the foregoing three classes. The required formula seems therefore to be this—'a derivative attribute immediately consequent on one of the foregoing'. (If I am right in this, Gomperz's conjecture *καθὸ ἀφροves* in ll. 18/19 must be wrong: for *ἀφροσύνη* cannot surely be an essential feature of anything.)

This is the whole of the evidence preserved under this head. It is interesting as showing to what extent the Epicureans found themselves compelled to fall back on something like Aristotle's predicables in order to make knowledge possible.

Rules of Investigation.—No formal statement of the rules laid down for investigation is to be found in the book. There are however a number of indications which may be

put together as follows. A careful survey of likenesses and differences is required¹ on these lines—

(1) Secure the highest possible degree of likeness (18, 19; 28).

(2) Secure the most specific likeness (*i.e.*, least general, vague, ambiguous) (18, 21).

(3) You cannot exhaust the instances, but you must make them both numerous and various (20, 30 ff.: πολλοῖς ὁμογενέσι καὶ ποικίλοις), *i.e.*, as varied as possible within the identity of kind. (*Cf.* Mill: 'only one circumstance in common'.)

(4) Do not ignore the differences, but carefully examine each in turn and so eliminate them all (πᾶσαν ἐκβάλλοντες παραλλαγήν, 21, 32).

(5) Do not always insist on a strict universal. You cannot always expect to find constant uniformities (κοινότητες ἀκίνητοι, 25, 36). Be content when necessary with a ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

(6) Before registering your conclusion, make a prolonged search for any contrary indications, either within your observation, or in the records of that of others, or in the προαποδεδειγμένα, *i.e.*, inferences already made (32, 24 ff.).

(7) In all cases the precise nature of the attribution intended must be made clear. *E.g.*, bodies are destructible. Yes: but not *quā* bodies. Only in virtue of containing the non-corporeal non-resistant void. Similarly of colour.

Thus what the Epicurean hopes to find is a conjunction persisting through difference in all experienced cases, which, in the absence of all suggestion to the contrary, may be justifiably regarded as a necessary conjunction, and so admit of extension beyond experience. What is so established may be asserted without fear of the unseen. For the seen is a fair specimen of the whole. "A thing devoid of all community with the seen is inconceivable" (21, 27). "We assume that such variety (ποικίλματα) as is found in experience is present also in the unseen" (25, 11). These last propositions give the Epicurean version of the assumption of the uniformity of nature.

If I tried to fill out this statement of the general Epicurean position with further detail, I should probably get into difficulties. There are many passages—some important—of the interpretation of which I am very doubtful. So, with apologies, I must decline to carry the exposition any further.

¹ περιοδεύοντων ἡμῶν τῷ ἐπιλογισμῷ δεόντως τὰς ὁμοιότητας (17, 32). περιοδεύειν is a regular Epicurean word for the systematic study of detail, and there is other evidence that ἐπιλογισμός was a technical term for the activity of thought involved. Both terms go back to Epicurus, but σημείον and its cognates, as here used, do not.

But I should like in conclusion to state the apparent relation of this new matter furnished by the *De Signis* to the old matter furnished by Sextus Empiricus.

It seems to me inherently probable, as Philippson says, that the impulse to the formation of a theory of signs came from the medical schools. Whether he is right in seeking the origins of the Epicurean doctrine in the joint influence of Democritus and Pyrrho on Nausiphanes, the author of the *Tripod* and reputed instructor of Epicurus, I do not feel competent to say. But the sceptical physicians may well have been sympathetic with Epicurean epistemology and may well have helped in the development of the theory. Of the Stoic view as presented by Sextus (so far as one can disentangle it) I feel that Zeno's criticism is true. It is not a theory of *σημείωσις* in the Epicurean sense at all. Sextus says no word of argument from resemblance, of the detailed study of resemblances, of what I called essential propositions, nor generally does he treat the problem as a problem of induction. The *De Signis* does certainly treat it in this light. It seems to me very unlikely that all this extra matter is either common to Stoics and Epicureans (as Schmekel seems to imply) or peculiar to the Stoics. It is surely far more likely that the Stoics treated the question in the dry formal way suggested by Sextus, and that so far as they did get involved in a discussion of the method of resemblance it was because Dionysius in his controversy with Zeno and Demetrius was led by them into it. I give the Stoics willingly their method of removal (of which only the faintest echo seems to have reached Sextus): but even that was probably a weapon of controversy, and the rest of the new matter furnished by the *De Signis* seems to me to be plainly Epicurean property. After all, there was no more favourable soil in Ancient Greece for a theory of Induction than the Garden of Epicurus. If Philippson, however, is right, even there it did not flourish long, but was suppressed as heretical or tiresome by Zeno's successors.

V.—RELIGION, METAPHYSICS, AND PRACTICE.

BY LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

AT the philosophical Conference at Reading in July, 1924, a good deal of discussion was stimulated by Prof. W. J. de Burgh's paper "Metaphysical and Religious Knowledge",¹ discussion which was increased by the incidence of the last *Symposium* of the session, on the problem of immanence and transcendence. At the latter meeting some attention was directed upon the ancient opposition between intuition and logic, and partisanship was freely expressed. Because there seems to be a good deal of misunderstanding on both sides as to the real function and meaning of religious experience and of metaphysics respectively, it seems worth while at this juncture to try to explore the field a little further.

A preliminary question, suggested by the title of Prof. de Burgh's paper, is not unimportant, but I do not intend to discuss it here. It is the question as to whether there are 'kinds' of knowledge at all. It may be seriously argued that all knowledge is essentially of the same kind, and that the differentiations which we do in common speech make between different 'kinds' of knowledge are due entirely to the conditions, subjective and objective, and to the objects, of knowledge. My aim here is, not to argue for or against this, but, accepting the common-sense view that there is at least some general concrete difference between 'metaphysical'² and 'religious' knowledge, to enquire at the outset as to their difference and as to their mutual relations. Afterwards I shall briefly discuss the respective places and values of religious experience and metaphysics.

To take 'metaphysical' knowledge first. We must distinguish between the genesis of metaphysical knowledge, the process by which we come to have it, and the consummation or maturity of that knowledge. The acquirement of metaphysical knowledge is a laborious process taking time. It is

¹ Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume IV., *Concepts of Continuity*.

² I take the term 'metaphysics' here as being equivalent to 'philosophy'.

(to put it dogmatically for brevity's sake) a process of intellectual analysis and synthesis by which the parts and wholes within the given Whole, Reality, are distinguished bit by bit and resynthesised into ideal wholes in relation to the larger Whole, in a way in which, in a rough and inaccurate sense, the ideal complex Whole can be said to correspond to the real. More accurately, the intellectual process of analysis and synthesis is one by which the mind acquires comprehension of the concrete complex Real itself. But, always, this active time-occupying intellectual process is only the means of attaining metaphysical knowledge, and is not, properly speaking, metaphysical knowledge itself. Nor again, can the total sum of true propositions about reality, when made, be said to constitute metaphysical knowledge, although this is sometimes supposed to be so. If we can suppose a being possessing perfect metaphysical knowledge, his knowledge would not be, on the one hand, a temporal process of analysis and synthesis, nor, on the other hand, a completed sum of true propositions. It would be, rather, the mental grasp of reality by a mind that had passed through these processes, that had synthesised propositions, and that had, by means of the previous mental processes, acquired what may be called a synthetic *attitude* of mind. The knowledge would be an intuitive insight into the whole system, and into the meaning of any particular fact in relation to the whole. How this intuition (which is, of course, not a mere feeling) can be accomplished even to the limited extent to which it is possible is a question for psychology as well as for logic. The act of intuition involves, *e.g.*, memory, and probably also some form of unconscious integration, so that what was realised bit by bit can somehow be held together and can be called up at the proper place and time through subconsciousness to the focus of consciousness. This quality of the mind which can envisage the complex whole and can pass masterfully from one point of knowledge to any other point is what Plato characterised as 'synoptic'. Its insight is what Spinoza called '*scientia intuitiva*'. To attain this insight, in which the meaning of the particular becomes clear in its relation to the rest of reality, is the ideal of all philosophy, an ideal which is only to some slight extent realised. If there were such complete insight there would be no need, so far as *knowledge* is concerned, for anything further. If it were possible to know in this complete way, even religion could contribute nothing more to knowledge.¹ Religion, so far as it

¹ Though its contribution to other aspects of life may be of the highest importance, as I shall argue below.

is knowledge, would itself be included in metaphysical knowledge. But this touches a point to be discussed more fully later.

Religion has been defined in many ways, but it may, for present purposes, be sufficient at the outset to describe (in the kind of language which those who have had religious experience would use) religious knowledge as the direct consciousness of the Spirit that is felt to be the Source of all Being, a Spirit to which the adjectives 'loving,' 'good,' 'holy,' and so on, are commonly applied. The individual feels in various ways that he is in loving and sympathetic contact with the Being who is the Essence of all things, an experience which is always accompanied by reverence and sometimes by awe. So much at the very least is claimed by the religious man himself.

The point which it is most important to emphasise in marking the contrast between metaphysical and religious knowledge is that the latter is primarily knowledge of Value.¹ To say this is not to imply that metaphysical knowledge is concerned only with mere bare Existence. Even sciences are to some extent concerned with functions and meanings, and it is the aim of metaphysics, most of all sciences, to attempt explanation of the meaning of particulars and so of their functioning worth or value in the system of the whole. Nor does the statement mean that religious knowledge is of Value as *opposed* to Existence. It may be convenient to oppose Value and Existence for special purposes, but it is always an abstraction, both in metaphysics and in ethics. And of course in fact the religious devotee predicates the existence of the Value he experiences.

When we say, then, that the religious experience is an experience of Value we do not mean that Value is an entity separated from the rest of reality, and which is experienced as separate from existence. Nor do we mean that the devotee calls it by the name 'Value'. He would say rather that the object of his worship is God, who, he might say further, unites Existence with Value. The Value-element may be said to enter in a two-fold way. The intense religious experience is in the first place an experience which is of high immediate intrinsic value to the experient; he feels simply that "it is good for us to be here," and he would, if his attention were directed to the experience, pronounce that the experience is one which has intrinsic

¹ I use a capital letter to denote that I am referring to the Value or Worth of Reality which the religious worshipper is alleged to know, and not to the worth of a particular thing as such.

worth and value in itself. In the second place the *Object* of the experience, Being or Reality or God, is pronounced to have Worth, indeed is pronounced to be the Source or Spring of all worth. The experience is felt to be a partaking of the ultimate Life of the Universe, which is the only thing possessing, truly and completely, intrinsic Worth, and which is the ground of the worth of all particular existences, lives and experiences, which in turn are partial revelations of itself. This religious knowledge is, it is held, an insight of a very peculiar sort, not in any way of the details of reality (though mystic experience may arise through contemplation of what are, in themselves, details) but in some direct way of the meaning of all existence. It seems to be as directly known to the experient as his pleasure or pain; his life appears to be, at the supreme religious moment, at one with the Life of the Universe, so that in knowing the nature of his own life he knows at the same time the nature of that Other. In the direct intuition of the exalted joy of that moment he seems to know, also directly, that this joy is one of the supreme ends of existence. He is inclined to go further, as a matter of fact, and to say that he knows *the End, the Meaning*, of all existence. As to whether all these claims are justified, we shall have to consider.

We must at least admit that the religious experient has knowledge of a sort, a knowledge of a kind of being within himself, of a kind of *living*, that in itself seems to make existence for him worth while. But this knowledge is not only of intrinsic worth to the experient, it is of value for metaphysics. The fact of this knowledge is one of the data with which metaphysics has to deal. And it is of the greatest importance that the metaphysician should have an intimate insight into this fact, based upon acquaintance. The metaphysician may have knowledge by description of all types of fact and value: he will—if he is the ideal figment we have been supposing—have complete discursive knowledge of the import of all scientific propositions, and he will, on the other hand, since metaphysics deals with values as well as facts, have discursive knowledge of the functions of values in reality. But knowledge by description is admittedly impossible without knowledge by acquaintance. If we suppose our metaphysician to have no *acquaintance* at all with values he will be totally unable to understand their function and place, and will thereby be rendered impotent as a metaphysician, just as without acquaintance with feeling and striving a psychologist would be impotent. It is important to remember this extreme case, as it demonstrates

the necessity for some direct intuition of value. In experience such an extreme case of course never occurs, and philosophers who may have very little capacity or sensitivity for deep experience of value may share in it to some extent, by proxy, so to speak. There is always some analogous value experience of their own to build upon, and although the building has to be done carefully, and dogmatism guarded against, it is not impossible to construct some sort of metaphysics upon quite slight foundations of personal experience. Strong imagination and sympathy combined with careful analogy will increase the chances of the metaphysics being sound and true. But the wider and deeper the personal experience, the better (other things being equal) the chances of the resulting philosophy.

For, though sympathy does much, the religious man, the mystic, and the poet (to take cases at the extreme end of the scale) are certainly sensitive to things of which the plain man knows practically nothing. The mystic or the poet testifies to the existence of an intrinsic worth of living because he has been acquainted with it in the life of his own soul in contact with reality, and it is this sense of his absolute unity with the reality which yields such worth that causes him to have no doubt whatsoever in adjudging this value to belong to reality. He himself, he believes, is in these experiences a part of reality, not apart from it, and the reality that is conscious in himself knows beyond any possible doubt the worth and joy of its own life. The ordinary man, on the other hand, or the religious man at his more ordinary moments, is in a practical relation to reality, where the necessity of self-distinction from reality and self-opposition to it, is necessary: the barrier between subjective and objective is marked. The individual is not less real at these moments, but he is more independent and wilful. He has not the immediate inner consciousness of the Value of Reality in the way that he has when the necessity to act is less prominent and when he seems to be fused through feeling with the inner Purpose of things.

But the question arises—and it always will arise so long as mystics are mystics and philosophers are philosophers—‘Is this religious knowledge or insight really and truly objective knowledge at all?’ When the philosopher asks this question the religious man gets angry, and either defends himself by asserting the objectivity of intuitions, or raises the attack by scoffing at what he calls mere logic. He says ‘I know it is so; that is enough, that is its own criterion.’

We have taken it for granted that intuitions are knowledge in *some* sense. This is a position which it would seem can be maintained without much difficulty. In the strict sense all experience whatsoever is cognitive experience, it involves cognition. This is true no less of illusions and hallucinations than of the experience of real tables and chairs or of other persons perceived by us. In *any* total experience there is always some objective happening which is experienced, as well as the experiencing by the subject.

This line of argument will not of course for a moment satisfy the philosopher as an answer to the question concerning the objectivity of religious intuitions. He may readily admit that all experience is in a sense cognitive, and yet say that what is important to him is whether the knowledge is *true* or not, and that one of the important tests of true knowledge is its coherence with the system of propositions, a coherence which is, further, *logical* coherence. And he will be right. But here the distinction made above between religious knowledge, which is knowledge primarily of value, and metaphysical knowledge, which is knowledge primarily of the meanings and relations of fact, may be found to have a bearing on the problem.

For, strictly speaking, religious knowledge as such cannot be said to be true or false at all. It is knowledge, in the sense of being a cognitive relation of subject to object, but it is pre-judgmental, and therefore, making (as such) neither assertions nor denials, cannot be called true or false.¹ Religious experience is, as we said, experience of acquaintance with value. It is an inner realisation that existence, so far as shared in by the experient at that moment, is worth while. The realisation of value itself is not a judgment—though presumptions and assumptions are no doubt present, and previous judgments that have been made are unconsciously or subconsciously there as well as the tendency to make new ones, influencing the attitude and ready to crowd in at any moment. The same is true of any knowledge by acquaintance. When I cognise the patch of green grass before me, my cognition as such is neither true nor false. Even if it is true that, at my sophisticated stage of knowledge, I cannot help making implicit and even explicit judgments (which no doubt affect vastly even the character of the content directly before me), the distinction remains between acquaintance, which is

¹ I am quite aware that this and what follows is not quite consistent with a good deal of the matter in the last chapter of my *Knowledge and Truth*

neither true nor false, and judgments which are either one or the other. Of religious experience it is often said that it is ineffable: it is a "peace that passeth all understanding". One meaning at least of this is that the propositions and concepts of the understanding can never in themselves convey the ineffable peace of religious experience. Acquaintance is acquaintance, and is not strictly translatable into terms of propositions which are true or false.

Nevertheless though acquaintance or intuition transcends propositions, intuition without the propositions of understanding is, so far as knowledge is concerned, inadequate. Even the religious devotee cannot rest in his intuitions; his very enthusiasm leads him to describe his experience, in however metaphorical language, and his description is already the beginning of an attempted analysis which claims truth. Immediately this happens—and it never fails to happen—he has entered the court of metaphysics and must be prepared to give his account before the bar of logic.

Although, however, when judgments become explicit, the only adequate test is that of consistency, there is a stage between the ineffable religious experience and the explicit metaphysical system. It is the stage where, though logical coherence is demanded, it is not yet possible, because of limitations in our knowledge. There is a stage, that is, where the only possible test of truth is through feeling, where the subjectively felt *experience* of the relation of the proposition put forward with the rest of the system of ideas in the experient's mind is a 'harmonious' experience, and where this is the only criterion of truth which is available. This view of feeling as the pre-logical test of truth is of some importance, and, although it involves a particular view of the nature of feeling,¹ it may be possible to explain it here in a few words. The view of feeling implied is that feeling is the subjective or experiencing side of a whole situation in which cognition and conation are always together involved, and in which each is simply a different mode of adaptation to the objective. Feeling is not identifiable with pleasure or pain, although its tone is (perhaps) always pleasurable or painful. On the above view feeling, partaking as it does of the concrete character of the whole situation, being its subjective side, is concretely different in each particular case. The intensity of the feeling seems to depend upon the nature of the conative responses; *e.g.*, if desire or impulse be very

¹ See "Towards Realistic Psychology," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXI., No. 18; and "Knowledge and Feeling," *Psyche*, Vol. V., No. 2.

marked, as in curiosity or fear, the feeling derives its peculiar and intense character from the factors involved in that particular response of the individual to the environment.

This view of feeling enables us to give some meaning to the phrase 'feeling one's way' to the truth. It is not that knowledge is to be identified with feeling; a cognitive act is always a cognitive act. But the thinker may literally 'feel' his way towards truth in the sense that he advances towards a new thesis when a proposition he makes concerning it 'feels right' or is pleasantly harmonious with the felt background of knowledge in his mind, whilst he tends to reject that proposition when the feeling or subjective side of his putting forward that proposition is unpleasantly disharmonious. Feeling in this sense undoubtedly plays a part not only in the discovery of new knowledge, but in the process of bringing into use knowledge which is already there. When the student of philosophy puts a problem before his teacher and suggests an erroneous solution of it, his teacher immediately knows it to be erroneous, not because there and then he carries out the full process of reasoning which demonstrates it to be so, but just because his feeling or subjective experiencing of the whole cognitive situation as he contemplates the proposition supposed to be true is one of unpleasantly toned disharmony. It is true of course that in this case the laborious temporal process of reasoning has taken place in his own mind in the past, that, in general, the degree of *scientia intuitiva* which he possesses is the direct result of processes which are not as such intuitive at all. Nevertheless, although the making or the rejecting of propositions is a cognitive act, what at the moment leads to the immediate rejection of the proposition cannot be said to be logical reasoning, but feeling. There is not the usual difficulty in accepting this kind of view if it be remembered that feeling is not something abstracted, apart from intellectual and conative processes, but is their subjective side. Immediate feeling is the subjective index which leads us to choose. The most complex intellectual processes may have gone before, habits may have been formed, dispositions may be there, but all these in their infinitely complex variety are in some way summed up in the present concrete attitude to the proposition before the mind, the feeling of which total situation is pleasantly harmonious or unpleasantly disharmonious as the case may be, leading to the acceptance or the rejection of the proposition.

If these things are true of feeling, there is at least a *prima facie* case for consideration of the spontaneous judgments which are the immediate outcome of the feeling which occurs

in religious experience. These judgments are felt in some way to explain and illuminate experience and reality, to make the dark secrets of being less dark. They are *felt* to be coherent with the body of truth, and the intensity of the concrete feeling makes the judgments worth special attention and respect. It is unlikely that they will be meaningless.¹ When for example a man 'feels' God to be transcendent, or the suffering of Christ to be an atonement for our sins, or (to take more strictly philosophic statements) that value is objective, or that it is the Person of God and no other that he intuits, there is in each case found to be contained in the judgment of feeling an important truth. The statement about transcendence may be an outcome of the direct experience of a Being who seemed to transcend the finite individual: the doctrine of the atonement may be felt to be true because (*e.g.*) the experienced facts of sacrifice, of the purification by suffering, of the punishment of sin, are 'felt' somehow to be related. Value may be felt to be objective because the experience of value is known to be a fact. And so on. All this is most important preliminary material for the intellect to sift, with a special claim to truth because of the importance of the experiences of which it is the outcome.

But it is only material, and it only has a *claim* to be considered. The sifting process of the intellect must follow in order to discover whether such 'judgments of feeling' have or have not much value as real objective knowledge. The judgments which we have cited may have some ground in fact, but they may be found, when analysed, to imply much that is false. There may (*e.g.*) be error due to the love of the human mind for concrete imagery and to its tendency to take concrete symbols literally as facts. Thus, because suffering purifies, because sin must carry its chastisement, and because one is punished for another's fault, it may be thought that the symbol of animal sacrifice can be extended and that another can purify us, if we will, by suffering for our sins. Or there may be illegitimate generalisation. Because the experient feels an intense sense of worth in his own existence at a certain moment he may illegitimately conclude that existence is of worth through and through. It may of course be so in fact, but the existence of a concrete 'feeling' here and now is nevertheless quite insufficient to solve, *e.g.*,

¹ Although it is true that the importance or value of such judgments and their coherence may be mainly practical rather than theoretic. See below, p. 213 *sqq.*

the problem of evil. Nor is the existence of God *proved* by any single intuition. An intuition is an intuition, but it cannot be its own justification. It may, for all we know, be an hallucination. If we are to show that it is not, we must ground our demonstration on reasonings and correlations of fact no *less* substantial than the reasonings and correlations we use when demonstrating, say, that so and so is not an optical illusion. All these propositions are, as we have said, worthy in the first instance of respect, but they must prove their credentials.

There is a strong tendency among theologians, *i.e.*, among those who at least ought to know a good deal about the religious experience, to deny that this placing of religious and metaphysical knowledge on a strict level is just. Theology, suffering just a little from a superiority-inferiority complex (because the two, as is well known, always go in pairs), is sensitive, and sometimes touchy, on the point. Theology has always been anxious to claim its gift of special revelation, a sphere into which philosophers as such are not supposed to be able to penetrate. So much of this attitude we have granted to be just, *i.e.*, the philosopher has no right to assert or deny anything about the metaphysical implications of religion unless he has some kind of direct insight into the inner meaning of religious experience. But the claim that knowledge *qua* knowledge has any preserves upon encroachment of which the trespassing philosopher, with his bag of logic-shot and his gun of criticism will be prosecuted, is not one to be tolerated by intellectual democracy for one moment. Some one remarked at Reading that it is easy to raise cheers at a meeting of philosophers by praising logic. The theologian, in his turn, is inclined to respond in a not dissimilar way to the utterance of the blessed word 'revelation'.

It is worth trying to discover the reason why religious intuitions and revelations seem to be of such value in the eyes of the theologians. It is not, I believe, primarily on account of their contribution to *knowledge*, though they have certain value for metaphysics (the ideal of all systematic knowledge), as we have seen. It is rather, it would seem, on account of their *practical* importance.

I have said (p. 210) that intensity of feeling seems to depend on the nature of conative factors, that if desire or impulse be marked, as in curiosity or fear, the intensity of feeling is great. And this, it seems to me, is one of the chief reasons for the intensity of feeling which accompanies 'felt' religious convictions, a feeling often mistakenly

supposed to be sufficient evidence of truth. The religious experient holds the immediate judgments which follow his experience to be true because they harmonise, not so much with a system of knowledge and *ideas*, as with the deepest *desires* of his heart, in other words, because of their immense *practical* importance for him. It is a felt harmony, not so much of idea with ideas, as of idea with desires. A man, *e.g.*, deeply desires to be 'saved from himself'. *Therefore* he is ready to accept the (theoretic) doctrine of the vicarious punishment of Christ. And the religious theologian, who is as often as not a practical preacher as well as a theorist, is jealous, often morbidly jealous, of any scepticism about his convictions, because he feels that, if they go, the very foundations of practical life will be cut away. The scientist, or scientific philosopher, on the other hand, although he has his desires and interests, and is therefore not without feeling, is trained to take a less immediately practical view,¹ and to accept propositions only in so far as they are coherent with the system of knowledge, whether or not they seem to conflict with practical needs and practical life. His feeling is accordingly of a 'colder' sort.

And if propositions are believed by theologians because they harmonise with practical desires, it is also undoubtedly true on the other hand that practical desires are satisfied by belief in these propositions. It has to be admitted without hesitation that many of the dogmas of religion now no longer generally believed have had in the past real practical value. There is no doubt at all that many of the creeds of Christianity—atonement, vicarious punishment, virgin birth, and so on—have owed their continued existence to the patent fact that thousands who believed in them have been made better persons thereby.

And further—to pass back to the immediate religious experience itself—there is, it seems to me, no doubt that the practical fruitfulness of actual religious experience is much greater than its theoretic fruitfulness, even although the latter be admitted in some cases. The outcome of the intense experience of Value in religious experience is, I believe, the awakening of an intense desire to express that Value in a fashion that can be truly called creative, through channels of life and conduct. The man who has known mystic experience to any marked degree is never quite the same man afterwards, although admittedly the expression of Value in terms of the material of practical social life is not

¹ Though not necessarily ultimately less practical.

achieved without thought and effort and development of sentiment and will. There is no doubt that it is through the holiness which it can give to his life that the frequent contact with God experienced by the religious man proves itself to have the highest value: any contribution which it makes to knowledge, as such, seems to be of lesser importance. It is significant that in religious literature itself we constantly find knowledge compared unfavourably with virtue or goodness or righteousness or holiness. And—to generalise—it is highly probable that, in the end, practice (albeit practice with insight) is a more ultimate aim of our existence than knowledge, and that knowledge, although pursued rightly for its own sake as of intrinsic worth, finds its most important function in fitting man better to adapt his life practically to the ever-growing demands which the cosmos makes of him.

But, if this is so, nothing less than the best in knowledge is sufficient for practice. This is where the value of philosophy is seen once more. There is no doubt that, as we have said, religious experience can give to life a quality which it could not otherwise possess, a quality of light and beauty and graciousness. Everyone knows how men in the humblest circumstances may have that quality which those more fortunately placed as regards knowledge may lack. But it is on the other hand equally true that any lack of wisdom is a bar to moral perfection. I use the term 'wisdom' advisedly, rather than 'knowledge,' which latter term might apply to mere knowledge of fact and connexion between facts. A wise insight into the significance and purpose of reality must necessarily make clearer the understanding of the meaning and significance of human life which is staged within reality—the purpose of which is to express reality's meaning and value. For Plato this was the importance for the moral life of knowledge of the supreme Good. Such knowledge is wisdom, and not only is conduct sweetened by wisdom, but it is blind and irrational without it. Religious experience gives a certain quality and an inspiration to life, but it will not in itself secure that the life of the religious experient is a well-ordered one. No one, not even our humble saint, can achieve harmony of life without using his mental abilities to the utmost extent open to him. Religion is often said in itself to brighten the intellectual faculties. But it is probably rather because the religious experience of Value rouses a reverent wonder in reality that it does so. Wonder may lead to further questioning about the nature of reality, thus quickening intellectual processes, a quickening which is indeed necessary. Meredith's cry, "More brains, O Lord!

More brains!" has some poignancy. The most intense religious devotion is sometimes unaccompanied in fact by much effort to be intelligent—a lack which renders of little worth (except for its good intentions) the actual life of the moral agent. In the end, then, the opposition between 'theoretic' truth and what are sometimes called the 'practical' truths which religious experience may yield, cannot be sustained. There is only one truth, and the labour of gaining it is great. Short cuts lead to disaster and spiritual death.

To sum up briefly. The immediate knowledge of religion is felt acquaintance primarily with value, an acquaintance which is neither true nor false. This felt acquaintance naturally issues in immediate 'judgments of feeling'. These judgments, though they claim truth, and deserve consideration, must have their claim tested by systematic metaphysics, the ideal of which is a developed '*scientia intuitiva*'. But the main importance of religious experience appears to be its contribution, not to knowledge, but to practice. Dogmas, *e.g.*, are believed true because they harmonise with deep practical desires, and we know that such beliefs have great practical value. In the end, however, beliefs must be grounded in systematic insight into reality. We return therefore to metaphysics. Practice may be (it might be contended) of supreme importance, but it must be a practice guided by true metaphysical insight.

VI.—DISCUSSION.

THE ORIGIN OF BRADLEY'S SCEPTICISM.

The trio of eminent Cambridge philosophers who, in the last number of *MIND* sit in judgment, like Minos, Rhadamanthus and Æacus, on one who was admittedly the most eminent philosopher Oxford has ever produced, and conduct the *ψυχοστασία* of his philosophy, assuredly have not erred on the side of severity, and deserve commendation for the leniency and courtesy with which they have performed their onerous task. They have said many things which are true, and none which are rude. But, perhaps for this very reason, they have not said the whole truth, nor conveyed the truth about Bradley's philosophy as a whole. In particular they have not explained a feature in it which is apt to chill the neophyte in metaphysics. Why is it that, in spite of the splendour of thought and diction which distinguishes it, Bradley's philosophy fails in the end to reveal that blaze of triumphant Idealism which its admirers so ardently look for? Why does it end instead in a minor key, with metaphysics hard pressed by scepticism on the one side and superstition on the other, confessing that its task is too great for human powers?

The three papers referred to tactfully abstain from dwelling on the final embarrassments of Bradleyan philosophy, though their authors, like the rest of us, must often have perused the private, but singularly candid, confessions of the imminence of scepticism with which Bradley not infrequently regaled his correspondents. Nor should I myself dream of insisting that Bradley's affinities with scepticism are a confession of failure, or arrogate to myself the rôle of devil's advocate without the authority of an infallible church, either Hegelian or Catholic. Still the situation is somewhat piquant. It is true enough, no doubt, that, regarded merely as a theory, a philosophy which lapses into scepticism cannot be accepted as a solution of the philosophic problem, and has, technically, failed; as also that the line which divides Bradleyism from scepticism is often hardly visible, and that strict logic would easily enough incite one to push it over the line. Still one may well feel that it is better to fail with Bradley than to succeed with narrower and less capacious minds, and that there is more to be learnt from Bradley's scepticism than from the dogmatism and credulity of lesser metaphysicians. Indeed there is so much to be learnt from the line of thought which has driven Bradley into his scepticism

that philosophers of all schools may well regard it as a fortunate fault which, properly understood, may inure to their salvation.

I.

It is necessary at the outset to grasp that Bradley's scepticism is in no wise arbitrary or gratuitous, nor due to any weakness or flaw in his personal temper. It forms the logical conclusion of a train of thought which had conducted him to his central conception of the Absolute, but which could not really be arrested at that point, and inevitably proceeded to plunge into scepticism.

This train of thought starts from Bradley's theory of judgment. Having decided, rightly enough, that judgment is meant to be about reality, Bradley has naturally to specify what the reality is which judgment aims at, and how it contrives to attain it. He makes it clear, first of all, that it cannot be the mere point of present perception at which we come into contact with the real. Nor can it be the particular objects of our solicitude in the sciences and in practical life : for these are always immersed in the whole context of the universe, and owe their being, together with all the qualities and powers attributed to them, to their environment, which conditions them on every side and in every way. The truth of our judgment therefore would be hopelessly compromised, if it were left dependent on the unstated, and largely unknown, conditions to which the universe subjects it. But how can it hope to withstand their pressure? Its only chance of safety lies in self-denial : it must renounce its claim to independence, submit to the Absolute's control, and so obtain from the Whole a guarantee of such truth as befits a part.

Hence the famous contention that whatever the ostensible subject of a judgment may be, its real subject is always, in the end, the Absolute. For it is only by buying off every conceivable opposition in advance, by obtaining the support of every condition that could conceivably affect its truth, that any claim to truth can stand. If the unqualified claim inherent in the form of judgment be taken to mean a claim to absolute truth, it can be vindicated by nothing short of the Absolute. Nothing less than complete knowledge of the whole of reality will ensure that conditions beyond it, which are not stated in the judgment, will not vitiate its claim. For it is only because the whole *exhausts* the possibilities that nothing can occur to upset the judgment, and that it obtains a final guarantee.

Now I will not here examine whether this guarantee by our notion of 'universe' is as complete and conclusive as it seems. To do so, I should have to examine whether our conception of a whole or universe, which apparently implies the assumptions of the ontological argument, can validly be applied *a priori* to the real which, empirically, we encounter. This question was recently raised by me in Number 130, but, as I expected, it was found too difficult to

meet with any response. Moreover, for my present purpose it will be quite sufficient to point out the serious consequences which Bradley's logical approach to the Absolute entails. In the abstract it may perhaps be said to vindicate after a fashion the notion of absolute truth, but at a prohibitive cost.

For (1) *humanly speaking* it means sheer scepticism. The truth of judgment which it vindicates can be apprehended only by the absolute knowledge of the all-embracing whole, and cannot be imparted to any partial standpoint within the whole. It does nothing whatever, therefore, to relieve the doubts or uncertainties of any human mind, or to enable it to assign any definite degree of truth to any assertion. Indeed it actually adds to the troubles of human knowers, for the only consolation which it offers is that every human judgment is necessarily infected with error to an unknown, unascertainable and incurable extent, and that it is not possible to regard it as absolutely true. To express a hope, thereupon, that this very argument of Bradley's may itself prove to be so heavily infected with error that it remains true only in a Pickwickian and nugatory sense, suggests itself as the obvious retort; but it would presumably be condemned as disrespectful petulance. Yet it remains true that a theory which denies truth to man to reserve it for the Absolute, compels *us* to despair of truth. And if a theory which puts truth utterly beyond our reach is not dogmatic scepticism, what is?

(2) If all judgments are ultimately about the totality of reality, it would seem that they must all ultimately mean the same thing. They can mean nothing but that the Absolute is the Absolute. But this meaning, however august it may seem, is certainly *not* what their makers believed themselves to mean. Thus the *human* meaning of every judgment, as it was meant by its maker, is utterly wiped out. All 'designation' becomes impossible, and we can no longer mean anything particular. Nay more, what *we* mean is *ipso facto* vitiated. Our meaning no longer counts, and must be ruled out as illusory.¹

After which (3) it seems slightly superfluous for Bradley to confess to scruples about the truth of judgment, engendered by its 'relational form'. The Absolute's reluctance to admit the absolute truth of a judgment which dis-evers its unity into a duality of subject and predicate does not really add to the burden of the scepticism which oppresses *us*; for that is already more than we can bear.

II.

Nor can we shake off this burden by contesting the internal coherence and formal validity of Bradley's argument. It follows logically enough from its premisses, and, once we embark on it, there is no stopping it. If we wish to avoid its consequences, we should inquire rather whether it was necessary to embark on it.

¹ Cf. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 234 f.

And we may ask also why Bradley himself wished to embark on it.

If we raise these questions we may find that Bradley's starting point was far from being inevitable, and indeed was only reached by a strange lapse in his logic, and as the result of a far-reaching confusion to which a good half of the difficulties of his logic must be ascribed.¹ This confusion may be shown to be a subtle case of the confusion between the judgment and the proposition, which so often persists even in logicians who are trying not to be Formalists. That this is so appears so soon as we observe that the 'judgment' whose claim to absolute truth Bradley examines is from the first taken in isolation and apart from its psychical setting and the context in which it arose. And its claim to be true is tested, not by reference to these conditions (which *actually* conditioned it), but by considering generally under what conditions it might have to be pronounced false. There is no suggestion of a doubt whether 'it' remains itself in all these imaginary contexts. But it is clear that the only identity between its application to one case and to another consists in the use of the same form of words on both occasions, and is therefore merely verbal. Thus Bradley inadvertently substitutes the form of words in which the judgment was conveyed, the *proposition*, for the original judgment, in his attempt to prove that the judgment's claim to truth is necessarily vitiated by the unstated conditions which affect it.

Now to take exception to this procedure does not mean that one denies that the original judgment *was* conditioned. It means merely a protest against confounding the conditions which actually affected it with those which might affect a hypothetical infinity of past and future judgments which might happen to find expression in the same words. For it is plain that these two sets of conditions are quite different, and have quite a different logical status. It is the latter alone which menace the truth of 'judgment' with infinite possibilities of error, and drive it to seek refuge in the Absolute. For to maintain the validity of a form of judgment in its verbal integrity it would be necessary to provide in advance against every collocation of accidents in the wide universe capable of creating a situation that would militate against its literal truth. And no human truth could stand this strain.

On the other hand, the conditions which affected the actual judgment are quite manageable in their proportions, and no responsible judgment need fear to meet their challenge. Indeed, the

¹The other half would seem to be due to an even more fundamental error, *viz.* the unfortunate and impossible relations between logic and psychology. These, which are only aggravated in the second edition of his *Logic*, compel him finally to confess to "a grounded doubt how far in logic the claim of logic is made good" (p. 601). But the claim of logic to be a self-development independent of the psychic irrelevance of the mind which generates the material it contemplates, is certainly not made good by a metaphysic which repudiates the relational form of thought as such.

very fact that it comes into being, the fact that some one decides to make it, is sufficient proof that it *has* met their challenge. For the judgment means that in view of all the circumstances present to its maker's mind and judged *relevant* by him, he *has* judged it best to make his judgment. It claims truth as being the best reaction to the circumstances which evoked it and as the truest response to the conditions under which it was pronounced. And its truth-claim can be disputed only by showing that under these same conditions something better, and so truer, but not necessarily more inclusive and perhaps even more selective, could have been judged. Otherwise it is final, and no appeal to other conditions, or to a conceived totality of reality, is permissible. Such appeals are barred, simply because, if they were relevant to the point of the argument, they must have been considered, and *rejected*, in the making of the judgment.

It is true enough, as Bradley contends, that no judgment is capable of expressing the totality of reality. Every judgment is partial, and affirms (or denies) of a part of reality, nay usually, of a part of what is before its maker's mind. But it does not follow from this that it is partly false. It is rather a condition of its being 'to the point' and expressing any significant or relevant truth. For it is *not* true that any judgment tries to grasp the Whole. Among the claims of judgment none is more essential than the *right to select*, and to *reject* what is judged *irrelevant*. This right to select obviously involves a risk of error, and if the logician will not admit the possible truth of what may possibly be false, this will give him a right to condemn all such judgments. *But if he does, he gives up logic.* For the right to select is indispensable. It is exercised whenever a judgment is made, and unless it is conceded, judging becomes impossible. Unless we have a right to pick out from the mass of possible subjects the subject we wish to think about, and from the mass of possible predicates the assertion we judge best to make about it, no judgment in the form *S is P* could conceivably come into being; and so no question about its truth or falsity could possibly arise. Thus the right to select, being a condition of the possibility of judgment, is logically prior to all questions about the truth of judgment. And yet, once it is recognised, it obviously forms an obstacle, apparently insuperable, in the way of all attempts to show that judgment is 'really' about the totality of reality. For a judgment that rests on selection, obviously relies on a part, and repudiates the whole.

III.

The question therefore resolves itself at this point into that whether Bradley's philosophy can afford to concede the right to select to human thought. This is probably the most difficult question that can be raised about his logic, as about that of Bosanquet. For though both of them speak of selection in connexion with thought, the references become much more copious in

their later works; also its valuation changes. At first Bradley conceived selection merely as a form of 'mutilation' and as a source of error, and *denies* that selective action is of "the essence of all inference".¹ But in the revised edition of his *Logic* he has to write a note on this dictum, and to say that "the 'selective action' is really quite essential" (p. 261). Similarly, it has to be confessed that every judgment is selective,² and likewise every inference,³ that all 'objects' are selected⁴ and that the 'object' never includes "the whole of Reality as that at some moment is experienced immediately".⁵

Nevertheless the original doctrine that selection is mutilation is not simply scrapped. The all-pervasiveness of selection is connected with the psychological impediment that is so successful in everywhere hindering the 'self-development' of thought, and in forcing logic more or less to ignore its own ideal, in order to exist.⁶

And though this irrepressible human side is more and more recognised as responsible for the desperate straits of Bradleyan logic, it never occurs to Bradley as a possible escape that his 'ideal' of an impersonal 'self-development,' aspiring (though not attaining) to absolute truth, may be radically wrong. He clings instead to the conviction that the human side is somehow to blame for the failure of his logic, and persists in representing selection as an unnatural and disreputable procedure. Judgment is *forced* to distinguish and select, and *compelled* to leave out that which it *ought* to include.⁷ Its selection "never can be fully justified".⁸ "If 'my selection' were truly mine, it would be ruinous".⁹ As in the original doctrine, selection always gives us less than the truth, because it gives us less than the whole. But, as before, the question "the judgment does not copy the whole perception, but why should it do so?"¹⁰ is never squarely met, and indeed has become more unanswerable, because the copy theory of truth, which haunted the first edition, is repudiated in the second. And so "the right of selecting what you please from the presented whole"¹¹ has in the end, if not to be denied altogether, to figure as a reason for the inevitable inadequacy of 'logic'.

IV.

Yet this whole valuation is utterly arbitrary and unjustified. If selection occurs at all among the facts which logic has to consider, it may surely be deliberate and *voluntary* as well as compulsory and

¹ *Principles of Logic* ², p. 258, cf. pp. 94, 97, 439, 467, 477, 586.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 629-630, 635, 662-663.

³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 495, 606, 614-615.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 630.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 108, 601, 629.

⁶ P. 533.

⁷ P. 632. Bradley says "in reality must": but he has himself admitted over and over again that in reality no judgment ever does or can include everything, cf. p. 477.

⁸ P. 630.

⁹ P. 614-615.

¹⁰ P. 94.

¹¹ P. 97.

involuntary, and which it is should in each case be a matter for inquiry. Now voluntary selection, though it may be risky and audacious, cannot be accused of failing to include the whole of reality, seeing that this is precisely what it is conscious of trying *not* to do, but to avoid. The principle on which the claim to select rests is the right to prefer the *relevant* and to exclude the irrelevant, and by far the greater part of the 'defects' Bradley discovers in our thinking consist precisely in its indispensable and entirely rational procedure of rejecting vast masses of irrelevance. Bradley, though never quite unfamiliar with the notions of relevance and irrelevance, never realised their logical importance.

Moreover, it is not possible to admit selection without allowing rejection. Bradley admits that selection involves choice,¹ but does not seem to see that in choosing one thing we reject the rest. In order to extract its significant part we have therefore a right to reject the greater part of a whole presented to us, and *a fortiori* of the assumed totality of reality. The 'defects' therefore which lead Bradley to condemn our thinking are really its essential merits.

V.

To conclude: the logical roots of Bradley's scepticism are without exception rotten. They grow out of his refusal to recognise the actual procedures of our thought on the ground that they are 'psychological': hence the great primary need of relevance is ignored, and selection is grudgingly given an untenable position which sees in the purposive selection underlying every successful reasoning nothing but a source of error. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the case for the alleged inadequacy of judgment, propositions are systematically substituted for genuine judgments, and the question of absolute truth becomes that of whether the totality of truth can be packed into a single form of words.

This situation would seem to be deserving of the strongest terms of philosophic denigration, including Bradley's own. It seems 'arbitrary' and 'monstrous'. Yet at bottom a common and apparently innocent piece of carelessness would seem to be to blame for this logical *débâcle*. Like most logicians, Bradley had got into the unfortunate habit of speaking of 'judgments' without envisaging the actual circumstances in which they were judgments. So they slipped insensibly into propositions, and are subsequently treated as such. It is no wonder that Prof. Stout hardly knows what to call them, and calls them alternately 'judgments' and 'propositions' in successive sentences.² Yet without this juggle Bradley's scepticism has no case.

¹ *E.g.* p. 663.

² *MIND*, pp. 40, 42, 53.

VII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Scientific Method. (An Inquiry into the Character and Validity of Natural Laws.). By A. D. RITCHIE. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1923. Pp. viii, 204.

In his Introductory Chapter Mr. Ritchie raises the question whether there is anything really permanent about natural science "which does not change from time to time and the study of which will give us an insight into the nature of science" (p. 14). The required feature is to be found, he considers, in the *method* of science. Science is to be defined as a process—the process of exploring the external world—and not as a collection of results.

On the other hand, the classification of the scientific knowledge of a given period into different branches must be based on results, since "scientific method appears to be, in its outlines at least, the same in all the sciences" (p. 16). For Mr. Ritchie, then, "a classification of sciences is simply an ordered statement of the kinds of laws that have been discovered"; and six groups of these laws are distinguished. Psychology is allotted to one of these groups, as it obviously should be. At this point we are told that entities can belong to that "external world" which it is the business of natural science to explore even if they are not capable of observation by the five senses; for it is admitted that minds cannot be seen, heard, felt, smelt, or tasted, "and yet we can study them by empirical methods and consider them as ingredients of the external world" (p. 21).

Mr. Ritchie realises the danger of destroying the unity of that part of the external world with which physical science is concerned, and of being left, in consequence, "with a dream world of sense on the one hand and a fairyland of conjectural entities on the other and nothing apparently to bridge the gap" (p. 23). He suggests that one cause of this undesirable Bifurcation of Nature is the extremely complicated character of "the processes by which the raw material of sense is converted into the manufactured products of scientific theory"; and as a remedy he proposes to adopt the point of view advocated by Whitehead in the first two chapters of the "Concept of Nature". Thus he remarks that "The progress of science tends to give greater and greater emphasis to the spatio-temporal aspect of things and less to the qualitative" (p. 37); for "All the laws of qualities are vague and liable to exceptions," whereas "Of the shapes and sizes and motions of bodies we can

find certain very constant laws. . . . It is of course the constancy and precision of these laws that lead to the belief that the geometrical properties of bodies are somehow more real than the others, so that the same theorizing that transferred colours and sounds to the mind of the percipient was not applied to shapes and sizes which were, by a legal fiction, allowed to belong to the external world" (p. 161).

In his Introduction, and again at the end of his concluding chapter, Mr. Ritchie discusses the relations between Science and Metaphysics. With regard to Metaphysics he says "All metaphysical systems have originated in some view as to the nature of the whole universe, that it is One or Many, that it is ultimately Pure Thought or Pure something else. They have also involved some view of the nature of the Good. . . . Beliefs of that sort are not obtained through experience by means of the five senses. Neither are they laws of logic, . . . for they are not formal at all but material" (p. 197). Mr. Ritchie's view is that the propositions of Metaphysics have no basis in common with the propositions of Science, though that is not to say they have no basis at all. He has no quarrel with Metaphysics as such; all he wishes to maintain is that scientific and metaphysical propositions are, or should be, entirely neutral to one another. We have one set of propositions consisting of various particular metaphysical theories; we have another set consisting of fundamental assumptions necessary to scientific enquiry, and of positive results of scientific enquiry, and of recorded failures of scientific enquiry to produce any results up to the present in certain fields. Neither of these sets contains any proposition which entails, or in any way influences the probability of, propositions belonging to the other set.

Now this assertion that scientific propositions and metaphysical propositions are mutually irrelevant to one another appears obvious enough if what one has in mind is some metaphysical proposition about the Universe as a single collective whole; one might take as an example the proposition, asserted by Bradley, that the world is "a single Experience, superior to relations and containing in the fullest sense everything which is". But what is the position of general propositions about all the things in the Universe, taken individually (where "all" is being used in the distributive sense)? We find Mr. Ritchie declaring that the aim of the metaphysician is "to give an account of everything all at once" (p. 5), and contrasting this with the procedure of the scientist who goes straight to work on particular parts of the physical world (since he cannot experiment with or observe the whole universe). "The man of science," we read, "does not trouble his head about the sorry scheme of things entire, but looks at one small part of it from one particular point of view to see what he can make of that" (p. 5). Further on, when we come to Mr. Ritchie's discussion of Induction, we still find him endeavouring to steer clear of any theory as to the nature of the universe as a whole; however, he cannot avoid

such theories altogether, since he is accepting the conclusion, established by the work of Keynes and Broad, "that inductive processes cannot be defended on logical grounds only but material considerations must be brought in" (p. 97). Thus he mentions two principles about nature which Broad had provisionally put forward in an article in "MIND" (vol. xxix., p. 13), and goes on to say "These propositions stated by Broad make no explicit reference to the nature of the universe as a whole, and that is to their credit, but it is clear that their claim to be considered true must be derived from some theory as to the nature of the universe" (p. 94). He then deals with the principle of the Limitation of Independent Variety and the principle of Atomic Uniformity; roughly, the first of these amounts to saying that everything in nature belongs to one or other of a finite and comparatively small number of natural kinds, and the second to saying that a great many of the processes which these things undergo can be considered as compounded of small changes according to general and calculable laws (instead of constituting in each case a different irresolvable organic combination).

Now these principles, even when properly stated in a strict form, must refer in some way to everything in the universe; obviously this must be the case if our inductions can apply to anything whatsoever; and if our inductions are not unlimited in their application but are only valid for a certain limited system, we must at least know that everything in the universe without exception *either* falls within that system *or else* may be safely neglected as irrelevant to what does fall within that system. Also, it is admitted that the principle of Atomic Uniformity and of the Limitation of Independent Variety (and likewise the principle of the irrelevancy of mere spatio-temporal position) are presupposed in any particular scientific investigation. But we find them placed by Mr. Ritchie among the later terms of a certain series—a series formed by the various prior assumptions which are necessary for the particular investigation in question. "These assumptions," it is explained (p. 102), "are themselves generalisations, the results of previous investigations, and these in turn are based on earlier ones still. Therefore, for any given investigation we use as our prior assumption: a set of propositions H_n , these are derived from a previous set H_{n-1} and these from H_{n-2} and so on. H_n has been derived from H_{n-1} by means of certain experimental evidence E_{n-1} as H_{n-1} has been derived from H_{n-2} with the help of E_{n-2} . If our procedure is to be legitimate the series must have a first member H_0 . The vital point of the whole matter is the nature of our first assumption H_0 and its probability because it is *ex hypothesi* not derived from any previous term in the way the others are derived from it." It is also important, as Mr. Ritchie mentions, that each forward step should be made with a degree of probability very near to certainty.

Mr. Ritchie is perfectly frank about the difficulty of justifying

Inductive Inference. Even after Keynes' "candid, lucid and masterly" treatment of the subject "we can find no reasonable ground for believing in the results of Induction, but we go on believing just as much as we ever did" (pp. 83-4). But Mr. Ritchie seems to find a special difficulty in the extremely general and abstract nature of the principles of Atomic Uniformity, etc. He considers it to be an advantage that in any particular scientific investigation we start from a collection of propositions of very small generality—i.e. from the assumption referred to as H_0 in the passage quoted above. "Each particular region of investigation has its own region of experience to explore and the validity of its methods and results is only slightly affected by what is found in other regions. In order to justify any special conclusions . . . the character of the whole of nature need not be introduced, but only the character of special parts" (p. 103). Nevertheless Mr. Ritchie admits that the separation of "regions" is not by any means complete, since "at the present day the boundaries are very much broken down and the old distinctions have become merely conventional and often inconvenient" (p. 104). Now in so far as each branch of science does require a *different* set of initial assumptions H_0 the problem as to how we come by the information contained in these assumptions, and as to what precisely that information is, will arise many times over instead of just once for all. And it is not at all obvious that this piecemeal method will present us with problems which are any easier to solve, supposing that such a method is in fact possible. The assumptions in question are generalisations, however restricted their range may be. Therefore they are not particular pieces of empirical information such as can be obtained directly by means of perception or introspection. Neither are they inductive generalisations, since they are presupposed in all inductive reasoning. However it is that we know them, they are certainly part of the ultimate foundations of science; they therefore occupy a peculiar position, having a priority over the other laws and theories in the different branches of science. For the other laws and theories can be subjected to criticism by scientists and revised "when they turn out wrong or inconvenient," whereas the ultimate foundations of science have to be held as certain all the time that these other portions of its structure are being tested or altered.

Mr. Ritchie appears to hold that these fundamental assumptions might be disproved by the progress of scientific enquiry although their truth can never be definitely established. "Any assumptions that are made for purposes of scientific investigation must be assumed as correct until they lead to contradictory results, then they must be corrected, but it is all a technical matter that does not concern metaphysicians acting in their official capacity" (p. 98). Now what the above passage asserts with regard to the *fundamental assumptions of science* is undoubtedly true as regards *ordinary scientific theories*. To judge from some of his statements,

Mr. Ritchie is inclined to overlook the distinction between the two—for instance, in the passage on page 97, "What we must appeal to to justify inductive reasoning is simply the general body of scientific theory," and also on page 7 in the passage "The claim of science to steer clear of metaphysics and of any theory about the nature of things in general can therefore be substantiated in this particular sense; namely that any view is held purely tentatively and no longer than is found convenient . . . it is very nearly correct to say that all propositions about the whole universe are false; and a false proposition about the whole universe, if really implicated in scientific theory, would stultify the whole procedure".

Certain other hypotheses are assigned quite definitely by Mr. Ritchie to the province of Metaphysics. Since they provide answers to questions which it is not the business of Science to raise, they are to be distinguished from the theories of science and the prior assumptions needed to justify induction. They are unavoidable if we are to study the Philosophy of Science and discuss Scientific Method. And Mr. Ritchie stresses the importance of stating them explicitly; thus he finds he has to assume as his starting-point "that there are minds whose nature and function it is to sense, remember, imagine and will" (p. 5), and "that there is an external world which is other than mind and of which we are aware in sensation" (p. 8).

Three important topics, which have to be discussed in dealing with scientific method, are enumerated by Mr. Ritchie at the end of his Introductory Chapter. They are (1) the data of scientific knowledge; (2) the methods of manipulating them so as to present them in the form required for generalisation; (3) the process of generalisation. "Scientific method," it is explained in another passage (p. 189), "is simply the attempt to acquire knowledge of general laws directly or indirectly by experience, . . . Anything that is logically related to experience by discoverable laws and is capable of description in general terms can be dealt with by the scientific method."

As regards the data of science, "there are relations within the whole composing a single experience and holding between different experiences, and it is these that are common, communicable and public" (p. 25). But only those relations among observed things which are perceptible by all observers who are properly situated, and about which agreement can therefore be obtained, are admissible as data for science (p. 28). Of course, as Mr. Ritchie proceeds to point out, the notion of observers being "properly situated" is a very obscure one. In many instances the majority of mankind may be incapable of ever becoming "properly situated"—they may be unable to undergo the necessary training, and perhaps they may lack some peculiar aptitude with which only a few people are born. Even if only qualified observers are considered, there remains the problem of selecting some of their

experiences as valid data and rejecting the rest, since "there are many classes of events that lie wholly outside the scope of ordinary scientific investigation, such as dreams and illusions" (p. 24). Some sort of a criterion is provided by Mr. Ritchie's remark that "It is of the essence of the method of investigation that occurrences should be capable of repetition under controllable conditions" (p. 188). That is, if the occurrences will fit into an orderly system, if laws can be found connecting them, then they can be studied scientifically. Mr. Ritchie mentions some interesting possibilities about the extra-scientific part of our experience: if laws should be discovered pertaining to some portion of it, then the occurrences within that portion would fit into an orderly system; yet that system might remain more or less external to and unconnected with the system formed by the scientific knowledge we at present possess.

With regard to topics (2) and (3), we may briefly indicate Mr. Ritchie's mode of treatment by the following quotations: "The laws of nature, since they are assertions of general relations among 'kinds,' depend upon the classification of the objects of the external world" (p. 35); "It is obvious that some systems of classification will give more numerous and more general and simpler laws than others; and these, if anybody hits on them, will be adopted" (p. 62); "When an alleged law is found to be false in any given case the problem for solution is a re-classification of the facts in such a way that the anomalous one can be successfully included" (p. 59); also "The introduction of a new idea is a process of classification because the new idea provides a new class concept for the grouping of the particular facts of experience. . . . The mere recording of observations will not result in the discovery of laws unless the right notions and methods of classification are there" (p. 71). And again "The mere knowledge that there are simple laws at the bottom of events is no earthly help in itself towards getting the description of the events into such a shape that these simple laws can be applied" (p. 76). For the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature Mr. Ritchie can provide an interpretation which allows it to be true (although altogether useless as an aid to Induction); all it means is that "there are laws of nature which are simple and discoverable" (p. 94). Our everyday experience of the course of events in nature exhibits very little uniformity. "But it does not follow," Mr. Ritchie continues, ". . . that nature is not orderly through and through. It only means that the order is not immediately apparent but has to be looked for" (p. 93).

Mechanical Explanation and Teleology and other matters connected with Biology are discussed at some length in the last two chapters. But Mr. Ritchie finds it profitable to devote most attention to the laws of Physics; for numerical laws, such as form the foundation of Physics, have the highest degree of probability of any known to us and are capable of being based

upon a very small number of observations, provided these are properly carried out. "Measurement," he says, "is on the one hand an extension of the process of classification, and on the other is a process of induction" (p. 152); for "The more nearly vague likeness can be reduced to identity in one respect and difference in all others, the more precise or perfect is the analogy and the stronger the induction founded upon it. . . . By means of measurement we confine our analogy very strictly to one character only and render it as precise as is possible" (p. 107). In making measurements, however much we may avail ourselves of ingenious mechanical devices and elaborate mathematical calculations, we must at some point rely on simple immediate perception—preferably visual perceptions of spatial equality, straightness, etc. Certain direct observations have to be accepted as the basis of the whole process. And, when we discuss them, it is no use dragging in "waves in the ether and retinal images and nervous impulses," since "All this is theory that is based on scientific knowledge and cannot be used to explain it" (p. 137).

To pass on to one or two particular criticisms, one might ask why Induction and Deduction are regarded as having so little in common that the former (p. 13) lies "outside the sphere of logic" in the narrow sense in which Mr. Ritchie wishes to use the term; also, why it is that "The form of a proposition depends not on the nature of the universe but on the will of the logician" (p. 9). In the discussion on page 38 concerning the status of molecules and electrons it is evident that the term "logical fiction" is not being used in the technical sense in which it occurs in the writings of Russell and others. And the description given of "scientific objects" on page 42, where it is stated that they "are conceived as composing the perceptual objects," departs entirely from what has been said about these two kinds of "objects" by Whitehead (whose views are being advocated in the passage from which the above quotation is taken). On page 99 it is not shown how, if at all, the result $H/CE > H/C$ follows from the result $C/HE > C/H$ —where C/H is the initial probability of a generalisation C , and E is some further evidence. The former result is, of course, equivalent to $E/CH > E/C$ and the latter to $E/CH > E/H$. But as to the passage from the latter to the former, Mr. Ritchie merely asserts that the result $C/HE > C/H$ "is always considered to increase the value of H "—i.e. to give us $H/CE > H/C$.

An excellent feature of this book, which ought to be particularly mentioned, is the great number of concrete illustrations that are taken from various branches of natural science. It may therefore be especially recommended to the notice of scientists as an introductory account of Scientific Method, not overloaded with technicalities, and admirably fair and open-minded in dealing with the many controversial questions of Philosophy which arise.

J. A. CHADWICK.

Kant's Treatment of Causality. By A. C. EWING, D.Phil., Late Heron Exhibitioner of University College, Oxford. London, Kegan Paul, &c., 1924. Pp. vi + 243. 15s. net.

THIS book is likely to open a new phase in Kantian study in this country. "While the number of general commentaries on Kant is legion" the writer observes in the Preface "I know of no English book devoted to expounding his thought on a single category abstracted from the rest". He has selected Causality as "the chief of the categories and the centre of one of the main philosophical controversies of the period"—presumably, though he nowhere says so, that of Freedom which he treats of in the last chapter. I wish at once to say that he seems to me in this more microscopic manner of dealing with Kant to have set an example of thoroughness which will make imitation difficult.

The first chapter on "Causality in Kant's Predecessors" goes over familiar ground from Locke to Hume and from Leibniz to Wolff, but the writer manages to impart considerable freshness to the story, as when he observes that what Berkeley really did was to deny unknowable and imperceptible powers and to reduce "all so-called physical causation to necessitated not necessitating sequence" and that the extremes of Locke and Wolff meet in the *petitio principii* of trying to establish the general principle of Causality by the argument that it is impossible for nothing to produce something. The cursoriness of the allusion to Spinoza at the end of the chapter is explained by the fact that Kant hardly ever refers and acknowledges no debt to the greatest of his modern predecessors. But the writer makes it the occasion of striking what is really the keynote of the book by calling attention to the resemblance between them in "the conception of the timeless causality of God as ground, standing in sharp contrast to the natural causality of science". Chapter II. gives the "Development of Kant's Conception of Causality up to the *Critique of Pure Reason*," from the dogmatic or (modified) Leibnizian stage of the early writings, through the transition period of 1736-66 in which he definitely breaks with the Wolffian formalism (rejecting the mathematical method in philosophy and asserting the synthetic character of the causal nexus), to the statement of the main problem in the letter to Herz of 1772, finally to the great discovery that the perception of objects presupposes the categories.

In Chapter III. the writer faces the perplexing yet fundamentally important argument of the Transcendental deduction first as generally stated and secondly as it bears on Causality. His aim is, neglecting the fluctuations of opinion traceable in the text, "to see rather the logical results than the precise expression of them at every stage." But he does not allow this to excuse him from faithfully dealing with the main causes of the obscurity of Kant's argument. He finds the first of these in the obscurity in which the actual text leaves the crucial point as to whether he

has really replied to the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume by speaking so constantly of self-identity (the unity of apperception) as a deduction from the cognition of physical objects—the precise point that the sceptic denies. In the end he exonerates Kant of any such *petitio principii* on the ground that the general sense of the argument is that *all* cognition, including that which Hume admits of a manifold of successive representations, implies a synthesis. What he really does is to hold a pistol to the sceptic's head in the dilemma "believe this (self-identity) or believe nothing". He must either in this "become as other men or cease to speak at all". This is a charitable interpretation of Kant's argument but on the whole I think the writer justifies it. The second and chief cause of obscurity is the prominence (in the first edition) of the psychological interpretation of the three-fold synthesis of the manifold in perception, past and present in imagination, and recognition in conception. To take this seriously is to commit us to a doctrine of psychological atomism involving for Kant the absurdity of asserting that we only have knowledge by a synthesis of a manifold which somehow we know already. Dr. Ewing again meets the difficulty by reminding us that Kant himself describes this as the "subjective deduction" and disparages it as merely psychological and by insisting, again I think rightly that besides being itself untenable it is unessential to the real argument which is concerned not with psychological processes but with the logical conditions of all knowledge. The point of course is quite fundamental for the proper understanding of Kant and one welcomes so clear a statement of it as is given in the closing words of the chapter. What the Deduction proves is that all knowledge involves "(1) self-identity, (2) systematic unity (with necessary connexion) in the object known". Necessary connexion, however, though implied, remains here in the background. It is the business of the "Analogies," particularly the second, to bring it into the foreground.

In the fourth chapter on "The Second Analogy" we have a statement of Kant's "six separate proofs of causality". Of these, in opposition to Kuno Fischer, Dr. Ewing sets aside that which is founded on the necessary determination of subsequent by precedent time as failing to carry with it causal determination of phenomena. What is required is to show not that time has a definite order, but that phenomena have an objective order in time, and that this is the same for all percipients in so far as the conditions are the same. It is this principle that underlies the remaining five arguments. The reader will find a useful summary of them on pages 81-2. But the main interest of the chapter lies in the writer's criticisms which follow. After censuring the "extraordinary assumption that our experience is merely successive" and the suggestion that "the synthesis is an actual psychological process," he goes on to defend the general principle of the arguments against Schopenhauer on the one hand, and modern Realism on the other. He has little

difficulty in showing that Schopenhauer's own argument is in principle identical with Kant's, but in his treatment of the Realist's criticism, in spite of its acuteness, one feels a certain inadequacy. I agree with the point, which he presses against Mr. Prichard, that our awareness of any object of perception as such implies its connexion with a necessarily determined system independent of our knowing and willing, but if so important a group of theories of causality as that represented by modern Realism is to be mentioned, it would have I think to be treated at greater length. The chapter ends with a useful statement of the limitations of the conception of causality which emerges from the deduction. It has lost all sense not only of intrinsic logical connexion but of dynamical activity, both of which are relegated (as by Kemp Smith who is quoted at length later in the book) to the noumenal sphere. Chapter V. treats of "Substance and Reciprocity," the one as that whose successive states are conceived of as causally related, the other as the union of causality and substance. In dealing with the former the writer brings out the difficulties of the arguments of the first Analogy: the hypostatizing of time as an unchangeable entity, the assumption that we only experience mental states as successive, and the unwarranted identification of the metaphysical principle of substance with the physical of conservation of mass; and traces them to Kant's departure in the case of these arguments from the real programme of the Analogies, *viz.*, to apply what has been already proved in the Deduction as to the reality of a permanent to the exposition of what this means with regard to the elements involved in experience. It is inevitable perhaps that in the treatment of so big a subject as Substance from the single aspect of causality, the reader should feel that justice is hardly done to it. But there are other points in the exposition which seem open to criticism, *e.g.*, when, as against Kant's contention (developed in the "Refutation of Idealism" in the second edition) that consciousness of any change as a change presupposes the consciousness of something that is not changing, it is argued (p. 107) that "the requirement is adequately met so long as all change does not proceed at the same rate". Surely in "change at the same rate" there is presupposed the permanent identity "rate of change". To put it paradoxically the permanent substance is change. On the other hand, the criticism of Kant's treatment of reciprocity seems to me particularly acute and suggestive in its conclusion that if it is to be more than the physical doctrine of interaction (and Kant clearly intends it to be more) it is really an Idea of the Reason and "allied to the coherence theory of reality" (p. 118).

Chapter VI. on the "Application of the Categories to the Empirical Self" raises the question as to Kant's own view. The cases *con* and *pro* are stated at length leading to the conclusion that we have here "simply one of the most striking cases of inconsistency to be found in Kant" (p. 140). Taking the above three categories it is shown that while the proof of the second Analogy leaves it

open to Kant to apply causality in the psychical sphere he shrank from applying substance to the self as an object of knowledge for the reason that he failed to find anything permanent in it; and that denying the psychical application of substance it was impossible for him to admit that of reciprocity. The assertion of *Gegenwirkung* between soul and matter in the posthumous *Hefte* is "wholly contrary to Kant's usual view". Going on to the question "ought the categories to be applied to the empirical self?" the author leads up to the conclusion that "while we must maintain necessary connexion within the self, this does not prove determination of it by what is external or temporally prior to it" (p. 167). Leaving this for the moment we have in Chapter VII. the discussion of what are admittedly two quite different subjects, "Cause and Ground and the First-Cause Antinomy". It would probably have been better to have assigned them separate chapters, or shortened the section on the Antinomy which only leads up to the fairly obvious and familiar point that the demand of reason for a First Cause is essentially a demand for an intelligible ground of phenomena not for an uncaused event at the beginning of a series of phenomena. In the other section we have what to readers less interested in Kantian scholarship will probably find the most suggestive part of the book in the indication it gives of the writer's own view of causality. The interesting point in it is not that the cause is taken (even in the sense of the *whole* past) as merely part of the logical ground—this is perhaps by this time a commonplace of logic—but the reassertion of the common-sense view of the "intrinsic connexion" between cause and effect on the ground "that a causal law involves the relation of implication between cause and effect" (p. 179). How far it is consistent with this realistic view to maintain in the same breath that "necessity is not an actuality" may be a question, but in these days when modern science seems to have come to the support of the positivist view of causality as mere uniformity of succession it is refreshing to have so courageous a statement of the validity of the category. As he puts it in the "Conclusion" to say that science has no need for causality because the general principle does not enable us to discover any particular causal laws is "like saying that a house has no need of a foundation because the foundation cannot be used as a room to live in".

The last and longest chapter deals with the "Problem of Freedom or Mechanical versus Purposive Causality". Dr. Ewing's interpretation of Kant's solution of the problem and his criticism of it do not, I think, differ from those to be found in other idealistic commentaries, *e.g.*, Caird's, but both are freshly stated. Kant's solution, it is pointed out, is not, as Sidgwick supposes, the puerile one of assigning determination and necessity to the known world, freedom, as the denial of them, to the unknown. Nor is it to be found, as Cohen and the Marburger School maintain, in the distinction between a means and that which is an end-in-itself.

Freedom to Kant is the name neither for indeterminism nor for intrinsic finality but for a special kind of necessity. "The term 'necessity' or 'law' always occurs whenever Kant attempts to give a clear description of our noumenal freedom" (p. 202). The real solution is in the distinction between the "partial cause"¹ which we must suppose determines the act as a process in time and the non-temporal or "complete"¹ causality. Kant's mistake was to interpret the non-temporal as timeless instead of as supra-temporal, and on this ground to go on to deny it any place in the phenomenal order. The writer is at his best in criticising the "atomistic view of causal necessity" and in the treatment of the third Critique as "constituting a definite breach with it." Yet Cohen might ask wherein a view that finds the solution of the antinomy of freedom in "teleology" differs from his own. More generally in these days when the interest of philosophy is shifting from what we might call the categories of existence, which centre in causality, to those of value we might have expected some clearer indication of the author's view of the relation between them. It is to be hoped that Dr. Ewing will follow up this admirable critical treatment of Kant's theory with a constructive one of his own on the whole subject. Meantime there is no reader of this book who will not heartily endorse the last sentence of the short Conclusion: "Surely it is well worth while to devote some trouble to the proof of a principle, which, without being in itself logically self-evident, is the indispensable presupposition of all science, nay all rational action, which is the main, if not the only, bond of unity among phenomena, which is the one gateway to the conception of reality as a systematic whole, the conception often, if not always, regarded as the chief end of philosophy."

It is a pity that so scholarly a work should suffer from not infrequent misprints, among them Benro Erdmann (p. 33), and from here and there a solecism such as "like" for "as" (p. 223).

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Speculum Mentis or the Map of Knowledge. By R. G. COLLINGWOOD.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. 327.

THIS book seems to me to show in an eminent and even in a distinguished degree, that rare but most desirable quality—the union of the form and manner of the exposition with the rhythm of the argument which is its substance. In this latest Dialectic, it is the ease and poise and smooth assurance of the Notion that impress us rather than its labour and resolute struggle. I do not mean, of course, that Mr. Collingwood's book is airy or merely graceful. Although slighter than many dialectics, it is not a flimsy structure, especially in its treatment of art, religion and history,

¹ Kant's phrases.

where its author's interests (as I think) are the keenest. I am thinking, and with gratitude, of the reader's ease, not of the writer's; and although the examples of Hegel and Bradley, Croce and Gentile have in a sense inspired and facilitated this latest adventure, its author's mastery (without theft or servility) of his own self-developing theme is too remarkable to escape our attention.

In its expression, also, the book, if not wholly admirable, is at least unusually satisfying. "It is my strong belief," Mr. Collingwood says, "that a philosophy which cannot be written in plain terms, without reliance on the jargon of any school, must be a false philosophy" (p. 11). That is as it may be; and Mr. Collingwood is not at all averse to the use of 'jargon' when he believes his thought to be moving in arid regions. (In my view his account of science is excessively 'dry, jejune and strigose'; but then one has to consider what he takes 'science' to be.) And perhaps the expression of the middle and close of the book has not *quite* the same quality as the beginning. This declension, however, (if it exists) is only comparative, and is not at all considerable.

The plan of the book may be baldly (but, I hope, not too unfairly) set forth as follows: Setting out to construct a 'map of knowledge' (or rather of wisdom as it shapes itself in living experience) Mr. Collingwood finds, in the end, a truer thing. The territory of human experience, he tells us, seems to apportion itself, at the first look, into certain provinces of thoughtful treatment whose boundaries are not ill marked, and permits of the natural procession of a dialectic which has a beginning, a middle, and (perhaps) an end. Provisionally at least, we may therefore distinguish art from religion, and this from science, history and philosophy. Each of these, he believes, is directed towards 'the universe', although often 'implicitly'; and each, were it 'explicit,' would organise the whole of us—and in a reflective fashion. Their order, moreover, is genetic as well as constitutive. In the order of the effort of experience towards an inclusive wisdom and fulness of life, the first stage of its organisation is naturally that in which fact and illusion are not discriminated one from the other. This is how young children begin, and Mr. Collingwood believes it to be typical of the infancy of the race. "Dim premonitions of religion palæolithic man certainly had; and, as we shall see, there is in all art such a premonition of religion. But the evidence of archæology is clear that the full development of the religious consciousness was the work of the neolith" (p. 52). So in the child, religion comes second, and after it abstract thought of a kind; and although the process may return upon itself (as at adolescence beauty commonly stirs us, and then religion very fiercely) there is a determinate order in this very recurrence. Historical thought does not come before science (or shall we say before mathematics and materialism?) but a ter. 'Critical history is the child of the eighteenth century' (p. 53). As for philosophy—well it has taken its time; and every philosopher who is not a

positivist believes that his philosophy should come at the end instead of being inserted between religion and science.

"Art, then, is pure imagination. The artist does not judge or assert, he does not think or conceive, he simply imagines" (p. 61); but since all imagination is built upon fact, and bathes itself in fact although half as a question, wisdom cannot abide in mere art any more than a grown man can always be at play. It must proceed to assert the reality of its imagining. "Now religion is art asserting its object. The object of art is the beautiful, and therefore the holy is the beautiful asserted as real" (p. 120). These symbols and mythologies, however, cannot justify themselves under criticism; and therefore the religious man, asserting his symbols 'verily and indeed,' finds that his dogma is a hybrid of myth and the letter, of superstition and the truth which it fain would become. 'Rationalism,' to be sure, is contemptible, for religion is not a shadow or mere nullity simply because it cannot mean precisely what it says, and cannot say precisely what it means. And yet, without question, we have to try to say what we do mean. Hence science. In science thought masters its symbols instead of being driven by them—but it still has to pay a price. Its mastery is only over *abstract* symbols and concepts, so that the very 'particulars' which it faces with its (desiccated) universals are, in fact, but 'counter-universals'.

"Mathematics, mechanism and materialism are the three marks of all science" (p. 167), materialism being the assertion of a shrunken logical substratum (*i.e.*, matter), mathematics a merely conceptual arrangement of an indeterminate plurality of units. "This indeterminate multiplicity is the mathematical infinite, which is therefore another name for the perfect abstractness of the mathematical universal" (p. 165). (We are also informed that "in point of fact what science calls infinity is nothing but indefiniteness, ambiguity in definition" (p. 190).) Even induction and hypothesis, in which struggling science seeks for the concrete, can never bring it there. What is needed is perception, not logic and sensation, 'history' not 'science'. "Sensation is the false or abstract account of perception. In perception we are immediately aware of our object, which is a concrete and therefore historical fact; perception and history are thus identical" (p. 204).

This may seem rather a free translation of 'history,' but Mr. Collingwood does not think so, and much of his discussion deals with what the plain man would be disposed to call by that name. "The gulf," our author says (p. 204), "between a Thucydides and a Gibbon, is not a mere difference of degree. . . . It is the difference between the recorder of those facts which happen to be directly visible from his own empirical situation in history, and the thinker who claims for himself, in principle, the power to recount the whole infinite history of the universe. . . . Even the slenderest monograph written from this point of view outweighs, as an achievement of the spirit, the whole output of the *rerum gestarum*

scriptores". (Thucydides is later reinstated but as a writer of drama.) Similarly we have a dialectical transition from old wives' tales through *Quellenkritiken* to 'the world of fact as the Absolute Object'. "There is thus no feature of experience, no attitude of mind towards its object, which is alien to history. Art rests on the ignoring of reality, religion on the ignoring of thought; science, on the ignoring of fact; but with the recognition of fact everything is recognised that is in any sense real. The fact, as historically determined, is the absolute object" (p. 218).

'Recognised' but not incorporated or understood. The infinite whole of fact is unknowable even in its infinite internality unless it is "*the nature of the knowing mind as such*" (p. 241, Author's italics); and in the overcoming of this last opacity of object to subject we are translated into the very life of philosophy. This is the message of "almost all philosophers of the first rank, whether ancient or modern; who with strange unanimity and for the most various reasons have held that in the last resort nothing but the knower can be known" (p. 245). In this last stage, that is made explicit which was implicit all along. "In philosophy, subject and object are identified and this is the differentia of philosophy" (p. 249). To be sure, there appear to have been as many varieties of 'philosophy' as there are types of abstraction. We have all heard of 'aesthetic' philosophies and 'scientific' ones; but all these pretenders stultify themselves *in adiecto*, and so make it unnecessary for us to refute them in detail. We have only to recall ourselves from them, and "to say once more, in words suited to our generation, something that everybody has always known" (this is how p. 38 puts it). We have entered upon the very fruition of wisdom, and can never be confounded. Thus when we say 'Mind' we need not recoil when we ask 'Whose' it is. "The absolute mind unites the differences of my mind and other people's . . . as the concrete universal of history unites" (p. 299). Even time cannot sunder it. "All concrete thought is in its immediacy, temporal, but in its mediation, extra-temporal. The mind in its actual thinking at once recognises and defies temporal (and spatial) limitations. . . . In the absolute process of thought, the past lives in the present, not as a mere 'trace' or effect of itself in the physical or psychical organism, but as the object of the mind's historical knowledge of itself in an eternal present. . . . This is the solution of all those problems concerning finitude and infinity which have so vexed abstract thought" (pp. 301-302).

Thus we lose our map; for it could not be made. "There are no autonomous and mutually exclusive forms of experience, and what is more, it is in no one's interest to assume that there are" (p. 306). Yet we gain a finer thing.

In one of the rare passages which the reader might wish to have seen otherwise expressed, Mr. Collingwood attitudinises in front of a potential critic, and says 'Strike, but hear me'. Grateful hearers are not in fighting trim, but some of them may suspect they have

been lulled; and as a small selection from the dubieties that have assailed me, I venture to make a few comments upon portions of the beginning and the end of this dialectical journey. (I choose them not because I find these particular dubieties the greatest, but because they are sufficient to indicate, if not to justify, what I mean).

The initial argument concerning art (chap. iii.) is intentionally an artifice. As an 'experiment' it begins with an over-statement, and the object of the device is to show that this over-statement leads to its own undoing. The artifice, however, could only succeed if its initial over-statement were plausible and its self-destruction manifest. It may be doubted, however, whether the device succeeds (at any rate in the second respect). The conclusion may be true, but is scarcely, I think, shown to be so.

We begin our 'experiment' with the view that art is imagination proper, and that this does not discriminate real from unreal, does not assert or deny, and cannot in consequence be either true or false; and, personally I find no difficulty in accepting the experiment. What has next to be shown, however, is that this form of experience *denies* the others (cf. p. 55), and this seems to me no more possible than that Mr. Santayana's 'essences' should deny, or be denied by, anything. Yet Mr. Collingwood thinks otherwise. "The world of imagination," we are told (pp. 62-3), "which is the object confronting the artist's mind when he looks at a sunset is not present to the scientist's mind at all. Indeed, the scientist as such is committed to the denial of its existence; for beauty is the secret of the universe or nothing, and for the scientist it is certainly not the secret of the universe."

Both artist and scientist, surely, might exclaim at this, although admitting that their concerns are different; and if art is not concerned with assertion or denial it makes itself ridiculous if it is affected by them. To support his singular contention, however, Mr. Collingwood goes on to say (1) that art is not merely immediate; (2) that it is the mind's achievement and therefore true or false; (3) that *ugliness*, being a failure to achieve beauty, is a standing self-retutation of the experiment; (4) that art is private to the artist—this being a necessary consequence of its imaginative character; (5) that art has nothing to do with principles or laws, and refutes itself by following them; (6) that art has a continuity with waking life; and (7) that thought moves in a 'systole and diastole' of question and answer. Now a question = suspension of judgment = (by definition) imagination. (He also says some other things, but these may suffice for a sample). --- - -

Of these (1) is irrelevant and plainly inconsistent with (7). Non-assertiveness need not be immediacy. (2) is a *petitio principii* (Mr. Santayana has shown this at least). (3) is a horrid monster. How does the non-assertive character of art prove that beauty may not exist, or that unasserted artistry may not be ugly? Even if there could be no beauty outside art, there would surely be the beautiful-or-ugly within it. In (4), so far as I can see, no proof is

given of the alleged 'necessity,' although the thing is stated, expanded, and may be true. (5) would not necessarily forbid art to proceed according to principles, although it might forbid the assertion of them. (6) is held to be the main point but seems again irrelevant. Is a dream, then, *not* a dream because it arose from waking conditions? (The author sees the irrelevance well enough on p. 130 but there he is dealing with religion. "Some incidents in the Bible are historically true; but this historical truth has nothing to do with æsthetic or religious value.") (7) seems ingenious although supposal and questioning are not quite the same; but, in fact, a merely questioning Pyrrhonism cannot be refuted and may sustain itself very well. Incidentally it is *not* refuted when the Pyrrhonist acts like other people—despite Pseudomenos, his alleged fallacy.

In short, we have only one argument: *viz.*, that no one continues a mere artist all his life, and that grown men do assert and deny. The artist might reply that this is a pity, and that we can avoid it with very fair success. If so, how precisely is he routed? And how, in the name of wonderful questioning, are these matters affected by the contrast between 'explicit' and 'implicit'?

I pass to some points concerning the conclusion. Mr. Collingwood, as we have seen, tells us with justifiable pride that he is in very good company when he maintains that "absolute knowledge can only be the knowledge of a knowing mind by itself" and other such things. These are hard sayings, however, and therefore we want very much to have them shown to us in language suited to our times. Unfortunately at this point Mr. Collingwood is really very careless indeed. He states clearly, to be sure, that subject and object are 'identical,' and complains of those who 'denounce as a stupid and trivial confusion anything in the nature of a synthesis of opposites'. It would almost seem, however, as if literally *anything* 'in the nature of a synthesis of opposites' were good enough to beat them with. Thus subject and object are correlative as well as identical (this is stated repeatedly) so that we have something in the nature of the interesting phenomenon of a son being his own father or of the event unknown to physiology in which a systole becomes its own antagonistic diastole. We are even told that "it is only in the synthesis of opposites that these opposites can be distinguished. It is only by comparing and contrasting A with not-A, which means holding them together in a single unity, that one can see the difference between them" (p. 249). As this applies to the well-known identity between black and white, one begins to wonder about stupidity and triviality. And lastly I venture to complain, although reluctantly, of a really elementary piece of carelessness which I shall indicate by italics in the two quotations that follow: "I am the self that I am, simply because of the nature of *the* world; by studying a certain kind of world and living in it as my environment, I develop my own mind in a determinate way. And conversely, *my* world is the world of *my* mind" (p. 248). "The very essence of trees and hills and

people is that they should be not myself but my objects in perception; they are not subjective but objective, not states of myself but facts that I know. None the less my knowing them is organic to them; it is because *they* are what they are that I can know them, because I know them that they can be what *to me* they really are" (p. 311).

JOHN LAIRD.

Ethics and some Modern World Problems (N. W. Harris Lectures).

By WILLIAM McDUGALL, F.R.S. Methuen, London, 1924.
Pp. xiv + 240.

THESE lectures represent an attempt (as the author is careful to point out in his useful Preface) to deal with a large subject in a small compass. The subject is nothing less than the future of our civilisation and the attempts that can be and ought to be made to guide it in the right direction. The compass is that of six lectures delivered in one week, 'printed substantially as they were delivered,' the only additions being 'footnotes and an appendix containing two suggestions towards the better establishment of international justice'.

We cannot afford to be ungrateful to any competent observer who points out to us the mistakes which we are in danger of making or the mistaken inferences which we may be drawing from principles in which we believe. If some of the dangers have been pointed out before, it is after all our fault that it should have been found necessary to repeat them. If the remedies proposed are not entirely new and have not seemed useful or practicable, it is always worth while to enquire whether the omission to adopt them is due entirely to a reasoned conviction of their inadequacy and not at least partly to lack of initiative or of courage.

It is inevitable that an author, when dealing shortly with large topics, should make allusion to many points, some as part of his argument and some only incidentally, with which he has no space to deal in detail. On many of the points to which Dr. McDougall refers in this way he has furnished proof in other works, and our consideration of them, whether in agreement or otherwise, should come properly in connexion with those works. For some others he has not, so far as we are aware, afforded such proof, and they give the impression of being ambiguous if not disputable: but they cannot fairly be judged from the brief allusion made here, and must therefore be left on one side. The author's chief contention is that our civilisation is based upon two general systems which he describes as Universal and National Ethics respectively. These systems are, at least to a considerable extent, in conflict; he holds that neither of them will prove ultimately satisfactory if it is pursued alone and that the only hopeful course is to endeavour to maintain the advantages of both. It is not quite easy to see what the Universal Ethical system means. As it includes 'the anarchic

and the cosmopolitan ideals,' as well as 'the ethics of Christianity and of Buddhism, and less strictly the ethics of Mohammedanism,' it would seem that it might conveniently be subdivided. Few of us would feel competent to answer for all these ideals, and a generalisation which might be accepted in regard to some of them would be resented if applied to others. If, as the author tells us, 'the formulation and advocacy' of the anarchic and the cosmopolitan ideals 'have been mainly due to the promptings of Christian ethics,' he probably does not mean to tell us that all Christians are either anarchists or cosmopolitans. Perhaps he does mean to tell us that all Christians, if their 'entire morality' were 'rooted in the Gospel' (to quote the phrase of Naumann which is cited in a footnote), ought to be one or the other: but such a contention would only lead us back to the ambiguities of the passage on which it is based, and would have to take full advantage of the fact, true enough in its own place, that there never have been any completely consistent Christians at all. However, the general characteristics of Universal Ethics are (apparently) to insist on democracy and to belittle the nation as an institution. The author tells us that he is a democrat and he cannot therefore be regarded as criticising all forms of democracy. On the contrary he reserves his criticism for that 'ultra-democracy' which prevails according to him in universal systems. This 'ultra-democracy' appears to be based on a belief that one man is as good as another for any purpose, including that of government. Such a principle, when it is worked out in any detail and is not confined to rhetorical expression, is more familiar in connexion with the objections raised by the Greek philosophers to the democracy of their time than in relation to problems of the present day. But, even if we accept those objections as entirely fair to the ideals which they condemn, we may remind ourselves that Aristotle, while describing their tendency as one which would make all offices open to all men equally, and would endeavour to secure this by electing to those offices through casting lots, allows an exception for such offices as require a special kind of experience, and that Athens did actually make such exceptions for generalship and to some extent for finance. If any peoples show a tendency to go beyond Athens in this matter and to hold that the government ought to be entrusted to persons taken at random without any regard to their competence or what is believed to be their competence, it is probable that most of us would agree with Dr. McDougall in repudiating the suggestion: but we hear far more often of other dangers, such as a refusal of peoples to obey the rulers whom they have selected, than of this one. As to the repudiation of the nation as a unit, it is not clear why some at least of these so-called universal systems should do this at all. They are presumably pledged to regard mankind as a whole as of greater importance than the nation: does it follow that they must disregard the nation altogether? There are other unities below the nation, such as the town, the public school, or the family: there are difficulties in defining the exact relation of each of these to the nation, but the wiser

advocates of the nation do not regard these narrower loyalties either as negligible, or, properly guarded, as other than useful. The anarchist will of course reject the nation as he will reject any other authority or bond of union; there are often internationalists who forget the nation: but there is no obvious reason why all of those who are classed in this book as universalists should either reject or forget it. Many certainly do not, and it is difficult to see why they should be regarded as inconsistent, provided they do not regard the nation as more important than mankind as a whole.

Nor is it altogether easy to see what Dr. McDougall means by National Ethics. There are some 'extreme forms' of this which he does not like, 'such as the Machiavellian and the Hegelian'. The illustrations appear to suggest that National Ethics, like Universal Ethics, admit of sub-divisions, for those who are jealous for the reputation of Machiavelli or of Hegel would almost certainly ask, though on different grounds, whether the author is not laying too much stress on isolated passages. But they would unite in surprise at being told that the 'fundamental error' of both these forms, which 'has been the ground of the sterility of much ethical and political discussion,' is the attempt to answer ethical without at the same time considering political questions. Yet too much stress must not be laid on these illustrations, for the general tendency of national systems is, as we gather, to consider ethics and politics together. If a thing is true, it cannot be repeated too often. We may gladly accept the advice to study ethics and politics together, and we may admit that there have been times when mistakes have been made through the omission to notice their interdependence, though we may doubt whether this failing has been quite so general as the author seems to imply. But this can hardly form the dividing line between nationalists and universalists. Not all universalists avoid politics. Probably the nationalist is he who recognises the nation as a unit, in the degree which Dr. McDougall regards as the right one. It therefore becomes very important to discover what that degree is, and we do not receive as clear guidance as we could wish. We are told that 'National Ethics naturally tends to find political expression in an aristocratic organisation of society'. The reasons are two: 'first, regarding the welfare of the nation as of prime importance, because an essential condition of the higher happiness of future generations, it sees that all existing members of the nation must be treated in some considerable degree as means to this end'; and secondly, it recognises that 'some are by natural endowment much better qualified than others to undertake the duties of leadership and control in all public affairs'. If the former reason is only admitted in nationalism, we ought all to be nationalists, and, if the second reason is only compatible with aristocracy, we ought all to be aristocrats. But surely both statements are very surprising unless one or more of the words is used in an unusual sense. And it would be as great an exaggeration to say that all universalists neglect the welfare of posterity as to say that no nationalists do. One is tempted to

suppose that the real function of nationalism, according to Dr. M'Dougall, is to counteract that excessive tendency to unselfishness which he holds to be inherent in 'the immediate prompting of our nature'. No one could fail to hope that the author's singularly favourable estimate of human nature is not over-optimistic: but even those who do not believe in universal depravity may well wonder whether the truth does not lie between the two, and whether there are not other and more serious dangers to be combated before we begin to discourage unselfishness. However, it must be admitted that this suggestion of the part which nationalism is intended to play is not explicitly asserted by the author. And it follows that one who does not fully understand either what is meant by universal or what is meant by national ethics is not in a position to express an opinion whether a combination of the two is what the times require.

The author's practical suggestions include a good deal of interesting discussion about the relation of the United States to the League of Nations, which need not detain us here. He urges that knowledge and education should be more fully recognised as essential conditions for political power or privileges: the general proposition has often been advanced before, but it is clearly open to great practical difficulties under the conditions of the present day, and, if Dr. M'Dougall may say that it is premature to discuss these, it may be replied that the suggestion is rather barren without such discussion. He makes further the proposal that the use of the air should be confined to an international force and that no aerial conveyance should be allowed to any narrower authority. He tells us, truly enough, that the loss of some commercial advantages and of some convenience in travel is a small price to pay for a guarantee that the horrors of bombing can be avoided: but is Dr. M'Dougall here paying enough attention to the facts of psychology?

The merits of these lectures consist rather in the incidental remarks than in the positive conclusions at which the author arrives. They provoke thought and are therefore worth reading even by those who do not feel that they can agree or who may often not feel sure what it is with which they are being asked to agree. 'The extent of ignorance and blindness and the extreme diversity of opinions in respect of the most fundamental of all political and social problems' is a fact with which we have to reckon, whether we interpret it, as Dr. M'Dougall does, of the question of population or more widely. To emend our ignorance and to cure our blindness is a necessary work, which will require the co-operation of many minds. It has however to be remembered that there is sometimes a long journey to be traversed between the conviction that others are ignorant or blind and such proof as may reasonably be expected to induce them to apply those epithets to themselves. Few of us altogether escape (and perhaps Dr. M'Dougall does not escape) from the danger of identifying these two conditions, and, till we have reached the second, even an extreme diversity of opinions may not be without its advantages.

P. V. M. BENECKE.

VIII.—NEW BOOKS.

Reason and Morals. An enquiry into the first principles of Ethics, by ISRAEL LEVINE, M.A., D.Litt., Lecturer in Philosophy at the University College of the South-West, Exeter. Glasgow, Maclehose, Jackson & Co., 1924.

MR. LEVINE has sunk his shaft in a distinctly fruitful vein. His book is virtually an invitation to thinkers on ethical subjects to look around and see what Ethics are left after the results of the new psychology (biological and psycho-analytical) have been given due weight and allowed to tell their tale. It was a rich field to tap. We are safe in saying—equally whether Psycho-analysis is to live or whether it is destined to die—that a great deal of this kind of work will have to be done on the materials turned up by its plough. What is the extent of Mr. Levine's contribution in this little brochure?

He is particularly interested in the fate of such conceptions as Reason and Freedom in Ethics. And he knows where he is. An earlier book, *The Unconscious*, recently published from his pen, was widely and justly appreciated as one of the most sane and informed (and one of the least "impossible") presentations of the Freud type of Psycho-analysis so far undertaken in the interests of the ordinary unsophisticated University or Training College student, who is expected to have some knowledge of contemporary movements in the psychological field and whose introduction to this one presents difficulties of such a unique kind to the conscientious teacher. Even *The Unconscious*, however, left the quite right book for all sides of this pedagogical purpose still a desideratum. And for a reason just to be given, we would take the risk of estimating Mr. Levine's present work by its success as an effort in the same direction.

The reason is that for once a subject-matter has come athwart the philosophical pedagogue upon which his thought and his book must be simple if it is to be path-breaking and must be philosophically path-breaking if it is to be simple. In other words, a book which is to serve our pedagogical purposes in this region simply must find bottom, as an out and out moral philosophy. It must be on first principles. It must do nothing less than show if or how fundamental ethical conceptions emerge from out of the psychological morass; and it must accomplish it in simple language. The courage of his title and the simplicity of his language between them show that the thing which Mr. Levine has had before him is precisely this. He has not brought the enterprise all the way. He has done one remarkable thing, besides writing with simplicity. He has subjected to philosophical reflection a "psycho-analysis," which analysts themselves can recognise. This was indispensable, and it was a difficult achievement. But will there not someone yet arise—if our author will give the matter another ten years, perhaps someone will—who will continue to be able to convince the analysts that he does indeed understand, who will also preserve the precious lucidity and judgment with which this book is written, and who will yet take the whole matter at a level just about a couple of feet

deeper than the point where Mr. Levine—may one say *the present Mr. Levine*—makes his incision?

This book points the direction, at times, straight as an arrow. The psycho-analysts have really been very rough with us; especially with "reason". But reason, says Mr. Levine with most refreshing simplicity, consists in being reasonable. And what, in turn, is this but the quality in us which makes us widen our field of interest? Caught in a moment of fury or passion, and besought to "try to be reasonable," what is a man being bidden to do, but to cease this unbecoming engrossment in the one matter immediately in front of him, and recollect the innumerable other things which, in social life, have got to be remembered if there is not to be disaster? This "reason," then, is simply the elementary fact of the moral life, and won't be exorcised away. But that is just the point. This is common ground to all theories of Ethics. What is distinctive of a particular Ethics is the interpretation it adopts of this basic fact. Now it seems to me that if we propose—as we must—to go to first principles, then the psycho-analytic interpretation distinctly invades the first principles of any except a hedonistic Ethics; and it would seem that one must, while accepting and really understanding the psycho-analyst's facts, challenge his interpretation of them in a deeper way than Mr. Levine has yet done, if hedonism is to go, and more than the name of reason is to survive, as a principle of the moral life.

For what is the interpretation which the psycho-analyst offers of his facts?

It is surely in the last resort the one which works with his patients when they can bring themselves to accept it. Now I cannot imagine anyone having actually been operated on by a psycho-analyst to any purpose without having accepted a kind of belief which in broad daylight would show up as a contradiction of the first principles of any Ethics which would found on a conception of "reason" or of "the whole".

I cannot, for instance, imagine a patient emerging cured from Freud's clinique without having got to the sexual root of his trouble. This means, if it means anything, that he must somewhere or at some time have obtained the Heavenly Grace to say frankly about some form or other of a "lower" sort of gratification,—*"That is what I have wanted. I've been pretending it was other things, but it was really that all the time"*. Such is the core of the oft-repeated little drama. The physician explains. One writhes and "resists" for a while; but it is of no use; one has to admit it. And once one frankly can admit it, a light goes up and the burden rolls from the heart. Such is the kind of incident that the healing moment is. It is the acceptance of that kind of conviction. And Freud of course assumes that it is an admission of the truth. But the whole issue is, is it the truth? And one thing at least seems to be very clear. Either Freud is wrong there—or else our ethics must be a variant of hedonism. At least, this that Freud is saying is precisely what the hedonist was told that *he* had said,—about *another* thing which was less than the whole object of desire, namely "pleasure". And as to the merits of the question, surely the chances are that Freud and he are wrong. It does not seem to me that the psycho-analytic position will bear inspection if you take it as the truth; that is to say, as philosophy. You search in the patient's past. You uncover something which he is ashamed to admit has had a fascination for him. You get him to admit it; to say "Yes, I have wanted that; frankly, I like that". And then it comes all over him, what a "beast" he really is, or what a "sham" he has been, etc. And it is very true, of course; tragically so. But the whole truth, is precisely what it is not. It does not follow, because "I like that," that therefore "that is what I like". What I like may be that and

a great deal more. What I really like may be what Mr. Levine calls the reasonable. It may be what Socrates calls the good.

This, then, is what the hedonist was told. The real object of desire, we said to him, is not pleasure. And similarly, to-day, we must say that it is not sex. But how it can be the good, is next the question,—and in view of the stuff which analysts have shown we are made of, it is a large one. It is a question to the opening up of which Mr. Levine's whole book is an invitation. Some answer to it is precisely the oil which he ought to be able to strike if only he can be persuaded to drive his shaft a little further. To find some answer to it is the problem which the whole of our instinct-psychology and the whole of our psycho-analytic psychology between them have left to any ethics which is to speak to this generation. We are driven right back on first principles. Goodness is costly; only the psycho-analyst knows how costly. Then, how is it good to be good? In other words, "Why should I be moral?" This is the first and last question of Ethics. In the extremely simple Kantian phrase, How is a categorical imperative possible? For that was his question too. The Categorical Imperative offers us only the good; but how can that be good? It is exactly the eternal riddle; and the answer, in the dialect of the present century, has not yet been much more than attempted. But we shall hardly hopefully begin on any such question as how goodness is good, until we get over the fallacy of thinking that because I like the other thing, the other thing is what I like; of thinking that because evil or quiescence or death is good to me, therefore it is *what* is good to me; of thinking that because behind a "symbol," I see and feel the power of this that or the other crude appeal, therefore this crudity is *what* I see and feel the power of, behind that symbol. No. This symbolism is weak. I do indeed see what the analyst points out. And, as I am ashamed to say, it attracts me. But it i-n't *what* attracts me. I also had another love to lose. And it too attracts. Why else do I weep? And it is the noumenon of which the other is the phenomenon, and not vice versa; for it contained the other and not the other it. Of course, however I took it, as upshot of it all, I am set free. And it is given on good authority that "the truth" will make you free. But while the truth will do this, so also will other things. And I deem, despite the disclaimer of suggestion, that what makes you free in the psycho-analyst's clinique is still not the whole or philosophic truth; but at best that truth made down into a little medicinal lie.

J. W. SCOTT.

Université de Louvain. Annales de l'Institut supérieur de Philosophie.
Tome V., Année 1924. Louvain and Paris, 1924. Pp. viii, 738.

The customary substantial annual of the philosophical faculty of Louvain opens this year with a graceful dedication to the venerable Cardinal Mercier. As in former years the contents are agreeably diversified. The first article is a brief but luminous and sympathetic study of St. Bonaventura's famous *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* by Fr. Symphorien. J. Henry follows with a long historical account of the "ontologism" current in the University of Louvain in the middle of the nineteenth century and the rather unedifying squabbling which led to the official condemnation of its most prominent representative, Ubaghs, by Rome. British readers will be interested to find that the influence of Reid's writings had a good deal to do with the Belgian 'ontologist' development. In an essay on *La population et la guerre* C. Jacquart makes a careful study of the effects of the recent war on population with rather disheartening results. He finds that Great Britain and Germany, among the

belligerents, may be expected to revert soonest to the pre-war percentage of excess of births over deaths. Belgium is still sound at the core, but her recovery will be slower, as so considerable a fraction of her best material has been permanently attracted to other abodes, notably France. The case of France is all but hopeless. With her persistently low birth-rate, her one chance of escaping death by exhaustion is to give systematic encouragement to immigration on a large scale from Belgium and other "Latin" countries. L. Le Fur makes a violent attack on Kant, *Kant et le droit des gens*. It is argued here that under the disguise of an apostle of "eternal peace" Kant teaches doctrines which justify the worst theoretical and practical excesses of the German "militarists". To me it seems that M. Le Fur has simply mis-understood or misrepresented all the passages of Kant on which he rests his case. Once at least a cynical maxim ironically described by Kant as a principle of the "morality" of eighteenth-century diplomatists is seriously treated by M. Le Fur as part of Kant's own ethics. This *crassa ignorantia* is really inexcusable. The Neo-Thomists are, of course, free to criticise Kant as severely as they please; no one is free to calumniate him by baseless misrepresentations. J. Maritain writes with his usual rhetorical violence on *J. J. Rousseau et la Pensée moderne*. In a rather confused article Port-Royal, Mme. Guyon, Luther, Descartes, "Protestants," "modernists" are all well be-spattered with abuse and all made out somehow to be either own brothers in the spirit to J. J. or his spiritual offspring. Much of the author's denunciation strikes me as merely rather foolish and based on a pretty general ignorance of the objects of his scorn. But such an allegation as that "Madame de Warens is the worthy mother of Modernism" is a stupid and vulgar insult which ought not to have disfigured the page of any publication of a distinguished University. M. Maritain does not want for ability, but he would do his own cause better service if he would abstain from foul language and "speak like a man of this world". E. Allo writes sensibly, though with insufficient documentation on *La philosophie grecque dans le N.T.* He is pretty successful in his argument against the crazy derivation of Christianity from "mystery-religions" and much to the point in his estimate of the attitude of St. Paul to "philosophy". But his view that St. Paul's knowledge of Greek "philosophy" and literature was thorough and extensive, though interesting, needs to be supported by evidence, which he makes no attempt to produce. D. Lottin gives a very full and carefully stated analysis of the Thomistic ethics in an essay, *L'ordre moral et l'ordre logique d'après S. Thomas*, which is a little tiring in the reading but will be found very useful for purposes of reference. The well-known mediaevalist, A. Pelzer, studies the history of the MSS. and editions of the lectures given by Duns Scotus at Paris in a learned paper, *le premier livre des Reportata parisiensia*. It seems only too clear that the published editions depend not on the reports, still extant, seen and approved by Scotus himself, but upon *reportata* which are both depraved and interpolated. Happily the industry of the fathers of Quaracchi is already repairing the mishap. A. Fauville, *Recherches sur la perception tachistoscopique*, reports and interprets a series of interesting experiments with the tachistoscope on the recognition of short words, simple patterns, etc. Perhaps the most interesting of the conclusions drawn is that the recognition of the meaning of a design or the like is independent of verbal suggestion. It is the recognised meaning which is first apprehended and suggests the name. M. Fauville is also convinced by his experiments that though several objects can be apprehended simultaneously, their significances can only be discerned successively. M. Defourmy's essay on Aristotle's *Politics*, *Aristote : l'évolution sociale* run to excessive length. The writer has two main objects, (1) to defend Aristotle's theory of the

origination of society from the patriarchal family against the now fairly discredited conception of a primitive sexually promiscuous "horde" succeeded by a "matriarchate"; (2) to prove that the main object of the *Politics* is to preach a "federal alliance" of the Greek states under Macedonian hegemony against the Persian Empire. I think the writer happier in dealing with the first point than with the second, though in both divisions of his essay he seems to me to show a zeal not wholly according to knowledge. To disprove the speculations of McLennan and Bachofen is not quite the same thing as to prove, what I think M. Defourny holds, that the *patria potestas* of a Roman father is a "primitive" institution of mankind. Again, even if one agrees with Aristotle and Westermarck on the "primitive" character of the monogamous family, it does not follow that the "state" must be simply an off-shoot of the family. May not both have grown together *pari passu*? On the second point, M. Defourny produces no serious evidence, and his view seems to me incredible. Aristotle's all but complete silence about the achievements of Philip and Alexander, coupled with his one-sided exaltation of the "speculative" life, his frequent disparagement of the pursuits of "princes" and his deliberate construction of a typical "best state" with no political aspirations would naturally suggest that he took little interest in the great achievements of his pupil Alexander and was, if anything, antipathetic to Macedonian ambitions. M. Defourny has to admit that there is not a word in the *Politics* which implies that Aristotle cared about "federal unity" or the conquest of Persia, though his thesis demands that the philosopher should have been an "enthusiast" for both. His proof of his case is really ludicrous. It amounts only to showing, what every one knows, that the Macedonians spoke Greek and that Aristotle did not regard the Macedonian monarchy as a "tyranny". To this is added the preposterous assertion that when Aristotle once refers to "one man in the past" who had tried to make the "middle classes" supreme in the "city," he must be meaning King Philip and the reference must be to the terms of pacification adopted at the congress of Corinth. (But Philip (a) could not be referred to in Aristotle's life-time as a "man of the past," and (b) made a point at Corinth of leaving the constitutions of the various "cities" untouched,—the very opposite of an attempt to secure the supremacy of the *bourgeoisie*.) A more serious indication of *parti pris* is afforded by the assertion that Plato, unlike Aristotle, merely paid a nominal honour to peace, but built his whole system of political thought on the assumption that the condition of a "city" is and must always be one of πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος. This is supported by a reference to *Laws* 625e-626a, where the speaker is a Cretan who simply professes to be explaining the principles of the Cretan legislation and institutions, and leads up at once to an unfavourable criticism by Plato's representative, the Athenian of the dialogue. It is the Cretan who regards it as "madness in mankind" not to recognise that war is the normal and standing condition of a state. Plato's own view (628c) is that "the best condition is neither war nor *στάσις*—one ought to pray that one may have no need of either—but peace with one another and good-will". M. Defourny has simply borne false witness against Plato in order to exalt Aristotle at his expense. I can find no better excuse for the falsehood than *ignorantia crassissima*, and I do not believe Aristotle would have wished to be belauded thus at the expense of the truth. The volume closes with a well-written essay by S. Deploige, *S. Thomas et la famille* directed chiefly against the advocates of divorce. I think the writer hardly distinguishes as he should between those who would allow divorce as a normal way out of a marriage which has not turned out happy and those who would only permit it when the flagrant and persistent debauchery of one party seems to make family life

into something like a hell. The argument from the "spiritual interests of the children," on which M. Deploige rightly relies, seems in these last cases to make rather for than against divorce.

A. E. T.

A Theory of Knowledge. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS STRONG. Constable & Co., Ltd., London, Bombay, Sydney, 1923. Pp. xii + 103.

The Unknowable: The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford, 24th October, 1923, by GEORGE SANTAYANA, M.A., Ph.D. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. Pp. 30.

There is an essential community of outlook in this brief epistemological essay by Mr. Strong and the Herbert Spencer lecture on *The Unknowable* by Prof. Santayana, as is to be expected from the two most prominent contributors to *Essays in Critical Realism*. Both are agreed as to the necessity of making an ultimate appeal to everybody's irresistible belief. Thus Mr. Strong asserts: "The indispensable foundation of logic, that is to hold good of any thing, is the belief in real things. We share this belief with the animals; or rather some of us do. All men act as if they believed in matter: as you may see by observing their performances at the table and at bed-time. If pots and pans were ideas, they would not exist when unseen and untouched, nor last except by miracle from one perception to another. And everybody has an irresistible belief that they do last" (p. 58). So, too, Mr. Santayana asserting that substance can be called unknowable only in the sense in which a drum can be called inaudible, says, "In the sense in which what is heard is the sound, hearing is intuition: in the sense in which what is heard is the drum, hearing is an instance of animal faith, of that sort of perception which includes understanding and readiness to assume much that is not perceived, and to act on that assumption" (p. 16).

Mr. Strong believes that the essential characteristic of a philosopher is carefulness in making assumptions, and he thinks that the prevailing chaos in philosophical opinions is largely due to over-hasty assumptions, especially with regard to perception—the simplest form of knowledge. He attempts, therefore, by an analysis of perception to find a principle upon which all metaphysicians might be agreed. His main contention is that "all data are data of the intellect". The argument with which he attempts to establish this contention is difficult to follow, for it is extremely condensed and, as it develops, it becomes full of metaphors the exact force of which it is difficult to determine.

Mr. Strong holds both that there is immediate experience in which there is no distinction of subject and object and also that such "immediate experience is in time and space, and constitutes the inner being or substance of the things we perceive" (p. viii). Hence, immediate experience is identical with matter (p. 23); and the self is "identical with an extract from, or pattern of processes in, the nervous system" (p. viii). Immediate experience involves sensations, but these sensations are not data; they can be apprehended only mediately in introspection. Using the term "feeling" to designate the "psychical" character of immediate experience, Mr. Strong asserts that feeling "becomes itself a datum, or rather becomes known through a datum in introspection" (p. 11). Mr. Strong bases his account of immediate experience upon Mr. Bradley's well-known exposition in *Essays on Truth and Reality*, from which he quotes extensively, adding some essential corrections. It can only be said that Mr. Strong does not make Mr. Bradley's conception more intelligible.

Since there are no sense data but only *feelings*, the externality of our perceptions is to be wholly accounted for in terms of our motor tendencies. The externality of a sound, for example, is "brought before us by the motor tendencies that accompany the hearing of the sound" (p. 1). This motor tendency is essential in order that there should be any awareness of the external world.

To the present reviewer it seems extremely difficult to believe that mere motor adjustment can yield perception of an external reality; nor would such a theory enable us to draw any distinction between erroneous and veridical perception. Mr. Strong's treatment of his position is far too slight to carry conviction, while his frequent resort to metaphors is thoroughly unsatisfactory. What, for instance, can be made of the following passage, on page 49? "But matter is not only Force, it is also Light. I do not mean physical light, but the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world—the light of Nature, or Sense. We denied sensations to be experienced, but we did not deny them to be experience, that is (if the metaphor may be pardoned), to be full of inner light."

In applying his theory of immediate experience and of the nature of the self to the problem of knowledge, Mr. Strong asserts that there is a two-fold question: (1) On what ground do we believe that things really exist, and (2) on what ground do we believe that perception reveals things to us as they really are? To the first question his answer seems to be that we all act as though there were real things: hence we believe on instinct; to the second he replies that perception shows us data which are *exactly like* the real things although they are not the real things.

Such a conclusion seems to the present reviewer to be the inevitable outcome of the "essence" philosophy.

In the last chapter is discussed the bearing of this theory of knowledge upon life and conduct. An amazing number of subjects is passed in review, but with a brevity that results in merely superficial and banal sayings. As examples may be cited the facile description of music as "a pattern of sounds that please us by their harmony" (p. 86); the statement, "Poetry, apart from the noble meaning, is of course word music" (p. 87); the question on page 89, "Is not architecture a sort of visual music"?; the extraordinary dictum, "Nature is perfect rectitude (of a non moral sort): the straightness of straight lines is the type of her behaviour" (p. 91).

It is much to be regretted that Mr. Strong did not use the space of this last chapter to develop and support his main contention and to justify his assertion that logical relations are essential and internal whilst physical relations are accidental and external. This distinction raises problems of the utmost importance for theory of knowledge.

Prof. Santayana's lecture is, as might be expected, full of quotable sayings. Those who read it will be encouraged to proceed to the fuller exposition of his belief that he has provided in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*.

L. S. S.

The Metaphysics of Life and Death. By W. TUDOR JONES, M.A., Ph.D.
Hodder & Stoughton, 1924. Pp. vii, 202. 3s. 6d.

Ultimate Values in the Light of Contemporary Thought. By J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D. Pp. viii, 191. 3s. 6d.

The publishers are to be complimented on the production of the "Library of Philosophy and Religion," of which these are two volumes. The

purpose of the Library seems to be to provide a number of comparatively brief and less technical treatises on the important subjects of philosophy and religion, which will attract a wide circle of readers. There are already well established series of larger and more technical works, but no other like this, and the hope may be expressed that the publishers will continue it. The taste for philosophic literature is not very widespread, and unless publishers venture on such series as this, there can be little or no chance for it to become more so. Both these volumes can be recommended to the general reader, whether versed in philosophy or not: they bring into discussion problems which every reflective person recognises as intimately concerned in his life.

Dr. Jones' volume endeavours to show how man can and does rise from mere awareness and the factual to ever more comprehensive concepts and ideals, until finally he attains to "union with the Divine". In view of the conclusions of the study of religion this form of expression is open to some criticism in that it suggests that the "union with the Divine" is the goal, as though there is not something of this present in religious experience from the outset. But perhaps with that the author may agree. Nevertheless his treatment suggests considerable influence of the mode of thought present in Dr. Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution*. Dr. Jones insists, I think rightly, on the philosophical consideration and recognition of those relations of man to Nature and his body and instincts as part of it, which in practical life are so obvious, but which to the disadvantage and one-sidedness of most philosophy and theology, are by them generally neglected. The world of Nature in its fullest sense has to be accorded its significance for religion. So again man has to appreciate the fact that his body and its powers are valuable means, indeed, at this stage, indispensable means, for the attainment of higher values. Nevertheless, he is led to hopes and efforts for values beyond the well-being of his bodily organism and his relation to Nature, and it is along the lines of the consideration of such values that man attains to a spiritual view of existence. Reflection on the nature of the "mind," on the distinction of "things and thoughts" confirms this. And it is through the mind's acknowledgment of these values and its efforts to attain them, that lies most of the distinction between Nature and History. History has its relations with Nature but points beyond it. In his chapter on the "Metaphysics of History," Dr. Jones again treats, though briefly and popularly, of a side of philosophy much neglected by English writers. Yet a "Historicism" is seen to provide no adequate understanding even of history itself. For that, it is necessary to recognise "transcendental values". Dr. Jones' exposition at this point leaves something to be desired. Thus he says of "these values" that "they must constitute the very core of the universe," though in a few sentences previously he has spoken of the world and the individual having "co-operated in the engendering of transcendental values". Through their being the "core" they are "conserved". But the ideas of "co-operation" and "engendering" suggest, as it seems to me Dr. Jones wishes to imply, that here is the significance of human effort as seen, for example, in history (p. 158).

Dr. Mackenzie appears to me to have practically the same difficulty. His book contains the substance of lectures given in India at the Universities of Mysore and Lucknow, and in America at the University of California. Many philosophical students will already know the author's general position as expounded in his "Elements of Constructive Philosophy," and perhaps at least a few will share the present writer's dissatisfaction with the tone of indecision therein manifested, not so much through a philosophic suspending of judgment as through a lack of distinctiveness of the views discussed. The present volume leaves much the

same impression. Nevertheless though we are told that with regard to leading philosophers we ought to point to their realistic or idealistic tendencies, rather than talk of Realism and Idealism, the author "hopes" "that it may be found possible to justify a thorough-going idealism". And Idealism is described as interpreting our universe "in terms of value". Having led up to the necessity of some such interpretation, by brief considerations of "Form and Matter"; "Space and Time"; "Appearance and Reality"; "Evolution"; "Realism and Idealism," Dr. Mackenzie comes to a discussion of Value, concluding that it is neither merely objective, nor merely subjective, but "spiritual". The use of that term appears somewhat question-begging, and Dr. Mackenzie's further exposition seems in consequence largely confused. Thus, the ultimate values are enumerated as Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, and yet though according to him all value is subjective-objective, he leaves it quite unclear how these ultimate values are related to particular objects and particular subjects. That problem must be felt to be even more pressing when allowance is made for the author's views concerning values being by men not passively received but actively created. I do not think that his earlier metaphysical disquisitions concerning the Whole will help: they seem to suffer from a confusion due to the use of the terms "real" and "the real". Of course "the real" is the Whole, but that does not imply that any part in itself is less real than it is within the Whole.

The greatest difficulty of Idealism, says Dr. Mackenzie, is the problem of evil. But, let us not be dismayed, for "if the view I have here been endeavouring to set forth is tenable, it appears to furnish a final solution of the great problem of evil which has vexed mankind so long"! Yet, surely, to regard "things evil in themselves" as the means, even if the only means, to "some greater good" does not solve the problem. If it could be shown that evil *always* does subserve "some greater good," that might be some mitigation of its seriousness; but why any evil need be inflicted or incurred in attaining any good would still remain a problem.

In conclusion, I would suggest that in a more definite Theism, as distinct from a vague and indefinite Idealism which gains something of its attractiveness for some minds by the re-iteration of the triad: Truth, Beauty and Goodness in an abstract and impersonal way, there might be found a view of the present reality of "ultimate values" which still admits within the world of Nature and History the "creation" of particular values of certain types, or if one prefer Dr. Jones' term, their "engendering". And that, though giving a solution of the problem of evil as little as Dr. Mackenzie's indefinite Idealism, would I believe give a more justifiable and profitable attitude to the problem.

A. G. WIDGERY.

Il Pensiero di Spinoza. A. Guzzo. Florence [1923]. Pp. 529.

Dr. Guzzo has given us a study of Spinoza's philosophy which I can heartily recommend for lucidity and incisiveness to all students of the subject. His method is to deal first with the central ideas of the Spinozistic metaphysic, as they unfold themselves in the *Brief Treatise*, the *de Emendatione Intellectus* and the *Ethics* (studied respectively in Chapters II., III., and V. of the present work), and then with the practical application of these ideas in the determination of the rights of the State, and the plea for strict subordination of the ecclesiastical to the civil power, and for the freedom of philosophising. (Chapters VI., VII. on the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and *Tractatus Politicus*.) Chapter IV., a

sort of intermezzo, deals with the *Cogitata Metaphysica* and the long correspondence with Blyenbergh; the important later correspondence with Oldenburg and with Tschirnhaus finds appropriate notice in Chapter VII. The first chapter of the volume is given to an attempt to reconstruct the main lines of the no longer extant defence which Spinoza appears to have addressed to the Rabbis of the synagogue who anathematised him.

Dr. Guzzo has read very widely in the modern literature of Spinozism, though I observe that, as was also the case with his little works on Kant, he seems less familiar with work done in our own language than with German, French or Dutch contributions to the subject. Sir F. Pollock and Mr. Duff are incidentally quoted, but I see no trace of any acquaintance with Professor Joachim's detailed careful commentary on the *Ethics*.

In the main I find Dr. Guzzo an acute critic as well as a careful expositor. Thus he makes it much clearer than many expositors do that there is a radical flaw in Spinoza's central position. It is clear, not only from the title and disposition of his chief work, but equally from the personal tone of the *Tide* that Spinoza's primary object in thinking out a philosophy at all is specifically ethical. He means to lead us by the pathway of true and adequate cognition to the land of self-mastery and moral freedom. And yet, as Dr. Guzzo gently but relentlessly establishes against all half-Spinozists, the metaphysic which is to emancipate us turns out to be so crudely naturalistic that it makes the "freedom of man" impossible and that Spinoza is perhaps the one considerable philosopher who, on his own principles, has no right to formulate any moral judgments whatever. It is an excellent feature of the book that Dr. Guzzo does justice in this matter to Blyenbergh, whom too many writers on Spinoza have treated as a mere fool. Whatever his intellectual deficiencies, the worthy merchant had really put his finger on the weak place in Spinoza's system. That it leaves no room for taking moral distinctions seriously is the fatal difficulty which becomes clearer and clearer to Blyenbergh as the correspondence goes on, and which Spinoza obstinately shirks facing in his part of it.

As is natural in a warm enthusiast for Kant's doctrine of moral freedom, Dr. Guzzo presents the case against Spinoza's necessitarianism about as well as it can be presented. But he has also two other ways of his own of demonstrating the impossibility of making the system consistent with itself, which seem to me very suggestive. He remarks that the contradiction which runs through the thought of the *Ethics* is latent in its opening presuppositions. God, we are told, is the one substance of which all finite things are modes, and God is their "immanent" cause. But, he asks, very pertinently, is it not impossible to conceive of God as substance and of God's causality as purely "immanent" at once? If God is a purely "immanent" cause, i.e. a cause wholly expressed in its effect, and thus identical with the effect, how can we also think of God as the substance of which these effects are "modes," or *accidentia*, and if we are serious with the *Deus-substantia* conception, must not God's relation to the world involve "transeunt" causality? The same difficulty recurs in the famous propositions with which the *Ethics* end. "God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love." How is this to be conciliated with the equally express declarations of the author that the *infinitus intellectus* is a mode "immediately created by God" and belongs not to *natura naturans* but to *natura naturata*? This way of raising the difficulty is new to me, but I feel convinced that Dr. Guzzo is right in his contention that the whole series of propositions about man's entering into the "infinite intellectual love wherewith God loves Himself," the very doctrine which has done most to create a circle of Spinoza-worshippers, becomes

devoid of meaning unless we conceive of God, as Christianity does, as "transcendent" and "personal".

The same difficulty reappears in another guise in the curious circle, rightly commented upon by Dr. Guzzo, which infects both the *TdIE* and the Fifth Part of the *Ethics*. We can only emancipate ourselves from the passions in so far as we rise to the possession of "adequate ideas," but again our "ideas" will never be "adequate" so long as we are in bondage to the passions. The very first step on the way to freedom thus, as Dr. Guzzo says, seems to demand a "conversion" and Spinoza's philosophy leaves it an insoluble puzzle how the conversion can be effected. Not by emotionally falling in love with a Beauty to which we had formerly been blind, for Spinoza is emphatic on the point that you must have an "idea" of the object loved before you can love it. And not by an intellectual illumination, because so long as we are "subject to passions" we cannot attain "adequate ideas". A Christian divine or philosopher would introduce at this point the conception of "grace," a process of drawing and self disclosure beginning on the divine side, but for "grace" an immanentist philosophy can have no place.

Since Dr. Guzzo sees all these difficulties so clearly, one is left, after reading his exposition of the *Ethics*, with the expectation that he will decide to save substance and moral value by abandoning the "immanentism" which he appears to have proved incompatible with ethics. One is surprised, in the long chapter on the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and its sequel dealing with the *Tractatus Politicus*, to find him taking the very opposite line. In his "immanentism" he is *plus royaliste que le roi* to such an extent that he cannot even refer to belief in God—a belief not unknown among great philosophers—by any more respectful title than "the theistic illusion". Spinoza himself has some indecencies of expression about Christian beliefs here and there in his letters, which the circumstances of his life may explain but do not justify, but his habitual tone is much more worthy of a serious philosopher than this. However, the point which most interests me is not Dr. Guzzo's personal disbelief in God,—that is his own affair. What I should like to understand and cannot is how he escapes from the very difficulty he has detected in Spinoza, cutting himself off from all right to a doctrine of Ethics. He is far too much of a Kantian to wish to do anything of the kind, but I am afraid he has done the thing he would not. He professes, indeed, that, in some unexplained way, he retains Spinoza's "immanentism" without his "naturalism". But when I find him, in support of his assertion that Spinoza had no sense for history, complaining that his author had not grasped the great truth that every act which has ever been done by any man or body of men has its complete justification in the fact that it *has* been done (p. 437), I cannot help asking "if this is not naturalism, what can be meant by that word?" I fear that under many protestations of loyalty to *lo Spirito* Dr. Guzzo, under influences easy to identify, has really sold the pass. Still his work is so excellent that I will only express a hope that he may yet be "brought to a right way of thinking".

Incidentally I note an extraordinary blunder of fact on p. 371 where Spinoza is credited with the astounding theory that the historical books of the Old Testament were first collected by R. Abraham b. Ezra in the eleventh century of *our era*. Spinoza was a good Old Testament scholar and had at least read the New Testament intelligently, and consequently knew that the compilation of the O.T. historical books was long antecedent to the Christian era. It is Dr. Guzzo who has confounded "Ezra the scribe" of the fifth century B.C., to whom modern scholars agree with certain ancient traditions and with Spinoza in attributing a very important part in the formation of the "law," with Abraham b. Ezra,

whom Spinoza quotes for the view that the compilation of the Pentateuch must have taken place long after the age of Moses. And again, though I am forced to write this notice without a text of the *T.T.-P.*, I can hardly believe that Spinoza says, as Dr. Guzzo makes him say, that prophecy arose after the extinction of the Jewish Kingdom. Spinoza would know, as Dr. Guzzo apparently does not, that the greatest literary prophets, Isaiah, Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah were all "pre-exilic".

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy. By G. A. JOHNSTON, M.A., D. Phil. London: Macmillan & Co., 1923. Pp. vii + 400.

There is certainly room for this comprehensive and critical exposition of Berkeley's philosophy. Far too many writers on the history of philosophy, knowing Berkeley mainly from the *Principles*, the *New Theory of Vision* and the *Three Dialogues*, regard him merely as the bridge from Locke to Hume. Others, taking account of *Siris*, are wont to consider that Berkeley, in youth an extreme "empiricist," became in old age an advocate of some form of Platonic Idealism. To such the title of Dr. Johnston's book will be a surprise; it is not commonly supposed that Berkeley's philosophy did develop. Dr. Johnston, however, succeeds in fully justifying his title. He maintains that "the relation of *Siris* to Berkeley's early work is one rather of evolution than of revolution. He has travelled far since the days of the *Commonplace Book*, but he has made no volte face. . . . From the very first his architectonic conception has remained the same. The universe is an organic system dependent on God for its reality and knowability. . . . The problem in which the development of Berkeley's thought is notable is the question of the relative importance, within the whole, of sense and reason" (p. 258).

Dr. Johnston traces this development with great care supporting his argument with the minute analysis of numerous quotations; he draws largely on the *Commonplace Book*, and in an interesting footnote (pp. 20-24) he works out a theory as to the correct chronological order of the entries in order to show that it is not the order adopted by Campbell Fraser in his edition of Berkeley's works. It is essential for Dr. Johnston's argument that he should be able to justify the order which he adopts, for, as he points out, "if we take the *Commonplace Book* printed in the Oxford Edition, it is impossible to trace any development in Berkeley's thought" (p. 234, *italics his*). To the present reviewer Dr. Johnston appears to have established both contentions.

The early phases of Berkeley's philosophy, as represented in the *Commonplace Book*, can, Dr. Johnston says, be summed up in a single word "Particularism." But, he maintains, Berkeley was gradually forced to recognise the significance of the universal element in knowledge and thus "the development of his philosophy was to involve a gradually deepening realisation of the importance of the universal, both in knowledge and in reality" (p. 93).

As is to be expected, much the longest chapter in the book (Chapter IV.) deals with Berkeley's "Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge". It is preceded by an introductory chapter discussing the significance of Berkeley for the history of philosophy, by a chapter on the "Origins of Berkeley's Thought," and by another chapter on "The Psychology of Vision". It is followed by a less satisfactory chapter on Berkeley's "Mathematics" (Chapter V.), and concludes with a chapter on his "Ethics" and another on his "Philosophy of Religion". It is useful to

have the student's attention drawn to these comparatively neglected aspects of Berkeley's thought.

The exposition is throughout admirable; it is careful, accurate and lucid. To the present reviewer, Dr. Johnston appears to overestimate the importance of Berkeley's mathematical writings and to be unduly extravagant in his claim (made, it is true, only in passing) that Berkeley was "naturally the keenest mind in the history of English philosophy" (p. 325). Had Dr. Johnston not rated his intellectual powers quite so highly, he might have been less inclined to disparage his honesty by suggesting that Berkeley's criticism of Deism was largely due to his desire for ecclesiastical preferment. Would it not be simpler to suppose that he believed Deism to be false—a belief shared by many other acute intellects? It must, however, be admitted that Dr. Johnston brings forward some evidence to show that Berkeley "had an eye to what he himself calls 'the main chance'". It is certainly true that much support for this statement can be found in the correspondence between Berkeley and Percival, but it is difficult to reconcile such a view of Berkeley's character with the self-sacrificing activities of his closing years. To the present reviewer it seems more plausible to suppose that Berkeley's theological bias and desire "to get on in the world" were not the causes of his defects as a philosopher. It is just as great an error to make Berkeley a "Copernican" before Kant as to make him merely a bridge from Locke to Hume. Dr. Johnston has avoided the latter mistake, but he seems in some danger of falling into the former.

L. S. S.

The Logic of Contemporary English Realism. By RAYMOND P. HAWES, Ph.D. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1923. Pp. 147.

This is No. 15 of the Cornell Studies in Philosophy. By the 'logic' of realism the author says he means 'the point of view taken, the fundamental assumptions made, and the processes of thought relied upon in the Realist's efforts to know reality'. 'Realism' itself is left undefined, and the author treats it as a 'movement' whose doctrines are set forth in the works of Messrs. Moore, Russell and Alexander. (He mentions, but just mentions, Mr. Nunn and has some discussion of Mr. Broad. He makes no attempt to grasp Mr. Whitehead's thought, and never refers to Mr. Dawes Hicks.) Apparently whatever Messrs. Moore, Russell and Alexander write must be 'realism,' although there is a plaintive footnote stating that Alexander and Broad, in one particular, 'jeopardise the direct or presentative theory of perception for which they stand'.

Mr. Hawes explains that he makes no attempt 'to present systematically or to determine the relative merits of the various and ever-varying solutions of the special problems proposed by the different types of Realism or by different Realists'. This is unfortunate since these attempted solutions are precisely what the majority of his 'realists' are interested in, and although a criticism of 'realism,' to be valuable, need not be sympathetic, it should attend at least to the aims and to the interests of the criticised ones. This author's method, on the contrary, is to proclaim that Objective Idealism is the Truth and all else Error. He has therefore only to show that the realistic point of view is not that of Objective Idealism. This he does with elaborate documentation, nearly always accurate and quite well selected; and the pains he has taken to consult all his documents gives a certain value, perhaps not inconsiderable, to his performance in this respect. It is hard to see, however, why this author supposes that his book should ever have been made. He

accepts Objective Idealism so complacently that he does not even trouble to state the Truth with any serious attempt at accuracy. Instead, he leaves us to suppose that all this had been done already before the contemporary English realists began to spill their ink. In short, they did not see that Empiricism had been vanquished, dogmatism and formal logic overthrown, and Kant's 'insufficient thoroughness' set to rights. Why, then, did Mr. Hawes not leave the ignorant fellows to shout their anachronisms in their own blind alleys? So far as I can see, he has only one answer. These realists have guarded the Truth from being carelessly presented. They have helped to show the hollowness of certain false idealisms. "Moreover, Objective Idealists themselves have profited by the realistic criticism". One of their number has admitted that 'a good many idealists have given some ground for the misunderstanding by failing to take and maintain from the beginning a standpoint that is objective and genuinely speculative'. (This was Mr. Creighton.) As a result of the protests of the Realists, Objective Idealists have been led to define their position more carefully and to distinguish it more sharply from other types of Idealism.

The most careful expositions are those of the earlier work of Messrs. Moore and Russell. Russell's later work somewhat perplexes the author, but he gallantly treats it as if it were all of a piece. Mr. Alexander is also a little trying, and sometimes this author finds it hard to withhold his sympathy. He endeavours to show, however, that there is enough 'analysis,' 'mechanism' and anachronism in it to justify the same sage condemnation.

JOHN LAIRD.

Kant und das Ding an Sich. By ERICH ADICKES. Panverlag Rolf Heise, Berlin, 1924. Pp. 159.

This monograph is strictly limited to the problem in Kant-interpretation indicated by the title, and does not venture further afield on criticism or synthetic exposition of Kant's philosophy. But this should not deter readers; within these limits it is a very thorough and able study of a problem important for all students of Kant, not unattractively set forth, and it is well worthy of the tradition of scholarship behind it. That Kant held it to be an indisputable fact that there are things-in-themselves is shown by a most formidable and convincing array of quotations, so much so as to tempt the reader to believe in defiance of history that by them this point of interpretation is once for all finally settled.

The author holds the view that Kant never attempted to prove that there are things-in-themselves because he thought it self-evident. It was for Kant given in his immediate "Erleben" of reality and so not a deduction from any other doctrine, but a fundamental and unquestioned presupposition of his philosophical outlook. This may well be so, but I should have expected more emphasis to be laid on the connexion between the things-in-themselves and the given element in experience, a connexion which, though probably not the premiss from which the doctrine was deduced, surely provided Kant with a powerful philosophical motive for the retention of things-in-themselves as for him the only alternative to an idealism which he thought dogmatic and one-sided. The difficulty as to the application of the categories to the things-in-themselves is partly solved by the distinction between "thinking" them in a figurative way by means of the categories and "knowing" them or understanding their objective reality. The author thinks this distinction between "denken" and "erkennen" to be more fundamental than is generally supposed.

The difficulty is also met by the further distinction between the categories as "synthetic functions" of the mind or "activities" requiring a sensible content on which to be exercised, and the categories as pure logical concepts. In the former sense they are not applied to the things-in-themselves, but in the latter they are. (That Kant applies the category of causality to things-in-themselves seems indisputable, but the evidence given by the author seems to me hardly sufficient to prove that he actually applied the category of substance to them, but only, at the most, that, if consistent, he ought to have done so.) The author does not try to slur over the passages in which Kant seems to make the concept of the thing-in-itself merely problematical and even to talk as though its reality were in doubt. But he holds these passages to be just cases where Kant was carried away by his zeal against the old metaphysical dogmatism into a logical consistency which he generally did not follow. He argues that such an interpretation of them is the only one psychologically tenable, since otherwise we should be forced to suppose that Kant changed his opinion repeatedly from page to page, and draws the further conclusion that this inconsistency proves that the establishment of fixed limits to our knowledge was not the main object of Kant.

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IX.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. xxxiv., 2. January, 1924.

Colonel D. Borden Turner. 'International Relations and the League of Nations.' [Maintains that on the basis of self-interest nations must repudiate the use of force in international disputes and that they must advance to more thorough international co-operation towards which the most effective instrument at present is the League of Nations, the alternative being the shipwreck of civilisation.] **John H. Wigmore.** 'The League of Nations from a Lawyer's Point of View.' [Shows (1) that the organisation of the League of Nations is an almost exact parallel of the American National Conference on Uniform State Laws, the measures proposed by each having no intrinsic legislative force but being brought by members to the sovereign home states which either accept them, thus giving them legislative force, or reject them; (2) that the League is meeting the need for an international clearing house for co-operation in peaceful international activities, economic, philanthropic, and scientific; (3) and that the League substitutes rational discussion for violence in forming new rules when new conditions make old ones inapplicable, leaving the judicial functions to the Permanent Court of International Justice.] **J. M. Butler, M.P.** 'The League in the Development of Political Institutions.' [Develops the view that as the British Empire is developing a system of continuous consultation on all important matters of common Imperial concern and on such necessary concerted action founded thereon as the several Governments may determine, so the nations of the world are developing a similar system of continuous consultation and concerted action in the League of Nations.] **Roth Williams.** 'The Technique of the League of Nations.' [Takes as basis the position that the League does not diminish national responsibility, and that its success depends upon securing enlightened foreign policy in the various nations; analyses the two fundamental principles, that of clearing house and that of round table, and the three kinds of machinery, for settling disputes, for co-operation in certain non-political subjects, and for carrying out special tasks; examines some criticisms about the constitution of the Council and Assembly, and suggests that the League is developing into a loose association of states.] **A. Hammarskjöld.** 'The Place of the Permanent Court of International Justice within the System of the League of Nations.' [Shows how, though created by the League, the Court now constitutes an independent national convention, though at present administratively linked to the League for the election of judges and for finance; considers in detail the judicial and advisory functions of the Court in relation to the system of the Covenant.] **B. H. Sumner.** 'The Aims and Working of the International Labour Organisation.' [States the aims as furthering "the well-being, physical, moral, and intellectual of industrial wage earners" and "the organised co-operation of nations in working towards social justice"; explains the constitution of the Conference: two Government delegates, one employers', and one workers' from each member state, the Governing body being similarly

proportioned; outlines its methods of working by means of supplying information, preparing and passing draft conventions for ratification or otherwise by the competent authorities of each country.] **Daniel Somner Robinson.** 'A Critique of Meliorism.' [Distinguishes between critical and uncritical meliorism; the latter having no unequivocal theory of value, the former holding that intrinsic betterness is the fundamental category of value; maintains that the latter holds value to be the relation between a desire and a satisfying object and to be the harmonisation of desires without proof for its view that these are identical; concludes that this view leads to the basic principle of critical meliorism, an infinite value series of worlds, and that this is incompatible with its assumption of better or worse as the fundamental category of value, so that meliorism needs an intelligible answer to the question 'What is value?'] xxxiv., 3. April, 1924. **Israel Levine.** 'Reason and Morals.' [Defines reasonable as adapting oneself to reality, *i.e.*, to certain physical and social facts; these include moral restraints, obedience to which is a condition of social life, and individual security; maintains that this view has contacts with the theories of the Greeks, Spinoza, Kant, but avoids some of their difficulties because it regards the actual and the rational as phases of one process and because it recognises differences in social reasonableness similar to differences in intellectual stature.] **Edith Ayres Copeland.** 'The Institutional Setting of Plato's Republic.' [Advances and illustrates the view that Plato assumed certain economic and social arrangements to be permanent; maintains that his writings were directed to showing how these could be maintained in face of the changes which were accompanying the commercial development of Athens.] **Maurice Finkelstein.** 'The Functional View of Legal Liability.' [Illustrates the change in the theory of legal liability due to the increased complexity of modern societies by reference to (1) the abandonment in some fields of the idea of culpability as essential for liability for damages, and (2) instances of social interest requiring that contracts should not be enforced; suggests that further extensions will be made.] **A. P. Brogan.** 'Group Estimates of Frequency of Misconduct.' [Extends the inquiry summarised in previous article by giving scale of frequency of the sixteen practices as estimated by university students; suggests that the method used gives more reliable evidence about the behaviour of groups of human beings than any other yet available.] **Rexford Guy Tugwell.** 'The Distortion of Economic Incentive.' [Maintains that the desire to spend, characteristic of many members of modern industrial communities, instead of the desire to produce, is largely due to the increased complexity of modern life leading to social approval being given to those who by ostentatious spending show their cleverness in obtaining wealth from those outside the neighbourhood; points to evidence that society is endeavouring to recreate the moral controls lost in the growth of industrialism.] **Norman Wilde.** 'The Meaning of Rights.' [Examines various interpretations of "rights" to show that (1) rights have meaning only within the sphere of social relations, (2) they depend upon duties, (3) a right is a freedom of action possessed by a man in virtue of his fulfilling certain functions in the social order; distinguishes between enforcement, recognition and reality of rights, and concludes that in ideal society there would be the largest possible measure of freedom but that concretely it has refer to so much of this measure as can safely be acted upon at a given stage of society.] xxxiv., 4. July, 1924. **Roy Wood Sellars.** 'The Emergence of Naturalism.' [Sketches briefly the gradual separation of naturalism and supernaturalism as man's intelligence developed. Outlines rise of Greek civilisation bringing order into religious and political thought and later coming to view nature as an orderly realm of events; suggests that

the naturalism of Democritus and Epicurus decayed because of lack of adequate knowledge in face of the emotional attractiveness of a positive belief in a desirable after-life; maintains that change of interests, growth of self-confidence and increase of knowledge have gradually broken down the narrow theological supernaturalism and have led to conditions in the modern world similar to those which in Greece led to naturalism, but that there is a broader basis as nature includes man; hence modern naturalism must include humanism.] **C. Delisle Burns.** 'Labour and the League.' [Summarises useful services actually performed by the special body of the League organised to improve conditions of employment, the publishing of information, the inclusion of Germany and Austria in the Labour organisation of the League, and the work done in connexion with the "eight hour's day"; defends the view that though the machinery is not fully used it is worth maintaining; concludes that reports suggest that labour legislation in many countries has failed because of bad administration and that the next step forward is that to be taken by the General Conference "the consideration of methods of administration".] **Adolfo Posada.** 'The League of Nations: a Process. A Dialogue between Student and Professor.' [Analyses the value of the League as a process advancing towards internationalisation and revealing the essence of two great problems: the need for a radical change of moral attitude in the minds of nations, and for the voice of representative men to be heard in the League; pleads for faith in the League.] **R. F. Swift.** 'Security in Modern Life.' [Surveys briefly the function of groups to secure the interests of members; states that at present members are mainly concerned with economic security; maintains that spiritual interests need to be secured, and that the church should lead the way.] **E. F. Albertsworth.** 'Current Religious Thought and Modern Juristic Movements.' [Contrasts primitive Christianity with modern view that the present social order must and can be Christianised; illustrates by altered viewpoint with respect to authority of Bible; instances changing views of religion and of law: inherited dogmas not now regarded as final but are being re-examined in the light of the religious needs of the present, old premises and common law of our ancestors also found inadequate for the present; suggests that the modern religious view of the immanence of God with its breakdown of the sharp antithesis between social and secular is behind legal movement to conserve human resources; discusses effects of former view that man is essentially evil, and of modern view that man will attempt the right, on the administration of justice; concludes with considering co-operation between church and state and the use of state and law by the religious spirit to achieve its goal of a more perfect society here and now.] **Norman Boardman.** 'The Ethics of the Problem.' [Defines the problem as a conflict in experience demanding adjustment of the situation in which it arises; states that Ethics seeks the best possible adjustment that skilled judgment can offer in a given situation; considers ethical concepts of good, right, duty, virtue, justice, freedom, happiness, and the ideal in relation to the problem; concludes that the ideal is the best hypothesis in the light of judgment duly weighed.]

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. xxi. (1924), 21. **H. N. Wieman.** 'Experience, Mind and the Concept.' [Means by experience "the sensuous qualities in that temporal and spatial structure that goes to make up nature." 'Mind' is physical nature plus the capacity to learn and form habits. Concepts are symbols, and there are three kinds of truth, knowledge of natural objects, the fitness of symbols to designate, and the use of tools in scientific inference.] **C. A. Strong.** 'Things Perceived but not Existent,' and **W. P. Montague.** 'Things Perceived and Things

Perceiving.' [Continue their discussion and approximate to agreement.] xxi., 22. **E. A. Singer.** 'On Pain and Dreams.' [Part of an unpublished work designed to treat sensation 'as an observable object,' which has to meet objection based on the existence of pain and dreams. As regards pain it is suggested that by "varying the counter-stimulus, the anodyne, by observing the 'just noticeable difference' . . . as accurate a measurement of the intensity of pain as any other category of sensation affords" may be effected. As for "dreams they are probably 'occasioned' by definite physical events which act as stimuli."] **A. O. Lovejoy.** 'Pastness and Transcendence.' [Replies to Dewey, xxi., 8. The denial of transcendence in the knowledge of the past involving either a paradox or a platitude, Dewey chooses the latter; but if so he fails to deny transcendence. "Transcendence in general he neither disproves nor so much as controverts; each of his apparent arguments against it proves on analysis—when his terminology is translated into plain prose—to be but another reaffirmation of it."] xxi., 23. **C. E. Whitmore.** 'The Scale of Aesthetic Values.' [Assuming that aesthetic values need not be self-evident, how can they be arranged? A scale is possible in principle, if we can find "a suitable point of departure, and some way of estimating distances above it," and take "a pleased awareness of specific arrangements" as the stage above the zero-point.] **H. B. Smith.** 'A Further note on Subalternation and the Disputed Syllogistic Moods.' [To prove that I may be deduced from A by the writer's formal system.] xxi., 24. **A. A. Jaskelevich.** 'The Idea of Continuity in the History of Psychology.' [Holds that the historical continuity and uninterrupted growth of psychology is a fiction of its historians, and shows in the case of Aristotle, St. Augustine, Descartes and Locke, that in each case the psychology was subsidiary to the philosophic system and was not intended as a contribution to a continuously developing science of psychology.] xxi., 25. **E. R. Guthrie.** 'Purpose and Mechanism in Psychology.' [Mechanical and teleological explanations being equally empirical, what are their essential differences? (1) The latter apply to cases where the same end is reached by different means. (2) They allow of indeterminism. (3) They can use descriptions in terms of purpose. (4) They allow of prediction, even where the mechanisms are unknown, but not of certain predictions. Hence mechanical explanation is the scientific ideal, though "absolute prediction will never be reached."] **R. G. Tugwell.** 'Economics and Ethics.' [Attacks Sir J. Marriott's book with this title as conservative and out of date, and praises Smart's *Second Thoughts of an Economist*.] xxi., 26. **J. H. Leuba.** 'The Immediate Apprehension of God according to William James and W. E. Hocking.' [The mystical experience does not guarantee any interpretation, not even that of contact with the divine.] xxii. (1925), 1. **B. Blanshard.** 'Francis Herbert Bradley.' [Personal reminiscences by a Merton Rhodes Scholar.] **C. J. Ducasse.** 'The Non-Existence of Time.' [Criticises W. S. Franklin's "The Quantum Puzzle and Time," and shows that its paradoxes are not justified by Bohr's theory of the timeless jumps of electrons within the atom.] Contains also a long review of *Contemporary British Philosophy* by S. P. Lamprecht. xxii., 2. **G. S. Fullerton.** 'Things.' [A lucid argument that "the animal faith that accepts things as revealed in their aspects may be no more than the fruits of a developed experience brought to bear upon this or that particular 'given'." If so, "things are found, and not assumed arbitrarily. The faith in them can fairly be said to be justified," and so interpreted, animal faith "does not seem an inexplicable and unreasonable thing."] **E. C. Tolman.** 'Behaviourism and Purpose.' ["Whenever in order to describe a behaviour our description has to include that it is a function of an object

toward or from which the animal is going, there we have *purpose*. And whenever, at the same time, this object is non-present to sense, there we have also *memory*." **H. W. Schneider.** The Twenty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, at Swarthmore. xxii., 3. **M. E. Clarke.** 'Valuing and the Quality of Value.' [Criticises the writers on Value in the Journal for the last ten years, especially Dewey, Perry, Pratt, Picard, Urban, in order "to show that neither of the two positions principally represented . . . can be consistently maintained in its entirety, and that there is no alternative but to return to the view upheld by Moore and Russell, and by Meinong in his later writings . . . that value is a quality of objects not dependent upon the activity of valuing." This conclusion is finally said to be justified by the defects of the opposing views.] **C. L. Barrett.** 'Personality as a Category.' [Expounds the Personalism of Renouvier.]

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 31^e Année, No. 3, Juillet-Septembre, 1924. **Maine de Biran.** *Fragment du journal intime de Maine de Biran.* [A fragment of de Biran's diary, of the summer of 1816, dealing chiefly with a visit to the hot springs in the French Pyrenees. Interesting as a first-hand picture of de Biran's "introvert," self-analysing, self-tormenting type of mind. Includes an account of an ascent of the Pic du Midi.] **F. Enriques.** *La signification et l'importance de l'histoire de la science et l'œuvre de Paul Tannery.* [This short article is to be the introduction to a new edition of Tannery's *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène*. Pleads for the importance of the study of the history of science, as exhibiting scientific theories in their descent and affiliation, as well as in the context of human civilisation and culture in general. The study will also counteract the excessively analytic temper of science, and by introducing a synthetic point of view minimise the danger of an antagonism between science and philosophy. Praises Tannery as having advocated this philosophical way of studying the history of science.] **R. Wavre.** *Y a-t-il une crise des mathématiques? À propos de la notion d'existence et d'une application suspecte du principe du tiers exclu.* [Among modern mathematicians, there are two distinct types of mind, *viz.*, empiricist and idealist or formalist. The empiricists hold that only the evidence of intuition, extra-logical, enables us to decide whether two attributes A and B are mutually exclusive in the way required by the Law of Excluded Middle. The idealists try to avoid this appeal to intuitive verification by a suitable choice of axioms. A special case of this divergence of view emerges in the attempt to answer the question: Does there exist, in a given collection (*ensemble*), a member having a well-defined attribute A, when that collection consists of an infinite number of members? The idealist holds that the question must be answerable, on purely logical grounds, by Yes or No. The empiricist holds that it can be decided only by an appeal to intuitive evidence. He denies that "existence as a member of an infinite whole" is itself a well-defined attribute, as there may be several ways of existing. Or, again, he denies that, when we are dealing with an infinite collection, the Law of Excluded Middle applies to the propositions, (1) that all members of the collection have a well-defined attribute A, and (2) there exists a member of that collection which lacks the attribute A. The author concludes that the controversy is not at present capable of being terminated in favour of either party.] **R. Lenoir.** *L'activité humaine.* [Discusses the creative character of human activity from a strongly Bergsonian point of view.] **J. Jacob.** *La Morale Mystique de M. Loisy.* [Shows how M. Loisy's moral theory is influenced, partly by the catholic teaching in which he was brought up, partly by Bergson's "evolutionist dynamism," partly by the sociological theories of

Durkheim. Suggests that the mystic and rational elements in human thought will ultimately be reconciled.] New books. Periodicals. Obituary: Jean Nicod. 31^e Année, No. 4, Octobre-Décembre, 1924.

É. Boutroux. *Exposition de la doctrine de Spinoza sur la liberté.* [A thesis written by Boutroux when a student at the École Normale, with the comments made on it by Lachelier, his teacher. An interesting example of the give-and-take between a first-class student and a first-class teacher.]

A. Spaier. *Bonnes mœurs et autonomie.* [An introduction to a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, exhibiting the contrast, and also the interdependence in morals, between the individual's reason or conscience, on the one side, and social demands and standards, on the other. Kant's conception of autonomy is criticised as being too abstract and divorced from a concrete social system of morals. Durkheim's conception of society, as prior to, and determining, the individual, commits the opposite exaggeration of ignoring the individual's moral initiative and originality. The author inclines to think that morality implies an idealist metaphysic.]

J. Nicod. *Les relations de valeurs et les relations de sens en logique formelle.* [A short, but admirable paper, characteristic of an author whose recent death is described, in an editor's note, as having robbed the *Revue* of its "last logician". If we call truth and falsity "values" of propositions, inference may be described as a passage from the values of the premisses to the value of the conclusion. But, the relations of value, with which inference is concerned, depend in their turn on relations of sense, such as p being the contradictory, or the subaltern, etc., of q . The fundamental fact, for inference, therefore, is that certain relations of sense between propositions determine certain relations of value. This determination is of the kind called by Russell "material implication," which Nicod translates *entraînement*. The "strict implication" (*implication*) which C. I. Lewis tried to establish against Russell, does not exist. The symbolism of formal Logic does not explicitly name the relations of sense between propositions, but merely exhibits them in the arrangements of its symbols. This distinction between the naming and exhibiting functions of logical symbolism Nicod borrows from Wittgenstein.]

D. Parodi. *De l'explication dans les sciences, par Émile Meyerson.* [A critical appreciation of Meyerson's book, the thesis of which is that science is not restricted, as the positivists would have it, to a mere description of phenomena, but always aims at grasping and explaining reality. Parodi's chief criticism is that Meyerson, even whilst professing to avoid metaphysics, is all through assuming a metaphysic of too "realist" a character.]

G. Davy. *Le Problème de l'industrialisation de l'État.* [A critical examination of theories, and their implications, advocating the re-organisation of the State on the model of an industrial organism. The author holds that this would give the state an "economic" instead of a "political" character and lead to a narrow conception of the individual as, not a "citizen," invested with manifold rights and duties, but as merely a "producer" in the economic organisation.]

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RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. Anno xv., N. 2-3. Marzo-Giugno, 1924. Papers read at the 5th Italian Congress of Philosophy in Florence. **F. de Sarlo.** *La filosofia nell'ordinamento degli studi.* [The place of philosophy in the higher studies depends on the fundamental alternative, whether it is to be considered as a science, and therefore product of the logical processes of human reasoning, or rather as a special manifestation of the spirit—revealed by methods peculiar to itself—and akin to religion and art. De Sarlo argues that science and philosophy have the same aim, that

philosophy is a systematisation and extension of the knowledge acquired in science. Every science may be deepened into philosophy, but the science which is closest to, and indeed indispensable to, all philosophy, is psychology. Philosophy should be neither subjective nor abstract, and "the philosophical sciences, just because they deal with reality in its relation to spirit, may rise to a degree of absolute universality, absolute certainty, and absolute concreteness".] **Bernardino Varisco.** *Esperienza e pensiero.* [Experience is not merely of the individual; human language and co-operation prove that all men participate in one and the same thought—a thought numerically one. Experienced facts and thoughts are not absolutely opposed, as if the one gave merely causal, the other merely logical connexions. There is, in all facts, an order, which is in one aspect temporal and causal, in another aspect extra-temporal and logical. Thought-concepts are not finished entities; they express the procedure of the mind, by which facts are formed into series or chains of representations, held in unity by a common interest. Such concepts are implicit in animal thought; they become explicit, through language, in man.] **Giuseppe Tarozzi.** *Realismo gnoseologico e idealismo etico.* [Summary of the theses of a volume to be published shortly. The "ideal" is pure knowledge—knowledge, that is, of the mind's own laws, and therefore of its autonomy with respect to the physical and other conditions of knowledge. This autonomy cannot be explained except on the basis of the contingency of ordinary knowledge; hence the distinction, from itself, of these conditions as something other than the knowing mind, i.e., as the "real". The ethical value of the ideal is, that the autonomy of knowing implies the possibility of spiritual liberty, limited and controlled under the laws of the spirit alone.] **Alessandro Chiappelli.** *Modernità, valore speculativo e rinnovamento dell'idea teistica.* [The introduction to a forthcoming work on the Scientific Foundations of Modern Theism. The various forms which the reaction against materialism and positivism in Italy and elsewhere has taken are discussed and criticised; the aim of Chiappelli's work is to give system and organic unity to this movement, re-stating, in modern form, the thought of Lotze.] **Ernesto Buonaiuti.** *Filosofia, Religione, Misticismo.* [The spiritual crisis of to-day springs mainly from our relative inability "to see, mystically, in the invisible, and to grasp, in the supernatural, the impalpable".] **A. Masnovo.** *Vincenzo Buzzetti.* [A study of the earlier stages of the Neo-Thomist movement in Italy. Buzzetti—1777 to 1824—was the father of neo-Scholasticism in Italy, and indeed in Europe as a whole. An opponent of the prevailing sensualism and empiricism (Condillac and Locke), he took, on the constructive side, a different and more fruitful view of the relation of the human mind to the material world and to the Divine Mind, than either Galluppi or Rosmini, who followed him as leaders of different branches of the movement.] **Vincenzo Miceli.** *Sussunzione arbitraria dei concetti etici nel dominio del diritto.* [The distinction between morality and law or right, and the constant danger of it being forgotten or confused, as it is in all Utopias from Plato to modern Anarchism. To the individual or group, law is essentially negative, limiting, while moral ideals are positive, creative, constructive.]

X.—NOTES.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,

I have been distressed, and a little surprised, by the complaints made against me in Prof. Case's article, *The Development of Aristotle* (MIND, N.S., 133). May I be allowed to assure your readers, as I have already assured Prof. Case, that I have no feeling towards his work on Aristotle but that of profound respect, and that I am exceedingly sorry that he or any man should suppose me to imply anything else. In justice to myself I must add that the grounds given for the complaint seem to me inadequate.

I confess to having used the language quoted from my review of Prof. Jaeger's *Aristoteles* (MIND, N.S., 130) and from the "pamphlet" (actually a lecture), published by Messrs. Blackwell. I submit, however, that in view of the scope and detail of Jaeger's treatment of his subject, my words cannot be taken, as they were certainly not meant, to imply that no work, or none of any value, had been done on the development of the Aristotelian philosophy before Jaeger. In their context they mean simply that Jaeger's is the first large volume devoted exclusively to the one problem of the growth of Aristotle's personality. His book is being contrasted not with the work of other Aristotelian scholars but with the number of large books which have been given to a similar treatment of Plato.

Prof. Case's article on Aristotle in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* was indeed named in the other sentence of which he complains (MIND, N.S., 131), but not with any intention of depreciation. My object was, in fact, to call attention to it as proof that Germany had been anticipated by an English scholar and an Oxonian, and I "insinuated" nothing at all. When I said (not "insinuated") that the article was restricted in its scope I meant exactly what the author himself means by saying that it was "compressed into the space available". I have at least learned from Aristotle not to confuse distinct "categories," and should therefore never use a remark about quantity as a cover for "insinuations" about quality. I am so conscious of innocence in the matter that, had Prof. Case complained of the other two sentences alone, I should at once have referred him to the third as proof that I meant him no injustice.

A. E. TAYLOR.

EDINBURGH, January, 1925.

DEATH OF DR. McTAGGART.

It is with profound regret that we have to record the death of John Ellis McTaggart, Litt.D., Hon. LL.D., F.B.A., who died on January 18th, after a very short and sudden illness, at the early age of 58.

Born in 1866, McTaggart was educated at Clifton and at Trinity

College, Cambridge, where in 1891 he obtained a Fellowship by a dissertation on Hegel's *Dialectic*. In 1897, when James Ward was elected to the Professorship of Mental Philosophy and Logic, McTaggart was chosen to succeed him as College Lecturer at Trinity in the Moral Sciences; and he held this office till 1923 when, having served for the statutory period of twenty-five years, he retired.

Before he obtained his Fellowship, McTaggart had already become convinced, by his study of Hegel, that the abstract conclusion with regard to the nature of the Universe, which he supposed Hegel to have intended to demonstrate in his *Logic*, was in fact true; and also that this abstract conclusion rendered probable, if not certain, a number of further conclusions, both positive and negative, of which perhaps the most important are these: (1) That the Universe is "a differentiated unity," in which the differentiations are individual spirits, bound together in such a way that the unity is not "subordinated to" the individuals nor the individuals to the unity; (2) That consequently the Universe is not itself an individual spirit; (3) That the bond which unites the various individuals is love; and (4) That consequently the Universe is in reality very different indeed from what it seems, and that, in particular, Time, Change, Space, and Matter are all unreal. And he also held (though this, he would have insisted, is a conclusion which cannot be rendered probable by the conclusion of the *Logic* alone) that each of us is one of the fundamental differentiations of the Universe, and that consequently each of us is immortal—though not, of course, in a sense which involves the reality of Time. Of the truth of all these conclusions (which I hope I have not misrepresented in any way) McTaggart remained profoundly convinced throughout his life. But his views as to how they can be proved or rendered probable underwent some changes. As regards the most fundamental one—the abstract conclusion which he supposed to be the conclusion of Hegel's *Logic*—he believed, I think, at the time when he wrote his first two books, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (1896), and *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology* (1901), that a valid proof of it was to be found in Hegel; but by the time that he wrote his third and final book on Hegel, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (1910), he had become convinced, as he there points out, that some of the steps in Hegel's argument were definitely fallacious. "I should wish," he says in the final paragraph of this book, "in concluding the exposition of Hegel's philosophy which has been the chief object of my life for twenty-one years, to express my conviction that Hegel has penetrated further into the true nature of reality than any philosopher before or after him". But he adds: "It seems to me that the next task of philosophy should be to make a fresh investigation of that nature by a dialectic method substantially, though not entirely, the same as Hegel's". It was to this task that he then devoted himself, and his results are embodied in Vol. I. of *The Nature of Existence* (published in 1921, and reviewed at length by Dr. Broad in *MIND*, Vol. XXX.)—a book in which, as the result of a very long and difficult argument, very different indeed from Hegel's, he thinks he has demonstrated a conclusion carrying us a long way towards, but not, I gather, quite as far as, the conclusion of Hegel's *Logic*. At the time of his death he was engaged upon Vol. II., which (to quote his own words) was to consider "what consequences of theoretical and practical interest with regard to various parts of the existent which are empirically known to us" can be drawn from the conclusions of Vol. I. And I am glad to say that a draft of this volume had already been completed by him, though it had not received his final revision, and will, I understand, be published shortly.

Whatever may be thought of these and other conclusions of McTaggart's,

and of the validity of his arguments for them, there can, I think, be no question that in respect of ingenuity and subtlety, and above all, perhaps, in respect of the clearness of his thought, he was a philosopher of the very first rank. In his works on Hegel he continually succeeds in substituting clear, or comparatively clear, propositions for what, in Hegel, is to the last degree obscure and confused. Whether indeed Hegel really meant what McTaggart supposes him to have meant, there often seems reason to doubt; but at least McTaggart succeeds in giving a comparatively clear account of what he supposes him to have meant. Nor was it only that McTaggart was naturally clear-headed in a very unusual degree: he spared no pains in trying to get clearer and clearer about all matters which seemed to him fundamental. Perhaps the most valuable lesson which his pupils learnt from him was the importance and the difficulty of trying to get quite clear as to what you hold, and of distinguishing between good and bad reasons for holding it.

Besides the four works mentioned above, the only other book which McTaggart published was *Some Dogmas of Religion* (1906), a part of which was later reprinted under the title *Human Immortality and Pre-existence*. And this is a book which every one who has not read it, may be safely recommended to read. It deals with subjects in which every one is interested, and (at least for the most part) in a manner which every one can understand. Moreover it exhibits more uniformly, I think, than do his more technical books, one characteristic which ought not to be passed over in speaking of McTaggart—namely, his great distinction as a writer of English. His style is very peculiar: it is always very simple and direct; and one thing which cannot fail to attract attention is the degree to which he uses long successions of extremely short sentences. Nothing could be more unlike the common run of philosophical writing; and often the effects which he produces are extremely felicitous. Perhaps, too, this book enables the reader to see, in a greater degree than the others, something of the quality of the wit and humour and of the very strange and fascinating personality, which McTaggart displayed in conversation, and of which it is very difficult to convey any idea to those who did not know him.

During the whole period of his tenure of his lectureship at Trinity, McTaggart took a very large part in the teaching of philosophy at Cambridge. The teaching of the history of modern philosophy was almost entirely in his hands: he not only gave each year the general lectures on this subject for Part II. of the Moral Sciences Tripos, but always also the lectures on the special period, which is assigned for more detailed study, and which is generally changed every two years. In addition to this, from the time when, chiefly owing to his initiative, a paper on the Elements of Philosophy was introduced into Part I. of the Tripos, he did all the lecturing on this subject too; and he also for many years held informal classes on the Problems of Philosophy for Part II. Finally he instituted in 1902, and continued till his death, a course of free lectures entitled an "Introduction to Philosophy," intended for students working for other Triposes—lectures, which were very successful and attracted large audiences.

THE EDITOR.

DEATH OF PROF. JAMES WARD.

LESS than two months after the death of McTaggart, Cambridge and English philosophy have sustained another great loss by the death of James Ward, Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic, who died on

March 4th, at the age of 82. We hope to publish an obituary article in the next number of MIND.

DEATH OF PROF. A. BONUCCI.

WE also deeply regret to have to record the death of Alessandro Bonucci, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Palermo, and formerly at the University of Siena, who died last January, at the very early age of 40.

Prof. Bonucci was editor of *Studi filosofici e religiosi*. His principal publications were *La derogabilità del diritto naturale nella scolastica* (1906), *L'orientazione psicologica dell'etica e della filosofia del diritto* (1907), *Verità e Realtà* (1911), and *Il Fine dello Stato* (1918), the two last of which were reviewed in MIND, Vols. XXI. and XXIV. respectively.

MIND ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING.

THE Annual Meeting of the Mind Association will be held this year at Balliol College, Oxford, on Friday, July 24th.

It will be followed by a Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association. Details of the arrangements can be obtained from Prof. H. Wildon Carr, 107 Church Street, Chelsea, London, S.W. 3.